

**EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
DECLARE THEIR  
FOREIGN POLICIES**

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## PREFACE

This is a short brochure on the foreign policies of nine important European countries. It presents in a popular but accurate manner the main features and objectives of their role in international affairs.

For an authoritative account, the whole material in the brochure has been borrowed from the various fact-sheets, reference papers, and official publications supplied to us generously by the embassies of the respective countries. The various sources have been acknowledged in the brochure. We express our heartfelt gratitude to the respective embassies for extending their liberal cooperation and providing us with material of our interest.

**Publisher**

# CONTENTS

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PREFACE	(iii)
Foreign Policy of NEW ZEALAND	1— 25
Foreign Policy of FRANCE	27— 53
Foreign Policy of AUSTRALIA	54— 87
Foreign Policy of SWITZERLAND	88— 96
Foreign Policy of BELGIUM	97—118
Foreign Policy of DENMARK	119—124
Foreign Policy of NORWAY	125—146
Foreign Policy of SPAIN	147—174
Foreign policy of SWEDEN	175—180

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## EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DECLARE THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES

The Views Expressed  
Are Not of the Publisher  
And Hence in no Way  
Research Publications  
Is Responsible for Them.



FOREIGN POLICY  
OF  
NEW ZEALAND\*

\*As presented in New Zealand, Year Book, 1971

# General Aims of New Zealand's Foreign Policy

IT is clear that, as New Zealand has assumed the international responsibilities appropriate to an independent country, its foreign policy has changed in emphasis and scope. The foundations of New Zealand's pre-war position in international affairs—its identification with Britain and its membership of the Commonwealth—have been modified and extended to meet the demands of an international situation greatly changed from that of 1939. As a country of predominantly European settlement, New Zealand retains its traditional loyalties to the United Kingdom and a sense of identity with Europe and of involvement in its destiny. As a Pacific power, it has sought security in friendship and formal defensive arrangements with Australia and the United States of America. New Zealand's growing involvement in the problems of the South Pacific region and its close ties with the island people are giving rise to a new recognition of the importance of the role it will have to play in this area in the future. New Zealand is in a unique position to encourage the growth of a regional consciousness in the South Pacific which is essential if the problems of the area are to be seen and tackled as a whole. At the same time it has recognised the importance of regional developments in Asia and the future security of that region, and has sought to develop its associations with Asian countries. As a country concerned with the preservation of world peace and the organisation of defence against aggression it has placed prime importance upon development of the United Nations as an agency for peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the achievement of collective security. Pending the establishment of a broadly based United Nations security system, however, New Zealand has been prepared, in respect of South-East Asia, to participate in a protective grouping concerned with the defence of a single area. Moreover, while it sees aggressive Communism as the greatest threat to individual liberty at the present time, it is well aware of the powerful stirrings of other forces—the yearning for political emancipation, the antagonism to systems of racial discrimination, the demand of underprivileged countries for a greater share of the

world's prosperity, or social advancement and opportunity. New Zealand's action in the international field are designed to take account of these forces and, where possible, to assist the people of other countries in their striving for a better life. The limits of what it is able to do are those imposed by its size and capacity, its disposition is towards peaceful and friendly relations with all nations and (whatever the modifications which the needs of national security may impose) it is to that ultimate goal that its foreign policy is directed.

### NEW ZEALAND'S INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Though in nineteenth century Sir Julius Vogel and the Right Hon. R. J. Seddon had original views about the policy which Britain and New Zealand should pursue in the Pacific area—views which they announced with vigour—New Zealand did not acquire the right to conduct an independent foreign policy until the end of the First World War when the full nationhood of the "Dominions" was recognised. For some years after this, however, successive New Zealand Governments chose not to exercise this right and (pursuing a passive role in the League of Nations and refraining from establishing diplomatic relations with foreign Governments, or with other members of the Commonwealth apart from Britain) preferred to make known any views on matters of foreign affairs only to the British Government and through the confidential channels of intra-Commonwealth consultation.

Few pressures existed in the 1920s and early 1930s to impel New Zealand towards enunciating an independent foreign policy. The population was mainly British in composition and comparatively few were concerned to distinguish between New Zealand's interests and those of Britain. Nor had they much cause to do so: New Zealand had established a fruitful economic partnership with Britain, upon which country nearly all her material and cultural links were centred; and New Zealand's surest protector against dangers which it was incapable of meeting alone was the Royal Navy. It was, moreover, realised that New Zealand in her own right could make little impact on world affairs, whereas Britain was a great power capable of affecting the pattern of world events. New Zealand "foreign policy" therefore consisted chiefly in seeking to modify British policy in those few cases where New Zealand had a strong interest or a viewpoint rather different from that of Britain.

The emergence of an independent New Zealand foreign policy is usually held to date from 1935. Some Ministers in the new Govern-

ment were deeply interested in world affairs in general, and the Government's approach was influenced by theory and principle. In particular, they held strong views on the principle of collective security and upon the League of Nations as the embodiment of that principle. In its method of championing the principles of collective security, pressing for the restoration of the authority of the League of Nations and, at a time when the United Kingdom Government was pursuing the policy which came to be known as appeasement, urging positive League action over Abyssinia, Spain, and China, the Government came to depart from the pattern of the previous 16 years: for, in addition to making its views known in confidential communications to the United Kingdom Government, it also stated them with vigour in the international forum of the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations.

There was nevertheless, no fundamental departure from the traditional policy of association with Britain. Moreover, the course that would be followed in the event of war was never in doubt. As early as 16 May 1938 a leading member of the Government had said, "If the Old Country is attacked, we are too.....we will assist her to the fullest extent possible." When war broke out the Prime Minister, the Right Hon. M. J. Savage, expressed New Zealand's position in terms that were as true in 1939 as true they would have been in 1914:

"Behind the sure shield of Britain we have enjoyed and cherished freedom and self-government. Both with gratitude for the past, and with confidence in the future, we range ourselves without fear behind Britain. Where she goes, we go. Where she stands, we stand."

But the Second World War changed the pattern of power in the world and made it necessary for New Zealand gradually to revise its foreign policy and its method of implementing that policy. Even though the basic attachment of New Zealanders to Britain was little affected, the fact became manifest that Britain was no longer a power able to determine events on a world scale and that, since New Zealand interests could no longer be protected by British actions alone, it did not suffice to confine New Zealand foreign policy to occasional attempts to persuade the British Government to take note of New Zealand views. Japanese aggression and, later, the rise of Communist China forced New Zealand to face the reality of its geographical location with respect to Asia and the Pacific and to develop an additional relationship with the only other friendly

power capable of protecting New Zealand—the United States of America—with the least possible prejudice to its association with the United Kingdom.

During the war years New Zealand was admitted to the councils of the Allies and was expected to advance informed views. The Government honoured its responsibility and, having established in wartime the habit of participating in the making of international decisions accepted it as natural that New Zealand should continue to participate in the development of a post-war world order and in subsequent international consultations. To this end New Zealand established (in effect from 1943) a professional Department of External Affairs and a career foreign service, and proceeded slowly to establish diplomatic missions in countries where New Zealand's interests merited protection. In particular, New Zealand sought increasingly to make its individual contribution to fostering good relationships with its neighbours in the Pacific and Asia and to increasing the measure of security and welfare in these areas.

To be woven into any post-war policy was the now traditional New Zealand belief in the principle of collective security and international justice, especially as symbolised by the United Nations. This was by no means an easy task in a world where the divisions of the cold war were reflected in competing regional alliances. There had to be a place, too, for belief in the ability of international co-operation to control armaments and to eliminate poverty, disease, and other economic and social causes of international tension.

The threat to New Zealand's security, posed by the entry of Japan into the war at a time when the United Kingdom was fully committed in Europe, brought New Zealand into the closest relations with two of her neighbours on the borders of the Pacific—Australia and the United States. Recognition of the need for a greater measure of collaboration with Australia resulted in the signing in 1944 of the Canberra Pact which provided machinery for continuing consultation between the two Governments. Upon the entry of Japan into the war, both New Zealand and Australia had looked principally to the United States for protection. Relations among the three countries thus entered a new phase. The close association of wartime found expression in peacetime in the Anzus Treaty, in which, for the first time, New Zealand and Australia entered into a treaty of alliance and mutual defence with a foreign country and achieved the aim of both countries to enter into a close relationship with the major Pacific power. The Anzus Treaty, which came into force in April

1952, gives an assurance of United States support in the event of an armed attack from any quarter in the Pacific and so constitutes New Zealand's major safeguard from aggression in the area.

The establishment of SEATO, like the formation of the ANZUS alliance, took place against a background of continuing insecurity and of danger in the Far East. In 1950 New Zealand had participated in collective action by the United Nations in Korea. In 1954, following the Indo-China crisis and the Geneva Accords, a broader collective defence treaty covering South-East Asia and the South West Pacific, known as the Manila Treaty, was signed by New Zealand and Australia, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The parties agreed that in the event of armed attack on the parties or on a "protocol" State (Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam) they would act to meet the common danger. The parties established the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in Bangkok. In furtherance of its obligations under the Manila Treaty, New Zealand sent forces to Thailand for some months in 1962 and to South Vietnam in 1965. In 1955 New Zealand had transferred its war-time commitment from the Middle East to South-East Asia and agreed to contribute forces to a Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve. These forces participated in the Malayan Emergency and in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore against Indonesian confrontation. New Zealand with Australia, became associated with the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement concluded in 1957, which subsequently became the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement upon the formation of Malaysia in 1963. More recently New Zealand has participated in defence talks with Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia in the implication of the British decision to withdraw its forces from South-East Asia by the end of 1971.

These developments reflected a new awareness of the international and strategic implications of New Zealand's position. In 1955 the Minister of External Affairs, the Hon. T. L. Macdonald, discussing New Zealand's foreign policy, said that the only possible threat to New Zealand's security could come from Asia and in particular from the spread of Communist power in South-East Asia. "New Zealand foreign policy grows", he said, "from the need to reconcile geography and history, economic fact and strategic fact. In practical terms at present this seems that without weakening the many links which bind us to Britain and the whole Atlantic Community we must increase our concern with South-East Asia."

This concern was already being expressed in social and economic terms as well as in defence. In 1950, New Zealand, along with a group of other Commonwealth countries, had become a member of the Colombo Plan established to assist the countries of South-East Asia to improve their standards of living. To New Zealand, a pioneer in the field of social legislation and a country with a high standard of living fairly evenly shared, the Colombo Plan has a special significance. Contributions, large by New Zealand standards (if small when measured against the potential need), have been made to it. The scope of New Zealand's presence in Asia widened considerably in the years following signature of the Manila Treaty diplomatic relations were established with a growing number of countries in the area, and increased activity in other fields of co-operation besides that of defence followed the extension of this network of diplomatic posts. By the mid 1950s New Zealand had more complete representation in Asia than in Western Europe. Subsequent accession to regional membership of ECAGE, the Asian Development Bank and ASPAC (the Council for Asian and Pacific Co-operation) is further demonstration of the country's acceptance that it has a role to play in the Asian area.

New Zealand's direct interest in political, social, and economic developments in the South Pacific is reflected not only in its membership of such regional organisations as the South Pacific Commission, but also in a wide and growing range of contacts with island people and an increased sense of involvement in their problems. The evolution of self-government and nationalism in the South Pacific reached a new stage when Western Samoa became the first independent Polynesian state on 1 January 1962. Three years later the Cook Islands achieved internal self-government. New Zealand's own colonial past, its liberal tradition of friendship for emergent peoples, and the fact that large number of Polynesian people have settled there, means that the islanders tend to look to New Zealand for leadership and encouragement. In particular, Western Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji already regard New Zealand as an important export market and as a source of administrative and technical assistance. Inevitably New Zealand is going to be increasingly involved, in the South Pacific region.

These regional concerns have implied no weakening of the belief in the pre-eminent value of action organised on a world basis to deal with social and economic as well as security problems. New Zealand has continued to place special importance upon its membership of

the United Nations. It has been an active participant in the work of the General Assembly, has been a member of all Councils of the Organisation, has provided troops to the United Nations Force in Korea, and military observers in Palestine, Kashmir, and Lebanon and has endeavoured to assist all efforts to attain the political and social objectives outlined in the Charter.

If, since the Second World War, the facts of geography have had an important influence on New Zealand's attitudes towards foreign affairs, history and tradition continue nevertheless to mind its outlook. The historic links with the United Kingdom and with Western Europe and North America remain as close as ever; and the economic links with the United Kingdom, New Zealand's best customer, remain strong. No situation is, however, constant. One of the key problems of external political and economic policy now presented to New Zealand arises out of the movement towards political and economic integration in Europe and the continuing possibility of Britain's membership of the European Economic Community. New Zealand must expand the volume and value of its exports of primary products if the standard of living of its rapidly growing population is to be maintained and improved. In recent years it has become increasingly apparent, however, that the United Kingdom market is capable of only a limited expansion. The development of new markets in Asia and other less developed countries has been slowed by low income levels as well as by consumption patterns in which the type of foodstuff exported by New Zealand has not figured prominently. New Zealand's foreign policy is likely to continue the endeavour to reconcile geography and history, economic fact and strategic fact.

### **New Zealand in the Commonwealth**

Despite the emphasis in New Zealand's approach to international affairs resulting from the realities of its geographical position, membership of the Commonwealth remains a significant feature of its policy. In the past the Commonwealth, for New Zealand, has tended to be identified with Britain through special and historic ties. As these ties have loosened, with the growing orientation of Britain towards Europe, the Commonwealth has assumed a rather different perspective for New Zealand. Providing as it does for contacts with a wide range of countries, and on a great variety of subjects, it is a ready-made forum for co-operative effort. Thus although the Commonwealth ideal does not embody the identity of purpose formerly apparent among its members, it nevertheless has an important function, particularly for the smaller and more isolated



members such as New Zealand.

Although one of the oldest members, New Zealand, unlike some of its fellow members, did not seek to hasten the process of constitutional transition within the Commonwealth. At the Imperial Conference in 1930 the Prime Minister, the Right Hon. G. W. Forbes, stated that "We have felt that at all times within recent years we have had ample scope for our national aspirations and ample freedom to carry out in their entirety such measures as have seemed to us to be desirable". There was little interest in the adoption of the relevant provisions of the Statute of Westminster enacted in 1931 to give legal endorsement to the transformation that had taken place in the relationship between Britain and the Dominions. It was not, in fact, until 1947 that the necessary formalities were completed in New Zealand by the passing of the Statute of the Westminster Adoption Act.

Since that time there have been many changes in the Commonwealth association both in constitutional respects and in numbers of members. Whereas at the beginning of the Second World War there were only five members by the end of 1968 there were 28, and this number seems likely to be augmented in the future when constitutional developments in the South Pacific will allow some island territories to seek full or associate membership according to their circumstances and needs. A development such as this would reinforce co-operation in a region of particular concern to New Zealand, as Commonwealth co-operation has done in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. The Commonwealth has thus become an entity embracing several continents and its relationships have taken on a new scope and emphasis. New Zealand, itself a country where two races live side by side, sees in the Commonwealth a special opportunity for multi-racial co-operation and understanding.

The importance New Zealand attaches to the Commonwealth association has been given practical expression in its membership of a number of Commonwealth organisations. As well, New Zealand contributes to the budgets of the Commonwealth Secretariat and the Commonwealth Foundation which were both established at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's meeting in 1965. The Commonwealth Foundation, an independent fund administered by a board of trustees consisting of representatives of "member nations" has contributed greatly to the growing areas of common endeavour. It has sponsored official and non-official Commonwealth organisations that provide links between administrators, engineers, lawyers, accountants;

scientists, and private individuals in the different Commonwealth countries. Similarly, the Commonwealth Secretariat under the leadership of its Secretary-General has provided a focus for Commonwealth activities and a basis for extending co-operation between Commonwealth Governments.

### **New Zealand and the South Pacific**

The first areas of the world towards which New Zealanders developed a distinct and characteristic attitude was the South Pacific. This is New Zealand's immediate environment, its Polynesian peoples close kin to the New Zealand Maori, its islands nearest and most important in the lines of communication which link New Zealand with America and Europe.

Within a decade of New Zealand's establishment as a British colony Bishop Selwyn had made it the base for Anglican missions in the South Pacific and Sir George Grey as Governor had begun to advocate policy of expansion in the area. The increasing involvement of other powers and a desire to develop trade led Sir Julius Vogel in the 1870s to take up Grey's idea and to put forward various schemes for political and commercial expansion, which, however, found no favour in London. In the 1880s New Zealand joined the Australian colonies in an effort to preserve "Oceania for the Anglo-Saxons", and soon after the movement reached its peak in the robust opposition of Richard John Seddon to the bargaining away of Samoa in 1899.

The meagre fruit of half a century's agitation was the annexation in 1901 of the Cook Islands and their inclusion within the boundaries of New Zealand. Thereafter, New Zealand's interest in the South Pacific declined as its trade and its thoughts came to centre more and more on Great Britain. But though declining, the tradition was still strong enough to provide support for the Imperial Federation movement in the first decade of the twentieth century and, more practically, to inspire New Zealand on the outbreak of war in 1914 to occupy Germany's colony of Western Samoa.

At the end of the war Western Samoa, like other former German possessions, was retained by the occupying power under a League of Nations Mandate. New Zealand embarked on its new responsibility with greater enthusiasm than it had shown in the Cook Islands and much effort was devoted to solving the problems of the territory. The rate of change thus created however, proved too rapid for the tradition-loving Samoans. In the late 1920s a series of unfortunate incidents occurred and, for some time afterwards, the pace slackened.

The opening up in the late 1930s of air routes across the Pacific led New Zealand, along with other countries, to take an increased interest in some of the more remote islands in the area, but it was the outbreak of the Second World War which forcibly reminded the country of its situation.

Overnight half-forgotten islands became strategic points for the defence of New Zealand and its allies, and New Zealanders again became aware of the need to prevent them from falling into unfriendly hands. Accordingly, New Zealand joined with Australia in seeking ways to guarantee the future security of the area, and there emerged first the Canberra Pact of 1944 and later the 1947 Agreement to establish the South Pacific Commission.

Through the Commission the Governments administering territories in the South Pacific—Britain, the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, and (until 1962) the Netherlands—have made a concerted effort to promote the economic and social development of the area and its people. In the 22 years of its existence the Commission has, within its budgetary limits (its budget for 1969, \$ 984,000), done much valuable work, particularly in bringing the islanders together and developing a sense of community amongst them. Originally laying much stress on research, the Commission has come to concentrate mainly on providing technical assistance and on pooling experience of handling common problems of development. Its membership has grown to include Western Samoa and Nauru. At the same time the importance of the South Pacific Conference has increased. The territorial representatives who attend the Conference now have a decisive voice in determining the Commission's work programme. Close working links are maintained with United Nations specialised agencies which take an active interest in the region.

But New Zealand has not been content with promoting progress in the economic and social spheres only. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945 it took a leading part in working out the trusteeship system embodied in the United Nations Charter, and subsequently the League of Nations Mandate for Western Samoa was replaced by a trusteeship agreement.

In accordance with the wishes of the Samoan people, a programme of political and constitutional development was launched which continued throughout the 1950s and which culminated in the establishment of the independent State of Western Samoa on 1 January 1962. The transfer of sovereignty did not however weaken the close and friendly relationship which had grown up between Western

Samoa and New Zealand and this was confirmed in a Treaty of friendship between the two countries signed in August 1962. In the educational as well as in other fields New Zealand assists Western Samoa.

Whilst Western Samoa was moving towards independence, constitutional development was taking place in New Zealand's other island territories. Following expert surveys a programme of economic and social development for the Cook Islands was formulated in 1955 and legislative assemblies for the Cook Islands and for Niue were set up in 1957. In 1962 the New Zealand Government gave these bodies full responsibility for allocating the large subsidies granted by New Zealand. In the same year possible alternatives concerning constitutional development were submitted to the assemblies. Both chose full internal self-government together with a continued association with New Zealand. Events thereafter moved most rapidly in the Cook Islands. In 1963 a "shadow" Cabinet was set up and a Leader of Government Business elected. The following year the New Zealand House of Representatives passed the Cook Islands Constitution Act, with provision for the Act itself to come into force after a General Election in the Cook Islands. This election was held on 20 April 1965 and after the New Zealand Parliament had at the request of the Cook Islands Government made certain amendments to the Constitution Act, the new Constitution was brought into force on 4 August 1965 and the Cook Islands became a self-governing nation in free association with New Zealand. The Legislative Assembly, assured of New Zealand's financial assistance, is fully responsible for the internal affairs of the Cook Islands.

Progress in the constitutional field has also been made in Niue and the Tokelau Islands, New Zealand's remaining dependent territories. On 1 November 1968, at the request of the Niue Assembly, a full member system of Government was introduced giving the Executive Committee responsibility for the portfolios controlling all Government Departments. Responsibility for deciding priorities for government works and expenditure has been given by the Administrator to the Tokelau Islands Councils or Fonos which have also fully discussed their future development and have expressed the wish (as have the people of Niue) to retain their association with New Zealand. At the request of the Fonos, the New Zealand Government has instituted a pilot programme to assist Tokelau Islanders to resettle in New Zealand.

The independence of Western Samoa, self-government in the Cook Islands and the progress of the remaining New Zealand territories are indicative of broader changes in the South Pacific. Economic, social, and educational development has made the people of the area more self-conscious and desirous of managing their own affairs. New Zealand supports these changes, especially those which promote the development of regional co-operation amongst territories of the area and the Government's assistance is increasingly being directed to forms of aid of benefit to a wider group of territories; one recent example is the New Zealand Bursary Scheme under which students from certain English-speaking territories in the South Pacific will be able to undertake courses at the new University of the South Pacific in Fiji.

### **New Zealand in the United Nations**

For New Zealand, geographically isolated and with limited direct diplomatic relations, the United Nations is inevitably one of the most important forums available, not only to influence the course of international events, but also to secure the friendship and understanding of the world community. For any country, its international reputation is a valuable asset. If New Zealand is better known and commands more influence in international affairs than some other small States similarly situated, this is, in some measure at least, due to New Zealand's record of active participation in the United Nations.

New Zealand's share of the United Nations regular budget is 0.36 percent; in 1969 this meant a New Zealand contribution to the organisation of \$ 401,683.

*United Nations Security and Peace-keeping Activities*—It has been noted earlier that the first significant expression of an independent New Zealand foreign policy occurred in the League of Nations and was directing to supporting the principle of collective security. Support for this principle later and through the United Nations has remained a cornerstone of New Zealand's foreign policy.

The purposes which motivated the policy in 1935 were strongly held beliefs, rather than principles developed for any careful assessment by a national foreign service. The beliefs were nevertheless a reflection of widely held concern over world events, a concern which the succeeding years were to reinforce. It was, therefore, perhaps understandable that at San Francisco in 1945 New Zealand should argue so forcibly, if unsuccessfully, to eliminate the veto and to strengthen the collective security provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Despite its physical isolation, New Zealand has felt unable to regard with unconcern the fate of other small countries helpless to defend themselves against a powerful aggressor and thus liable to be picked off one by one.

The United Nations does not, it is true offer a complete guarantee of New Zealand's or any other small country's security against aggression. Nor has it yet achieved agreement on disarmament. But New Zealand Governments have acted upon the conviction that the United Nations, and it alone, contains the rudiments of a universal collective security system and that it is through the United Nations, and not through its abandonment in favour of some alternative, that an effective and comprehensive collective security system may eventually be developed and agreement on disarmament achieved.

Within the United Nations the expression of this policy has taken several forms. New Zealand has sought to remove the causes which might produce the need for recourse to collective security action. Its representatives have urged that the Assembly be used as a place for harmonising relations between nations : they have voiced the need for restraint in the pursuit of national objectives; they have consistently sought and supported responsible action in aid of an effective international organisation; and they have retained the need for the early adoption of a broad programme of supervised disarmament.

New Zealand was elected to the Security Council, which is charged with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, for the years 1954 and 1955, and for a second term in 1966 when membership for the council was increased from 10 to 15.

New Zealand has also advocated adequate and timely preparations in case aggression should occur and has supported the fullest possible development of the United Nations' capacity for peacekeeping. New Zealand has been prepared to play its part; forces were supplied to the United Nations Forces in Korea and military observers to the United Nations Observer Groups in Palestine, Kashmir, and Lebanon; a civilian police unit has served in Cyprus; and the government has indicated to the Secretary-General its intention in principle to designate a stand-by unit which would be available for properly instituted peace-keeping operations of the Organisation in the future.

In some respects, however, the United Nations has not lived up to

the hopes placed in it. There has never been complete agreement in the United Nations itself on peace-keeping issues, and further practical developments to increase United Nations capability for peacekeeping are not likely to occur, due to the existing power conflicts in the world, or in view of the divergent interests of many of its present members. New Zealand has therefore recognised that the objective of developing the United Nations in its present form must be buttressed by regional defensive alliances.

*Economic and Social Activities*—Apart from this substantial and primary concern with international peace and security, other aspects of the work of the United Nations have increased greatly in importance in recent years. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter recognised that peaceful and friendly relations among nations depend largely on conditions of economic and social progress. Advancement in these latter fields absorbs annually more and more of the United Nations' resources, and represents at least one area in which international understanding and co-operation are reaping tangible rewards. The United Nations organ with primary responsibility in this vast field is the Economic and Social Council (or ECOSOC), an elective body of 27 members, which co-ordinates the activities of the wide variety of bodies with interests in these fields ranging from the functional Commissions and Committees of the United Nations itself to the independent specialised agencies.

The biggest single task now facing ECOSOC is to promote and direct programmes for economic development in underdeveloped countries. New Zealand had always recognised the need for this type of development, and has been concerned to ensure that the international programmes in this field should be effective and realistic. Its interest in social and economic questions is illustrated by its membership of ECOSOC from 1947-49, and 1959-61; and it is fully expected that a further term will be served in the years ahead. New Zealand in 1968 became a full regional member of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), a body of which it had previously been a non-regional member. New Zealand has also served terms of office from time to time on the Status of Women Commission, the Technical Assistance Committee, and on the Statistical, Social, and Fiscal Commissions. It is currently serving on the Commission of Human Rights for a second consecutive term for the period 1969-71, and on the Population Commission for the period 1969-72.

In undertaking these responsibilities, New Zealand may to some extent be regarded as "taking its turn". It is, however, keenly aware of the advantages of doing so. It certainly shares with others an interest in ensuring that economic and social conditions are such as to permit ordered political progress. It is concerned to ensure that where political principles are at issue, the beliefs which New Zealanders hold as essential should be recognised and, if possible, accepted by the world community. Some times, too, there are strong reasons of self-interest; it is important that New Zealand's interest and its special problems be taken into account in the work of these bodies. Moreover, the international activities of the various agencies are nowadays on such a scale (the United Nations Development Programme, for example, spends almost \$200 million a year), the detailed knowledge of their work can provide mutually valuable opportunities for New Zealand to provide goods and expert services for their programmes.

*Specialised Agencies*—New Zealand is a member of all specialised agencies except the International Development Association, and is also a member of the International Atomic Energy (IAEA), which, though not strictly a specialised agency, exists under the aegis of the United Nations. New Zealand's contributions to the regular budgets of the agencies, which are based for the most part on a scale of assessment similar to that used in the United Nations itself, range from \$2,600 to \$180,000 annually and totalled some \$675,000 in 1969. New Zealand has also subscribed capital to the financial agencies.

Convinced of the value of the form of international co-operation that the agencies represent, New Zealand participates actively in their work. In the case of the technical agencies, there are direct benefits to New Zealand in membership. Membership of the Universal Postal Union, for example, is essential to facilitate the efficient international movement of mails to and from this country; and the International Telecommunication Union works to promote the most rational and efficient operation of world-wide tele-communications services. The World Meteorological Organisation is the medium for establishing a world wide network for the rapid exchange of meteorological information, which is of particular value to remote areas like New Zealand. In other cases, New Zealand benefits by the free interchange of knowledge and experience, and from the endeavours of the agencies to establish world-wide standards of safety, to promote facilitation of international traffic, and to examine



restrictive or discriminatory practice in these fields. Minimum standards of working and living conditions for wage-earners are the concern of the International Labour Organisation.

In addition to its contributions to the regular budgets of the agencies, New Zealand gives voluntary assistance in the form of further monetary grants, the service of experts to developing countries (for example in physiotherapy, police work, forestry and education), and donations of equipment or commodities.

Two major fields of this sort of additional assistance are the contributions made to the United Nations Development Programme and to the World Food Programme. New Zealand has given annual contribution to UNDP (in 1969 we gave \$450,000), and in addition has sent experts abroad to work in the field on UNDP assignments. The WFP is a programme approved by the United Nations in 1961 and administered jointly by the United Nations and FAO. For the six years 1963-68, New Zealand made total grants of US\$1,250,000, of which US\$450,000 was in cash, and US\$800,000 in commodities. For 1969-70, New Zealand has pledged a further US\$420,000, of which US\$160,000 will be in cash and US\$260,000 in commodities. New Zealand is a member of the Inter-Governmental Committee which supervises the Programme.

New Zealand's accession to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Finance Corporation not only allows this country to participate in measures designed to increase the stability of international trade and promote the economic development of the underdeveloped areas of the world, but also serves to strengthen New Zealand's own economic position by providing access to more varied sources of capital for capital projects or for balance of payments purposes.

New Zealand is also a foundation member of the Asian Development Bank, established in 1967 under the auspices of ECAFE "to foster economic growth and co-operation in the ECAFE region."

New Zealand has strongly supported any expansion of agency activity which will help the social and economic development of the Pacific Islands for which it is directly responsible. WHO has assisted in the past in the eradication of yaws and tuberculosis; FAO is at present the executing agency for a UNDP project designed to control the rhinoceros beetle which ravages much of the islands' coconut crops; and expert services have supplied assistance in several smaller projects. Within the General Assembly of the United

Nations and in specialised forums, New Zealand will continue to draw attention to the needs of the South Pacific.

New Zealand has in the past served on the governing bodies of WHO, FAO, and UNESCO, and most recently served on the Executive Council of the UPU from 1964 to 1969. Although because of its size and limited scale of contributions, New Zealand is not likely to be elected frequently to the boards of at least the larger agencies, it can expect, over the years, to bear its share of administrative responsibility within them. In any case, by participation in the plenary sessions of the assemblies of the agencies, New Zealand is able to play some part in trying to ensure that the agencies do not duplicate activities with one another, that there is rational budgetary growth and that the rightful spheres of activity of the agencies are not unduly disrupted by the political conflicts that occur in the main United Nations forums.

*Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)*—As a result of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development held in Geneva in 1964, the General Assembly agreed to hold a triennial conference on Trade and Development with the objective of promoting international trade, particularly between countries at different stages of development, with a view to accelerating the economic growth of developing countries. UNCTAD held its second session in New Delhi early in 1968. UNCTAD is the United Nations body generally responsible for all matters relating to trade development. It is open to all United Nations members and other states members of the specialised agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The conference has become a permanent organisation, with a Trade and Development Board which conducts the affairs of the organisation between plenary conferences. New Zealand commenced its second consecutive term on the Board in 1968. There are also within the organisation functional committees on commodities, manufacturers, financing of trade and shipping. New Zealand held a seat on the Committee on Commodities from 1967 to 1969, and is currently a member of the Committee on Shipping until 1971.

*GATT*—New Zealand has been a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade since its inception in 1947. Although not strictly a specialised agency, the GATT has assumed some of the characteristics of one, and its activities have extended into all aspects of international trade including, more recently, measures to liberalise non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade and to provide

special export opportunities for the goods of the developing countries.

### **New Zealand Collective Security**

The defence of New Zealand has been judged by successive governments to call for active support for the concept of collective security. New Zealand alone is unable to defend its considerable but very isolated territory against aggression by any militarily significant power. As a small country with limited resources, New Zealand is in no position to maintain the extensive defence effort needed if all possible contingencies are to be met. As mentioned previously, it has therefore supported efforts to promote the effective implementation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter designed to establish a universal system of collective security and, until this goal is reached, has accepted that its defence efforts should be made in concert with like-minded countries in order to create a broader framework for security than its individual national effort could provide. This in turn involves the obligation to make credible and effective contributions to collective defence arrangements from New Zealand's own armed services.

Since the Second World War, New Zealand has contributed to collective security action on several occasions both within the United Nations and other arrangements. New Zealand's contribution to United Nations security and peacekeeping operations has already been noted. From 1955, units from the three services were based in Malaya as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, where they took part in actions during the Emergency. During 1962, New Zealand took part in a deployment to Thailand by SEATO member countries. New Zealand forces supported Malaysia in its successful resistance to Indonesian Confrontation. In 1964, in accordance with the same principle of support for collective security, a New Zealand Army Engineer detachment was sent to South Vietnam. In 1965, this unit was replaced by an artillery battery, which has subsequently been joined by two infantry companies for service with 1 Australian Task Force.

**ANZUS**—A basic expression of New Zealand's support for the principles of collective security is provided by the ANZUS Pact. This tripartite security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States was signed at San Francisco on 1 September 1951 and came into force on 29 April 1952. It assured New Zealand and Australia of American support in the event of aggression in the Pacific.

The main provision of the ANZUS Pact is that each party recognises "that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it will act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitution processes". In the context of the agreement, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include "an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces; public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific".

In keeping with the close ties between the three countries, the machinery for consultation has been kept as simple and flexible as possible. Meetings of a council of Ministers are generally held once a year to review situations affecting the treaty area.

**SEATO**—The Geneva Agreements for Vietnam Laos, and Cambodia, which were concluded on 21 July 1954, brought an end to the fighting in Indo-China, but they fell short of a fully guaranteed settlement of the security problems of the area. Eight governments—Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States—signed the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, also known as the Manila Treaty, 8 September 1954. The treaty came into force on 19 February 1955. Under its terms each party recognised that aggression by means of armed attack in South-East Asia or the South-West Pacific against any of the Parties or against "a protocol state" (Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam) would endanger its own peace and safety, and agreed that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process. In the event of any other threat, the parties would consult on the measures to be taken for the common defence.

The South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) established under the Treaty is headed by a Council, made up of the Foreign Ministers of the signatory governments, which meets annually in members' capitals. Between meetings a body known as the Council Representatives provides continuity with representation generally provided by the heads of member countries' diplomatic missions in Bangkok; New Zealand is thus represented by its Ambassador to Thailand. From time to time various expert committees and study groups are convened to give collective advice to Council Representatives. The Council also agreed in February 1955 that the Military Advisers to the Ministers should meet as a group to advise it on measures for common defence. The civil and military Secretariat

has its headquarters at Bangkok.

The Manila Treaty has special significance because it is the only multilateral defence treaty applying to South-East Asia and the only treaty under which the United States has an obligation towards mainland South-East Asia. It is also the only treaty under which Thailand has any security guarantee. Thus the treaty helps maintain the fabric of collective defence without which the region would become the target of intensified Communist pressure. It provides a backing for the efforts of those countries of the area striving, as the Manila Treaty states "to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law". The military planning and exercises carried out under the Treaty are valuable in improving the capacity of the members to act together against aggression.

Neither in concept nor in structure is SEATO fitted for a major role in spheres other than defence. Nevertheless, the nature of the challenge in South-East Asia was recognised by making provision in the treaty for the parties, separately and jointly, to increase their capacity to counter subversion and to co-operate in economic measures to promote economic progress and social well-being. While most of this action is taken outside the framework of SEATO, the Organisation has a useful aid programme designed to meet particular needs of the members of the treaty area. Thus SEATO has sponsored wide-ranging research efforts in the field of tropical medicine, agriculture, and engineering. A number of special SEATO professorships, post and under-graduate scholarships, research fellowships and travelling lectureships have been established. The SEATO Graduate School of Engineering, established in Bangkok in September 1959 has now developed into an independent institution known as the Asian Institute of Technology. A programme to provide for a SEATO agricultural survey of the farming problems of the South-East Asian member governments has recently been initiated; New Zealand has contributed one expert to this programme. Seminars and study groups have been organised to consider particular problems. Cultural exchanges have been promoted. The New Zealand Government has established a fund of \$20,000 from which to contribute to SEATO aid programmes.

*Commonwealth Arrangements*—The Commonwealth defence arrangement known as ANZAM has provided a further basis for co-operation in defence matters, between Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Unlike SEATO or ANZUS, it is not an organisation established by a formal treaty but has gradually evolved from the

practice of close defence co-ordination among the three countries. One of the main functions of the ANZAM machinery has been the preparation of a joint plans for the defence of the area as a whole, and the co-ordination of existing plans drawn up by the respective national authorities. The three Governments, however, retain full control over their individual defence policies. ANZAM meetings are usually held in Canberra.

In 1955, New Zealand transferred its wartime commitment from the Middle East to South-East Asia and agreed to contribute with Britain and Australia to a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve to be established in Malaya and Singapore.

Upon its accession to independence in 1957, the Federation of Malaya concluded the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement, which was subsequently extended to Malaysia on its formation in September 1963 and re-named the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. Under its provisions, the United Kingdom undertook to assist in the defence of Malaysia and was accorded the right to maintain such forces, including a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, as are agreed to be necessary for the defence of Malaysia and for the fulfilment of Commonwealth and international obligations. The Agreement has been accepted as applying generally to Singapore upon its accession to independence in August 1965. New Zealand, together with Australia, is associated with the Anglo-Malaysian Defence agreement by an exchange of letters placing on record the fact that the provisions of the Agreement applicable to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, in particular the provisions dealing with the status of forces, apply in respect of New Zealand forces in the Reserve. In a statement made when tabling the relevant documents in Parliament on 20 September 1963, the Prime Minister noted that "New Zealand has always given cause to believe that she would not stand idly aside in the event of an armed attack on Malaysia" and stated that "in the event of any armed threat against Malaysia the New Zealand Government would promptly consult with the Malaysian and other Governments concerned in the measures to be taken".

New Zealand's military contribution in the area of Malaysia and Singapore has varied according to the circumstances of the time. In general, however, New Zealand has in recent years maintained in the area one infantry battalion, one RNZN frigate and one squadron of RNZAF transport. These forces took part in the Malayan Emergency and in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore against Indonesian confrontation.

The British Government announced in January 1968 that its forces in South-East Asia would be withdrawn by the end of 1971. Ministers of the five Commonwealth countries concerned—Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore—met in Kuala Lumpur in June 1968 and in Canberra in June 1969 to discuss defence problems arising from this decision.

At these meetings, the five powers reaffirmed their continuing interest in the peace and stability of the area and declared their intention to maintain close co-operation among themselves. Malaysia and Singapore declared that the defence of the two countries was indivisible; they said that they were resolved to do their utmost for their own defence and they have made substantial progress in improving the defence capability, and that they would welcome the co-operation and assistance of the other three governments. Britain has outlined the form its continuing interest will take after 1971, including its significant capability to assist in the event of a threat to peace and its plans to continue exercises and training in the area. New Zealand and Australia announced in February 1969 their decision to maintain their forces in the area at about existing levels after the British withdrawal. Discussions on the practical arrangements needed to implement these decisions by the five Commonwealth countries are continuing. In addition to normal intergovernmental consultations, the work of advising working groups in which officers of the five countries participate has been important. On the basis of the report of these groups, specific decisions have been taken on some of the practical defence problems resulting from the British rundown, notably the establishment of an integrated air defence system, naval co-operation, joint exercises, and the establishment of a Commonwealth Jungle Warfare Centre.

The concept of collective security continues to underlie the New Zealand approach to the new situation that will be created by British withdrawal. New Zealand forces are designed as a contribution to the security of South-East Asia as a whole and will have a particular function of assistance to Malaysia and Singapore. They will be maintained only so long as their presence has the consent and encouragement of the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore and is seen by them as a contribution to security. They will not be involved in internal security problems and their deployment on active operations will require the express consent of the New Zealand Government.

### New Zealand Aid

New Zealand's aid to developing countries takes many forms—capital aid (cash grants and equipment), technical assistance (the provision of experts and student training), food aid and loans. It is channeled through a number of diverse programmes; multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental.

New Zealand has for many years played an active role in multilateral programmes initiated by the United Nations and its specialised agencies, e.g., the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme, and the programme of aid to refugees.

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The largest individual bilateral programme is the Colombo Plan, the main vehicle for New Zealand civil aid to South and South-East Asia. Other bilateral programmes undertaken by New Zealand include those involving the Cook Islands, Niue Island, the Tokelau Islands and Western Samoa.



FOREIGN POLICY  
OF  
FRANCE

## GENERAL DE GAULLE'S INTERNATIONAL LEGACY\*

General de Gaulle's foreign policy has been an important factor in international life over the past eleven years. It is true that the memory of the steadfast leader whom the Second World War revealed not only to his own country, but also to men the world over, did much to reinforce his exceptional influence. But the past alone would not have sufficed for him to establish this influence. It was necessary, as well, that foreign peoples experience the strong impression of a will, quickly and skillfully acting with the times, inspired on one hand by a universal vision in which politics and ethics meet, and on the other, perpetually and actively aware of the responsibilities France owes it to herself to assume.

Our times no longer allow democracies to possess an empire, that is to say, power over peoples, most of whom do not consider themselves as one with a motherland different from themselves. The authority resulting from universal suffrage requires a profound agreement, an expression of national sentiment.

In a few years, the African and Malagasy States thus gained independence, most of them in friendship and joy. From this decolonization, effected painlessly, with only one exception, there was born the new reality of confident relations between the former mother country and the young States: should that reality evolve further, it will still retain an exemplary value. The case was different for Algeria—a unique problem, one that was more than painful, and which could not be solved without deep suffering, for the hatred that had been stirred up over too many years had made the battle inexorable. Ah, if only France's leaders, in 1951, had not chosen to brush General de Gaulle aside..... Yet, appeasement began more quickly than one would have thought after such a cruel ordeal. The future remains open. It also remains open with Tunisia and Morocco. It is even so, now, with the states of former Indochina.

The division of Europe, after World II, was the result of the fundamental opposition which immediately separated the Nations of

\*Michel Debre, French Foreign Minister.

the East and those of the West, but it was due even more to the threat of invasion or subversion which Stalinist policy brought to bear. Once the threat had lessened, it was indispensable, for the benefit of all nations—and above all, for all of Europe—to surmount the consequences of the state of affairs resulting from the war as well as differences of regime, in order to promote a peaceful orientation and, in all fields, new relations, favourable to all and to the entire world.

General de Gaulle, then, gave priority to an effort of understanding aimed at making a progressive entente possible between all the Peoples of the old world, beginning with Soviet Russia. France took a decisive part in that evolution. She opened a path upon which others later embarked. Of course, tragedies, like that of Prague, have shown the divergences and uncertainties that remain. But, if the road is still difficult, a great impetus was given which has made Europe move.

Decolonization and detente are not a simple adaptation to circumstances. These two orientations take on a special value from the universal vision that inspires them, moral as well as political.

It is by the solemn and repeated affirmation of the right of Peoples to determine their own destinies that General de Gaulle gave France an exceptional visage, one of the finest in her history.

France thus marked the limits of the tendency, a natural one of the great powers, to constitute blocs where they assure the law. She also took stand, not only against imperialism of military nature and which inevitably provokes resistance, but also against the more insidious hegemonies brought about by excessive economic and monetary supremacy. She emphasized the tie between independence and advancement at a time when autonomy of the State is necessary to the national effort—the key to social progress.

France's voice was all the more heeded that, in the same movement, it affirmed the irreplaceable political value of the cooperation of industrial countries in helping countries whose development has been slower and remains more difficult.

We have, for ourselves, given the example by making cooperation, both with the new independent State of Africa and Madagascar as with Algeria and the independent States of north Africa, one of the prominent features of our foreign policy. In many respects, what has been undertaken—economic and social investments, budgetary and monetary support, fulfilling of military service through technical aid and cooperation, technical aid volunteers—constitute an

overall effort that is without precedent and without equal.

We have done more. France, with the aid of her Community partners, has oriented Europe toward Africa: the Yaounde convention, whose success owes so much to our insistence, is a model of its kind. Almost alone, France advocated setting up indispensable mechanisms such as the stabilizing of prices of certain major products would require, in order to ensure the developing countries' income, or the setting up of financial measures such as the earmarking of a percentage of armament outlays.

Our action has borne even more fruit because, preaching by example and applying to herself the two principles whose universal value she proclaimed, the France of General de Gaulle, for the first time in nearly a quarter of a century, found peace without thereby losing faith in her own future or interest in world affairs.

Nothing would have been possible nor would it have worked to our advantage if France, in view of what she is in Europe and in the world, had not become aware of what she owes herself.

She owes herself the arms necessary for her security, that is, the free disposition of her armed forces and the mastery of her diplomacy. Thanks to the worth of her researchers and technicians, France was able to become a nuclear power and General de Gaulle was able to endow her with a modern force adapted to our means and our requirements. That first decision made possible a second one—a release from an integration which in our view was a distortion of the Atlantic Alliance. Thus France restored her own right to have a strategy and increased her value as an ally.

France owes it to herself and to Europe to establish special relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. This is not just a matter of words and feelings. The demographic and industrial strength of the Federal Republic of Germany outweighs ours. Its political objectives may not be ours. France, therefore, needs a great national potential in order to participate in this entente so as to keep the role she must have in its orientation and thus allow this entente to take root in the heart of the new generations. Following a solemn treaty, a sustained effort of exchanges and consultations was undertaken. Success was considerable on either side of the Rhine, while, at the time General de Gaulle emphasized the necessity of respecting frontiers, especially those of the Oder-Neisse, and the necessity of a general European agreement for reunification. Thus the foundation was laid for a new action benefiting the whole world.

It is on this double base of our potential for action and of a durable agreement with Germany that the European enterprise was continued. Had it been up to General de Gaulle alone, even greater progress would have been made.

France has proved her interest in the realization of an economic union, that is to say, the success of the Common Market. To go even further, that is to say, to form a policy for Europe, presupposes an end to confused thinking. One cannot want at the same time a supranational reinforcement and enlargement of the Community, European independence, and a strict military Atlantic intergration. Already the picture of the Europe of the future which General de Gaulle drew in the beginning of the year for a British visitor, becomes clearly visible. The large perspective which was outlined then will be understood one day.

Other responsibilities are incumbent upon France : the security of the Mediterranean, the safeguarding of her interests or of her natural role, indeed her traditional role in the Middle East, in Africa, in the Indian ocean, in the Pacific, the defence or the advancement of friendly peoples, those whose language, spirit and hope are the same as ours. In a few years France has gained a presence, an influence, and often an authority which had not been known for a very long time. What country in the world was not mindful of what General de Gaulle thought, of what one could ask of France, of what France could provide, thanks to him ?

Probably, in order to cast a shadow on so much light, one calls to mind the lively opposition to certain decisions or interventions. One in particular caused a big storm, the embargo, which applies to Israel as well as to the Arab States in the field of battle, one purposely forgets to point out that this decision was accompanied by a very important diplomatic initiative : the concertation among the Four, which was accepted by the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and which, henceforth, seems like the only chance for peace in the justice, that is to say, in security for all.

To espouse the times, to elevate France's vision of relations between countries to universal scale, to raise our country to the level of its responsibilities : this overall policy has enabled France to assume a special stature with respect to the very big powers whose strength is, at this time, the mainstay of the destiny of mankind.

At present the United States is the last recourse for the West and the principal source for world progress, scientific as well as technical. This is what justifies the maintenance of an active and renovated

Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand the frank collaboration of a prosperous Soviet Russia is essential to Europe : this is what justifies the priority of détente.

These two facts do not lead to an alignment with one or the other of these giants. Since our situation and the times in which we live make it possible, since it has been proved that an effort in keeping with our size easily gives us the means, thereof good relations with the United States and with Russia are an equal obligation for us. In order to succeed, it is in the interest of France to maintain freedom of action which is a means of influence and an example.

It is thus that France was able, in the course of the eternal discussions on disarmament, not to yield to appearances, and to affirm that all sincere disarmament should go through a first stage which consists of international control of the manufacture and stock piles of the greatest nuclear powers in the world : the United States and Russia.

Also it is thus that France was able to recognize the People's Republic of China and that this gesture has inspired similar decisions.

Very few nations indeed can give evidence of such freedom and can take, when the opportunity arises, independent action. Since France can, it is in her interest to do so. Eleven years of foreign policy are for ever marked by this distinct course.

Circumstances impose evolutions : this is the supreme rule which is imprinted in the heart of all political reality and there are innovations which are not denials. But those who condemn the chosen orientations, show that they have not understood them. However, tomorrow, it will be easier to draw inspiration from them, for the French people, one can be sure, will become more aware as time goes by the priceless international capital which General de Gaulle bequeathed them.

ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS BY  
MR. MAURICE SCHUMANN FRENCH MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS\*

France, a country that does not wish to have and does not believe it has any enemies, salutes you today.

Twenty-five years ago the United Nations was created by the common hope of nations and men to transform the victory won by force of arms—after indescribable suffering—into a universal order, naturally a universal order based on justice and law.

This hope which we are all pledged to protect is expressed in a charter, our Charter, and in an organization, our Organization.

Today, our organization lives and those who challenge it most question its imperfections or inadequacies rather than the need for its existence. I did so myself here one month ago when setting out before you—and there is no need to do so again—the principles on which France's foreign policy is based.

However, it is quite true that an organization cannot by its own weight alone create an order. A charter is of value only insofar as each one conducts himself in accordance with the commitments he voluntarily and freely undertook, without guile, without mental reservations, without misinterpreting the words and principles. We are an assembly of nations and that is already a reality; we are not yet that international society capable of ensuring to one and all, peace, independence and economic and social progress. In order to attain these goals which are 'set forth in the Charter and in accordance with what it prescribes, we have two kinds of duties to fulfil: toward ourselves and toward the United Nations as a whole.

France believes that she has fully lived up to this responsibility toward herself with respect to the goals stated in the Charter.

As I said before we do not wish to have nor do we believe we have any enemies. We have ended all our conflicts, near or far, sometimes at the cost of the hardest of victories, that which—as the President of the French Republic on whose behalf I speak said—one must win over oneself. Just as, at the beginning of the century, we

\* The Speech highlights the aims of French Foreign Policy.

ended the wars that had set France and Britain against one another for over 100 years by an Entente Cordiale, a definitive and irreversible Entente Cordiale, the need for and vitality of which was demonstrated to Europe and the world during the most critical hours of this 20th century, so France and the Germany of today, overcoming their age-old hostility have sealed a fruitful and special friendship. Beyond these relations with other nations, we have sought patiently and steadily to build Europe, a Europe of which the European Economic Community is the first foundation; it is indispensable and beneficial to all and it remains open to all who wish to join it by accepting its rules and regulations. The organization of this political, economic, cultural and human, united, peaceful and prosperous whole is not only necessary because of our concern to preserve the balance in the world but because of our concern to heighten the values of civilization which are foreign to no-one.

Lastly, the service of peace led General de Gaulle to undertake this policy of detente whose first fruits are beginning to appear today in the West and in the East. It was forth mentioning this here following the visit of the President of the French Republic to the USSR and also following the signing of a treaty on the non-recourse to force between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union.

Detente, this means, of course, refusing to set one part of Europe against the other, one part of the world against the other; it means instituting a more real and more genuine security than the balance of terror and the guarantees—even if they are temporarily necessary—of the systems of military alliances. It also means creating on a lasting basis the conditions for peace and, while respecting the social, political and economic structures that each nation must choose for itself, making possible the affirmation of national identities and the free circulation of ideas, goods and men—in short, it means creating through cooperation the possibility of a permanent and frank dialogue.

It is in this spirit that—provided it be properly prepared—we are favourably disposed toward a Pan-European conference on security and exchanges in which the United States and Canada would participate.

How right my friend, Mr. Moro, was and how I agree with the speech that we applauded a moment ago. Yes, he was right to say that the solidarity of Western Europe, notably the strengthening of the Common Market on the one hand and the policy of detente and



and acceleration of scientific and technical progress with all the possibilities that it offers for the solution of the problems of hunger, sickness, poverty and ignorance, but also with all the dangers it presents and with all the new problems it creates.

Yes, the collective awareness of the need for solidarity has penetrated the specialized agencies, but it remains that the gap between the industrialized nations and the rest of the world is widening. Each year the rich grow richer and the poor poorer. But rich in what, wonder young people, who do not understand injustice—moreover, that is the best definition one could give of youth—and question the meaning of our civilization. Therefore, what must be done is to establish international cooperation proportionate to the needs. The time has come, and it is the purpose of the United Nations in launching the Second Development Decade, to mobilize technology, to mobilize will, so that all states take part, according to their means, of course, but to the uppermost limit of their possibilities, in the immense effort of solidarity.

There were 51 of us in San Francisco and now there are 127. What does this progression mean if not first that the aftermath of World War II has in part disappeared, that the signatories have understood the meaning of the goal which they set for themselves and that they have complied with the principle of self-determination of peoples. But this appeal has not been heard everywhere and has not been heard by everybody. And the Lusaka Manifesto, presented to our Assembly last year by President Ahidjo, is there to remind us, if necessary, that all peoples throughout the world have not yet the right to freely determine their destiny. Nor can we state that the Declaration of Human Rights has been universally implemented. But law does not only apply to relations between states. The progress of any society is measured in many ways by the growing respect for individual rights and freedoms. We are all concerned, in the very terms of our Charter, by any attack—I quote—"on the fundamental human rights, on the dignity and worth of the human person, on the equal rights of men and women and of nations, large and small". We feel that solidarity is just as imperative in order that justice prevail as it is to promote economic and social well-being.

And this is why I come to what remains the primary task of our organization, to what remains its "*raison-d'être*": peace.

Strange paradox ! While the new order which we are seeking cannot only be national or even continental, while it cannot be only western or eastern, while it must be universal, while we must achieve

this cooperation through which manpower, raw materials, markets and spiritual resources could be better distributed, the division of the world remains and has even worsened.

Contrary to our name, we are not *united*.

It is not the solemn character of this celebration which should keep us from mentioning these divisions that we feel like wounds in ourselves and which are called war : War in Vietnam, war in Indochina, war in the Middle East.

With the coming of this 25th anniversary, we have all looked inward and made—I have already used this expression here—a sort of examination of our consciences. As far as we are concerned, we have concluded that our weakness—one of our weaknesses—is the void caused by the absence from our midst of a quarter of mankind, and that none of the problems of peace—the halting of current conflicts, international security, disarmament—could be seriously approached and resolved unless this void were quickly filled. How can we organize a peaceful and prosperous international community without the participation of all nations and all peoples ?

Also, how can one not realize that, independently of all the reforms of procedure and practice often necessary, there is in our Charter one major requirement which dominates the effectiveness of any action for peace ? Let us remember Article 25. "The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present charter." How can one quote Article 25 of the Charter as I have just recalled it, without thinking of the Middle East ? I want to say how much I approve of what Mr. Moro said on this matter a moment ago. It is not possible, it is not conceivable for the United Nations to abdicate its responsibilities in one of the fields where it can act effectively. It is not conceivable especially, that the permanent members of the Security Council—whose duty is to justify their own responsibility remain insensitive to the appeal of our Secretary General, of our Secretary General who was very right to stress, quite recently even, the loyalty which is required of each of us in regard to the international community. Of course, strengthened by the lessons of the last 25 years, we welcome any rapprochement of the two superpowers, one of which, as I said right here the United States, is our oldest ally and the other, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which played such a difficult and such a decisive role in the victory of the United Nations in 1945, is bound to us by ties of cooperation and friendship. The burden of the world is too great for one or two nations

to bear. Peace is our common property and all the members of the United Nations, permanent and non-permanent members of the Council, the United Nations itself, should assume their own responsibilities. The challenge has been made ; the opportunity has been given us.

Mr. President, may I, in conclusion, recall the first words of our Charter ? The first words of our Charter are simple. "We the peoples of the United Nations..." Peoples of the United Nations. Yes, even beyond the United Nations, we must, if we want our organization to survive, rely on the support of the peoples we represent.

In San Francisco, we experienced a faith, an enthusiasm, an impetus whence arose this organization with the hope it continues to embody. "The traveler," said a great French writer, Saint-Exupery who died in the struggle against tyranny, one should remember here, "The traveler who scales his mountain in the direction of a star, may, if he allows himself to be too absorbed by the problems of ascent, forget which star is guiding him."

Let no obstacle, no indifference, no registration ever divert us from the mission which brought us together. Let no obstacle, no indifference, no resignation make us forget our star.

## FRENCH COOPERATION WITH THE THIRD WORLD\*

The most recent public opinion poll in France on the subject of cooperation showed that 78.5 per cent of Frenchmen replied affirmatively to the question of whether "France ought to continue providing aid to underdeveloped nations."

Accordingly, it would seem that on the threshold of the second decade of development nearly eight Frenchmen out of ten endorse the government's policy of cooperation. But what does this cooperation, defined by General de Gaulle as "France's great aim," and the "great task of the 20th century," actually involve?

The problem of assistance and the idea that industrialized nations could and should help other countries which had been less blessed by nature or history did not truly arise on the world scene until after the Second World War. New attitudes about democracy and the rights of peoples and nations suddenly appeared, to herald a movement for the independence of all and the establishment of relations based on autonomy and equality. It followed that efforts were also needed to attempt to equalize the living conditions of different peoples.

Out of this feeling sprang the idea of assistance to the Third World, with an important lead being offered from the start by the United Nations and certain industrialized nations. To be sure, the motives behind such assistance have often been very different. There is some reason to believe that only countries, with limited economic scope and, for that matter, no colonial past behind them, can claim to act on purely humanitarian grounds. For all the others—and France will not deny being among them—political, economic and cultural considerations inevitably accompany strictly humanitarian motives.

As early as 1944, when he presided over the war-time Brazzaville conference at which the first principles of the policy France was to follow towards her territories were laid down, General de Gaulle declared:

"...in French Africa, as in all other territories where men live under our flag, there can be no progress worthy of the name until

\*Yvon Bourges - secretary of State for French Foreign Affairs.

people in their homeland benefit morally and materially and gradually reach a level from which they will be able to participate in the management of their own affairs. It is France's duty that this comes about."

Thus the way was open for cooperation to take over when the time came as an extension of what had been accomplished, and as the natural complement of independence.

### **France and International Solidarity :**

During the initial stages of the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva in 1961 the industrial nations were urged to set aside one per cent of their revenue for assistance to the developing countries.

With a contribution amounting to 1.24 per cent of her gross national product in 1970, France was second only to the Netherlands (1.47 per cent) in backing the cause of international solidarity. Indeed, for the first time in 1970 the total sum of French aid to developing nations topped the 10 billion franc mark, this amount representing an increase of 13.5 per cent over the figures for 1969.

France can therefore legitimately claim to stand in the front rank of nations which have backed their words with deeds in the struggle against under-development.

But whatever the size of her contribution, France does not feel that it is enough to merely give. Accordingly, she has shown great concern over what her Third World friends have come to call the "deterioration of trade terms," namely the fact that in the prevailing system of trade in the world the trade balance of the developing countries is constantly in the red and indeed becoming more so every year. French representatives in Rio de Janeiro, New Delhi and elsewhere in the past 10 years have constantly pointed up the need to remedy this situation by stabilizing the raw materials market and by granting generalized preferences to help these nations market their produce and boost their industrialization.

While France feels that bilateral assistance offers numerous advantages in many cases she has never insisted on being the lone country to aid this or that under-developed nation. In fact, the thought of rejecting other forms of aid or opposing multilateral assistance would not occur to her. Ample proof can be seen in the fact that France's contribution to international aid schemes has constantly increased over the years, rising from roughly six per cent of the total amount of French aid in 1967 and 1968 to nearly 11 per cent in 1970.

Moreover, France shares with West Germany the brunt of contributions to the European Development Fund, having poured 745 million dollars into the Fund since its launching—or more than 33 per cent of the total. Lastly—and this further illustrates the French attitude towards multilateral assistance—it has become increasingly apparent to the French government that the needs of developing countries are such today that some projects just cannot be handled by one country alone. Instead, it appears to the government that future operations will be conceived, studied and carried out jointly by a number of partners, including the developing nation in question, and that the various forms of assistance thrown into the venture, whether bilateral or multilateral, will function individually.

### FRENCH BILATERAL AID

However, it must be said that the great bulk of French assistance—more than 80 per cent, in fact—is dealt out at present on a bilateral basis.

French policy is highlighted by educational and training schemes. This option is illustrated on the one hand by the amount of technical assistance being provided and on the other by the priority paid to teaching and to educational and training scholarships. Nearly 32,000 Frenchmen are serving abroad, some 22,000 of them as teachers. To this figure can be added experts who are sent out from France on short-term missions. Meanwhile, 25,000 foreign students and trainees have been offered either scholarships or special facilities to attend school in France or work in government offices or big firms to perfect their methods and acquire new skills.

The basic aim of such assistance is to pave the way for a skilled leadership in the developing countries, training men to take the destiny of their nation in hand and thus ensure its development, progress and sovereignty. As far as possible France attempts to adapt its aid to the particular conditions, mentality and need of each country and to apply individual solutions to problems. The underlying conviction is that one should never dictate, but rather respond to a need or render a service.

Undoubtedly, the aspect of assistance considered to be the most essential is the financial contribution of industrialized countries to the economic development of the poorer nations. In France's case, this aid has never amounted to more than a third of the whole.

French financial assistance comes in three forms, the first being private investment by French firms. Such investment is considerable

amounting to nearly half of France's financial contribution to the economic growth of the developing nations. Next comes assistance provided by the Public Treasury, in the form of credits to firms or government loans. Lastly, the French government backs public or private investment with subsidies or loans.

France pays top priority to its cooperation with the French-speaking countries of black Africa or the Indian ocean. Indeed, more than half of the amount set aside for cooperation in the French budget is earmarked for these countries.

The first distinctive feature of France's cooperation with Africa is the fact that it is based on permanent cooperation at all levels, being governed, to all purposes, by contracts. French assistance is also permanent for if political considerations are not entirely absent from the picture they have never been allowed to dominate thinking on cooperation. So French aid has never been cancelled or suspended because this or that state has taken a new ideological turn, or because of temporary tension between Paris and an African capital. In all matters pertaining to personnel, investment, development schemes or training programmes for Africans the initiative has always been left completely to the African countries.

Much of the responsibility for organizing assistance falls to the French foreign office's Aid and Cooperation Fund. This body earmarks credits for such wide-ranging projects as the development of agriculture and stock-raising (33 per cent), the equipping and setting up of communications systems (30 per cent), industrializations and the improvement of educational sanitary and social facilities.

Another key organization in cooperation is the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation. By granting long-term loans at low interest rates to governments local organizations and private firms, it can be said to play an essential part in pushing through certain development programmes.

Lastly, French African cooperation takes place within the framework of a single cohesive monetary zone, namely the franc zone. The advantages of belonging to the zone (monetary unity, free transfer of capital, joint pooling of currency and distinctive mechanisms) are such that they have provided a solid basing to French-African cooperation and enabled it to develop without being directly hit by the recent world monetary crisis.

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of French aid is that it is both sizeable and useful.

It is sizeable since the total amount poured into the venture in

1970 topped the 10 billion franc mark. The government put up nearly 55 per cent of the total with a contribution of five billion 440 million francs, while private investment by French companies—traditionally counted as foreign assistance by the OECD—amounted to four billion 608 million francs or slightly more than 45 per cent.

These figures would mean little if such aid were not useful, however. It has become customary in some quarters to claim that cooperation is mainly useful and beneficial to France herself. *Without agreeing with this view entirely I will not deny that France works some advantage out of her assistance.* On the cultural level, for instance France cannot be indifferent to the fact that 100 million people beyond the borders of Europe—in French speaking Africa to be precise—use French as an official or everyday language. Economically speaking, France undeniably reaps some advantage out of its cooperation, to the extent that this policy enables her to export men, technical methods and goods. So cooperation is a paying proposition for France. But it is even more so for the countries that benefit from our aid, which is hardly surprising since this is the basic aim.

The latest economic statistics confirm that French assistance has played a direct and essential part in the growing prosperity of Africa. The gross national product of the Ivory Coast rose from 142 to 320 billion CFA francs in eight years, while the g.n.p. of Mauritania, the Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville rose respectively from 14·5 to 47 billion, from 22 to 47 billion and from 24 to 55 billion CFA francs in the same period.

Other countries may have achieved less spectacular growth rates but it can be felt that even in these cases French aid has helped to maintain stability by smoothing over a certain number of prickly financial problems.

This ties in with the ultimate goal of cooperation such as France sees it, which is to contribute to the safeguarding of peace and stability in the world. For the rich nations to help the least favoured countries can be seen either as a duty or as an act of generosity. But, as President Pompidou recently pointed out, it is also an act of wisdom and an insurance policy for the years to come.



## BREAKING NEW GROUND IN FRENCH-SOVIET RELATIONS\*

### French-Soviet Relations

Since taking over the leadership of the Soviet communist party, Leonid Brezhnev has visited the majority of eastern bloc nations. He has also toured Yugoslavia. But never has he set foot in a western country, such visits being left to premier Alexei Kossygin and other chiefs of the Soviet government apparatus. Now, however, he has inaugurated a new phase of his career by visiting France. Did his choice fall haphazardly on Paris? Whatever the case, his visit bears witness to the excellent climate existing between the Soviet Union and France for the past ten years. Other spectacular signs of good relations have marked the decade, for instance Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Paris in 1960, the voyages of General de Gaulle (1966) and Georges Pompidou (1970) to the Soviet Union, and Mr. Kossygin's trip to Paris in 1966.

A few formulas sum up the positions adopted by the two countries. Official communiques insist that the two governments hold similar or very close views on important international issues. Whether involving the Middle East or Indochina, the attitudes seem fairly identical. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has appeared to endorse General de Gaulle's three-stage programme for French-Soviet relations, namely detente, agreement and cooperation.

### Detente came from the east, 1955

Some considerable headway has been made on this programme. The cold war between Paris and Moscow has been relegated to the distant past. Curiously, relations between the two countries were exceedingly strained when Paris and Moscow were bound by a treaty—a treaty denounced by Moscow in 1955 when France agreed to the rearming of West Germany. The angry Russian move seemed tantamount to a break in relations but nothing of the sort occurred. If anything, the tearing up of the treaty coincided with an improvement in French-Soviet relations. This surprising thaw can be traced to changes inside the Kremlin. At the time, the collective leader-

\*Bernard Feron.

ship, already under the guiding hand of Mr. Khrushchev, was busy discarding much of the Stalinist tradition. The leaders were anxious to "humanize" the regime, declaring for all to hear that the Soviet Union was determined to achieve peaceful coexistence between nations regardless of their political and social systems. It was in this climate that Guy Mollet, the French premier at the time, paid a call on Moscow.

### France puts out feelers, 1960

The rapprochement gathered steam a few years after General de Gaulle's return to power. The former President was keen to mark France's independence in world affairs. To do so he was led to find a counter-balance to France's traditional bonds with the west, without breaking the latter. The natural choice was the Soviet Union, the greatest power in eastern Europe and a country with which France had never been in open conflict. Since they had been quick to guess the General's intentions, the Soviet leaders discreetly welcomed the creation of the Fifth Republic, even if their newspapers ritually backed the cause of the French communist party against gaullist domestic policy. It was obviously the Kremlin's belief that General de Gaulle stood the best chance of being able to oppose American influence. But two factors stood in the way of rapprochement.

First, France remained closely tied to West Germany, and this was hardly designed to please the Kremlin. Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Paris in 1960 offers a good example of Soviet misgivings. One theme cropped up constantly in the Soviet Chief's speeches, namely that the Soviet Union and France had fought side by side to defeat the common enemy but vigilance was necessary since the German "revenge-seekers" were preparing a counter attack. Mr. K. was convinced that he had swung General de Gaulle to his view but, in fact, he was indulging in wishful thinking. Shortly after his return to Moscow he showed his displeasure by authorizing his press to unleash an attack against the French premier, Michel Debre, who had just visited Bonn.

Meanwhile, France was conducting a war in Algeria in the early 1960's. For ideological reasons the Soviet Union backed the rebellion but it nonetheless took care not to unduly ruffle France's feelings. The Kremlin juggled with these contradictions as best it could, obviously feeling that General de Gaulle was decided on, or resigned to, eventually granting independence to Algeria. This was the outcome Moscow wanted, and it was indeed a bit too hasty in-

anticipating the event. In the spring of 1962, the war was all but over. Without waiting for the official end of French sovereignty, the Kremlin recognized the provisional government of the Algerian republic. This caused some hard feelings, as de Gaulle was not the man to take the question of sovereignty lightly. For having buried France in Algeria without waiting for the death certificate to be signed by the proper authority, the Soviet Union was obliged to recall its ambassador for "consultations".

### **Bilateral Cooperation, 1970**

These difficulties have long been smoothed over. The Algerian war ended, and French-German relations no longer bear the special stamp they possessed during the Adenauer period. Moreover, the Russians can hardly reproach France for living on good terms with West Germany when the Kremlin itself is so obviously well disposed towards chancellor Brandt. Naturally, it was feared in some quarters that Paris and Bonn might try to outdo one another to win the favours of the Soviet Union. Elsewhere, the Russians are accustomed to keeping many irons in the fire. Could they be cultivating the Bonn government in order to keep Paris dancing to their tune? If the truth be said, however, France bears no grudge with Brandt for having signed the Moscow Treaty, nor for having gone to the Crimea. His *ostpolitik* is altogether compatible with the principles laid down by General de Gaulle.

French-Soviet cooperation is operated by two committees—the "grand" and the "small" committees—which meet regularly to examine the trade situation and draw up technical agreements. For cooperation to work as well as everybody would like it is not enough for the governments to merely express their desire to develop relations. Broadly speaking, the Soviet leaders can act directly in trade matters. If political considerations call for it they can bid their industries and foreign trade services to place orders with one country rather than with another country. Still, they cannot always place politics above economy. The country with which they choose to deal must be able to deliver the goods they need, and at a price that compares with that of competitors. And in this respect it must be admitted that French businessmen generally lack the aggressivity and drive of, for instance, their German counterparts. It was to remedy this situation that Mr. Pompidou asked French businessmen to accompany him on the Moscow leg of his visit to the Soviet Union.

Another problem is that trade cannot be carried out on a one-way

basis. There are no laws to oblige French importers to buy Soviet goods in sufficient quantity to level the trade balance between the two nations. Businessmen are not philanthropists—they buy merchandise only when they are sure of being able to sell it at a profit. And for the time being Soviet goods stand no chance of winning a spot on the French consumer market. Ministers and experts are striving to solve the immediate problem by bringing the Soviet Union into big works schemes being carried out in France, such as the new port of Fos near Marseilles.

### **Peace treaty waiting to be ratified**

This brings us to political matters. At first glance it would seem that Paris and Moscow hold pretty similar views. France was the first of the Western nations to propose that the borders laid down at the end of the Second World War be recognized, and Paris has joined Moscow in urging that a conference on European security be convened. A closer look, however, reveals some differences. In the past Paris maintained that a security conference could not be held until a detente had been reached in Europe. In concrete terms this meant an agreement over Berlin. The French government's attitude can be summed up as follows: the conference would bring together all the established states of Europe, and East Germany, being one of these states, would win a *de facto* recognition by being invited. West Germany could hardly be expected to sit at the same table as East Germany until a thaw had occurred in inter-German relations. Blocking progress was Berlin and the question of its status.

Ambassadors from the four powers signed an agreement on Berlin on Aug. 23 that removed the last stumbling block to the security conference. At this point, it could do to wonder about the exact object of the conference. The Soviet Union sees it essentially as a means of confirming the territorial and political status quo of the continent. By signing a diplomatic charter recognizing present borders, the states of Europe would be doing the job of the victors of World War Two who failed to draw up and sign a peace treaty.

### **European security: agreeing on the terms**

The French are equally keen to see the ghost of World War Two laid to rest. But if France wants to consolidate the territorial status quo she might be less satisfied with the political status quo. Paris has consistently resisted any temptation to stir revolt in the coun-

tries under the Soviet wing. But it has not, on the other hand, looked harshly on any prudent show of independence by these countries. In 1967 General de Gaulle even encouraged the Poles to cultivate their "originality." So both sides must make it clear either before or during the conference that when they talk of "national sovereignty" or "non-interference in the affairs of others" they are speaking the same language.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries took place at a high point in French-Soviet relations. The Paris government regretted the move, albeit in extremely moderate terms. (Mr. Debre, foreign minister at the time, described it as a "mishap on the way".) Nevertheless, it was deeply affected by the event, sharing the dismay of French public opinion from the right to the extreme left. How could such an operation be conciliated with the principles of a detente in Europe? Opinions on this score are divided in the communist countries. Several eastern bloc governments hope that the security conference will allow each nation to achieve greater autonomy—in fact, that it will confirm the territorial status quo on one hand while helping to break down power block on the other.

Paris realizes that detente and cooperation in Europe are impossible without Soviet endorsement. Meanwhile, French leaders are conscious of having given a lead by quitting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization without breaking with their allies. Only too well can they understand the yearnings of statesmen in eastern Europe who call for the demise of power blocs. Mr. Pompidou and Mr. Brezhnev have already reached agreement on borders. Now the moment has come for them to state their views on the future of Europe.

## †THE AIM OF FOREIGN POLICY IN 1972

Speaking of the prospects for France's foreign policy in 1972 at the last cabinet meeting in Paris, Mr. Maurice Schumann (foreign minister) put it under three main headings—aid to the developing countries of the third world, European conference on security and the summit conference proposed by President Pompidou to his present and future counterparts of the European Common Market.

The French Chief of State has been working actively in these three directions since he was elected and since his confirmation of the principles of independence, sovereignty, and non-interference in the affairs of others defined by General de Gaulle.

The conference which is due to take place in the near future at Santiago De Chile on the question of relations between industrialised countries and developing countries is in keeping with one of the constant preoccupations of French policy: the importance of solidarity between the rich countries and the poor countries by giving the latter better and guaranteed prices for their primary products and the means of emerging from the state of under development. These points were particularly stressed by President Pompidou in December last, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of O.E.C.D. The French President called on the western nations to follow the example of France and, like her, to earmark 1% of their G.N.P. for aid to the third world, in conformity with the appeal of the United Nations which has designated the 1971–1980 period, as the 'Second Development Decade'.

This duty by the 'have' countries towards the 'have nots' between which there is a widening gap which is dangerous for the future of the world, was stressed by the French President during his visit to five African countries at the beginning of 1971. This duty was reflected in all the declarations made by French delegates to the United Nations during the course of the year. More recently, President Pompidou has reaffirmed his position in this matter, when he received the new years greetings of the diplomatic corps in Paris, at the Elysees Palace. On this occasion, he announced his intention of increasing France's contribution to cooperation in favour of the

† France, January 1972,

weaker countries. It is expected that he will be speaking again on these subjects during the course of his forthcoming visit to the Republics of Niger and Chad.

The second and third points on which the French government intends making a special effort concerning Europe: Europe in its relations between the countries of the west and Europe in its relations between the east and the west. These are two major talks to which President Pompidou intends to attach his name. After having helped the adhesion of Great Britain by his declaration at the 'Hague Summit' and his talks with Mr. Edward Heath, the French President has called on the Europeans to define the stages which should follow on the increase in size of the community'. This explains his proposal, for a 'Summit' which could be devoted to a relaunching of the principle of an economic and monetary union. All negotiations on this ended in may 1971, due to the decision to float the mark. Also at this summit, it is possible that the enlarged community could lay the foundations of future European institutions perhaps under the form of a confederation such as was proposed by Paris in 1971.

Last but not least in the domain of France's foreign policy, there is the question of a detente in Europe. A lot has happened since the visit of Mr. Brezhnev, Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party to Paris. There has been the inter-German arrangement on Berlin. Completing the quadripartite "Framework" agreement of September by the big four U.S.S.R. Great Britain, France, United States, France considers that it is now possible to go ahead with the immediate preparation of a European conference on security, the preliminary work being carried out by the European ambassadors in Helsinki. Such a meeting is considered by France to be highly desirable inasmuch as the time has come for all Europeans to make their own voices heard and in so doing, more than 26 years after the end of the war, bring about the reconciliation between the two parts of the old continent.

FOREIGN POLICY  
OF  
AUSTRALIA\*

\*As expressed by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Mr., L. H. E. Bury, 1971



## AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

In the broadest of terms, the objectives of our foreign policy are to enhance and protect Australia's national security and Australia's national welfare. We have identifiable and separate interests and independent policies and responsibilities.

However, the pursuit of a narrow national interest would be self-defeating. In the 1970's, no country can live in isolation and expect both to prosper and to remain secure.

Our own national interests must be seen in the lights of the known interests of other countries, and their aspirations. We must adapt our own policies to the facts of international life, but we also seek to influence the policies of others where they may be inconsistent with our own interests.

### MEANS TO REALISE OUR OBJECTIVES

Australia's independence in international affairs is expressed in our identification of our national objectives and the choice of means by which we seek to realise them. Once the means are chosen an element of interdependence is introduced. Close relations with other countries, or membership of international institutions, such as the United Nations, or regional organisations, such as SEATO provide reinforcement of our policies. But these also entail mutual commitments which may to some extent limit our own future independence of action. For small countries in an unsettled world interdependence is a pre-requisite of security.

Australia has strong and valuable traditional friendships. We have historic relations of co-operation and mutual confidence with Britain and we value the Commonwealth as an organisation in which many countries, of differing backgrounds and interests but certain common traditions, can consult and co-operate. We have long-standing links with Western Europe, reinforced by a continuing flow of migrants and mutual interests in trade and investments. We have new contacts with the countries of Africa and Latin America.

Our relations with the United States are deep and cover the whole range of our international relations--political, security and economic. The United States is and will remain a Pacific power of the

first magnitude. It has made an essential contribution towards the security and future welfare of countries in the Pacific since World War II. The maintenance of the closest relations and co-operation with the United States remains a central element in our foreign policy.

The maintenance of close relations with our neighbours in Asia and the Pacific is also a pre-requisite for Australia's security. These have been developed both through bilateral contacts and through our participation in regional organisations. The continued security, stability and prosperity of this region is of greatest importance to us and our diplomatic international co-operation, and mutual security efforts are primarily focused there. It is through our efforts in the region, where for reasons of geography our ability to exercise influence is greatest, that Australia can make its most effective contribution towards global stability and security.

The Government seeks a fully integrated foreign policy. The effectiveness of our alliances and the state of our relations with our neighbours are affected by our industrial development and our defence programme. That Programme must be kept in balance with the need for national development and a stable economy. Our image as a stable, secure and developed nation in turn enhances our ability to attract foreign investment and immigrants and increases our attractiveness as a trading partner. The goals which we pursue in our foreign policy are related to our total national objectives.

Although this review deals mainly with developments in the field of international developments with security implications Australian policy is of course closely co-ordinated in practice with our international economic, financial and other objectives.

## CHINA

For Australia, as for other countries in Asia and the Far East, one of the major factors affecting policy is the emergence of the Communist People's Republic on the mainland of China from the upheavals of the "Cultural Revolution".

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is now making marked progress economically and more slowly, in the reconstruction of its political institutions. In retrospect, it appears that the Cultural Revolution had a less adverse effect on economic performance than might have been thought. A record harvest was claimed for 1970, and it seems that agricultural and industrial production both in-

creased significantly. This is the first year of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, but production targets have not been announced. It is clear that many problems remain, for example in the modernisation of technology and in the provision of food for a population of some 750 million people, estimated to be increasing by some 14 million per year.

The reconstruction of the Party has been proceeding slowly: Party Committees at provincial levels have so far been re-established in some 14 of the 29 provinces or their equivalents, but there appear to be many gaps in the reconstitution of Party Committees at lower levels within the individual provinces. The People's Liberation Army (PLA), which has been closely integrated with the people and has played a substantial role in civil and economic affairs has become even more important in politics and administration. The leaders of the Army also have parallel political roles and the rigid distinction between political and military roles is not drawn in China as it is in several other countries. Most of the top leadership of the PLA has a close association with Mao and Lin Piao and their policies. The overall dominance of Mao and his policies remains unchallenged, but there are indications of continuing tension within the leadership. For example, two of the five members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (Chen Po ta and Kang Sheng) have not appeared in public for many months and may have been removed from power. Mao, Lin Piao and Chou En-Lai are the other three members of the Standing Committee and retain their wide authority.

After several years of internal preoccupation during the Cultural Revolution, the PRC has in recent months been showing more interest in international affairs. Its objectives appear to be:

- (i) the maintenance of the security of its borders, the incorporation of Taiwan, the removal where possible of what it regards as hostile influence in adjacent areas, and the maintenance or establishment there of governments responsive, if not subservient, to Peking;
- (ii) the establishment of a strong bargaining position with the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, and the reduction of their influence wherever possible;
- (iii) the related aim of improving relations with middle-size countries partly in order to use these relationships to reduce the influence of the two super-powers on world affairs;
- (iv) improvement of Chinese standing among small powers,

both to reduce the influence of the United States and USSR, and to win further support for Communist China;

- (v) assistance to what China sees as the inevitable processes of Maoist-Marxist history, showing favour to and often aiding liberation movements where they exist

The main features of China's participation in international affairs during the past year have been:

- (i) the continuation of the trend towards more normal state-to-state relations with the USSR, although fundamental ideological and national differences remain :
- (ii) an increase in Peking's influence among the Indo-Chinese Communists, marked by support for Sihanouk's group based in Peking and unremitting support for a hard line of fighting for victory and opposition to negotiations for a settlement of the Vietnam war;
- (iii) an increasing concern at Japan's growing power, and at the alleged possibility of a revival of Japanese militarism;
- (iv) the improvement of relations with North Korea;
- (v) heightened interest in the Middle East;
- (vi) the conclusion of the massive aid agreement for the Tanzania/Zambia railway and increased aid to other African states;
- (vii) an increase in foreign trade, especially in imports from Western countries and Japan;
- (viii) successful negotiations for recognition by Canada, Italy, Chile, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Kuwait, and greater support in the United Nations.

## JAPAN

Australia's co-operation with Japan is close and intensive. In the political as well as the economic spheres, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, there is a considerable coincidence in the interests of the two countries.

It is in Australia's national interest that this should continue to be so. The rapid growth in trade between the two countries is only one factor in a broader set of ties.

It was for this reason that a high level Inter-Departmental Committee was established in 1970 to report to Ministers on the whole gamut of the relationship. Such a course is not unprecedented, but indicates the particular importance we attach to the continuing and mutually satisfactory development of a complex and many-sided relationship. The Committee has completed its examination of the

basic issues and is now preparing its report.

The then Prime Minister and a number of other Australian Ministers visited Japan during the year. My predecessor was in Japan in September 1970 and had useful discussions with the Prime Minister, Mr Sato, Foreign Minister Aichi and others. On our side the Australian Government and people were happy to welcome the Emperor's younger brother, Prince Mikasa, and his wife when they visited Australia in January. The Foreign Minister, Mr Aichi, came during the year, we have recently had an extremely valuable visit by a high-level Economic Mission, and the Minister for International Trade and Industry Mr Miyazawa, will shortly be here.

These high level contacts form an essential part of an increasingly intimate relationship, marked by regular bilateral exchanges on matters of mutual interest. The annual talks between Australian and Japanese Foreign Ministry officials are another occasion for such exchanges. The Secretary of my Department led the Australian delegation to the 1970 session, which took place in Tokyo in late October.

In his statement in the House in March of last year, my predecessor spoke of the potential role of Japan in the Asian area, referring to the economic and political fields, and to the contribution Japanese investment and aid could make to the ability of the countries of the area to provide for their own defence. He expressed Australia's understanding of why the Japanese people were so reluctant that the Self-Defence Forces should assume any role beyond defence of the homeland.

The Defence White Paper published in October 1970 by the Japanese Self-Defence Agency emphasized that Japan would become an economic great power but not a military great power. It would not possess offensive weapons, would not dispatch military forces overseas and would adhere to its traditional non-nuclear weapons policy. The White Paper re-affirmed that Japanese defence is to be achieved by reliance on a combination of self-defence and the United States/Japan Security Treaty, but that Japan would move towards assuming greater responsibility for its conventional defence.

This concept of Japan's defence lends particular significance to the country's relationship with the United States. Based upon the Security Treaty originally concluded in 1951 and now to continue in force until either party gives one year's notice of intention to abrogate, the relationship has been strengthened by agreement in principle on the return of the Ryukyu Islands, including

Okinawa, to Japan. Another very important element in the relationship is the trading partnership between the two countries. The United States is Japan's most important export market, taking some 31% of its exports and providing 27% of its imports. Inevitably there has been some friction in the commercial dealings between two such large and partly competing economic powers. But, as Japanese leaders have said, these frictions are of minor importance when compared to overall Japan-United States relations.

During the past year, Japan has emerged as an active participant in political consultations on matters affecting Asia and the Far East. It played a leading role in the Djakarta Conference on Cambodia in May 1970. That Conference was an historic occasion because it brought together the major regional powers in discussion of a regional problem. Moreover, it demonstrated the weakening impediments to an active regional role by Japan. In the past few weeks, Japan has taken further diplomatic initiatives, in association with Indonesia and Malaysia, in relation to Laos. The Australian Government attaches great importance to evidence, such as these two examples provide, that Japan is ready to play a positive and co-operative political role in the area of most immediate concern to us.

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The essential ingredient in this growing capacity and readiness to play a constructive diplomatic role is the great size of Japan's economic resources which it is applying increasingly, towards the economic development of the South East Asian region. The Japanese Government last year announced that it would endeavour to attain by 1975 a level of foreign assistance equivalent to one per cent of Japan's Gross National Product. If this target is achieved, it is estimated that Japan's total foreign assistance, about two-thirds of which currently goes to Asia would rise to about \$ US 3,400 million in 1975. This would mean almost a three-fold increase over the 1969 figure.

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INDONESIA

Australia's bilateral relations with the Republic of Indonesia also continue to develop. This trend has been illustrated by the working visits to this country in recent months by the Indonesian Minister for trade, Professor Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, and by a senior Indonesian military officer, Lt. General Sumitro.

During the past year the Indonesian economy has continued its recovery and progress. Australia has made a significant contribution

towards international action to assist that progress.

Indonesia still needs economic aid. The Inter-Governmental Group on Aid to Indonesia met in Rotterdam in December. The Group, which Canada joined as a full member for the first time, noted that the Indonesian request for \$US 600 million for 1970/71 was likely to be met, and endorsed the Indonesians' estimate of their aid requirements in 1971/72. The Australian Government welcomes this evidence that the international community is both willing and able to give economic aid to Indonesia on the scale that is necessary to enable Indonesia to develop a balanced economy.

The Government will continue to implement the Australian commitment to provide \$US 60 million over the three-year period 1970/71 to 1972/73. A new project under this programme was announced by the Minister for Defence on 26 March. It consists of assistance with the mapping of some 25,000 square miles of Southern Sumatra. A joint mapping project in Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), in which Australia participated, has already been successfully completed.

The contribution that assistance from friendly countries makes towards the economic progress of Indonesia is important but can only be marginal. But the roles of the Indonesian authorities, of Indonesian business firms and of the Indonesian people are vital.

These sustained efforts achieved noteworthy success in 1970. An important indication of this success is the fact that exports in 1970 reached the figure of approximately \$1,000 million (Australian), an increase of over 15% compared to the previous year. Almost every sector of the economy recorded production gains. Inflation was kept back to an acceptable rate. Economic conditions and the standard of living of the people of Indonesia improved in 1970 and seem likely to continue to improve. These are most gratifying results.

The first general elections to be held in Indonesia since 1955 are scheduled for July of this year. Political parties and organisations are preparing actively for the campaign which opens on 3 May. This reflects the stability and confidence that have been achieved there in recent years.

## INDO-CHINA

It would be agreeable to be able to report progress towards peace in Indo-China.

Regrettably, North Vietnam continues its aggression against all three countries in that region—the Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia (now officially entitled "The Khmer Republic") and Laos—and

continues to oppose a genuinely negotiated settlement.

**The Situation in Vietnam :** In general terms the past year has been one of considerable progress for the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and its Allies. Enemy military activity has remained at a generally low level, and although it has been punctuated from time to time by efforts to mount "high-points" of increased attacks in localised areas, enemy efforts to concentrate have frequently been frustrated in the preparatory stage. On the South Vietnamese side local security has increasingly become the responsibility of the regional forces (RF) which has progressively allowed the regular armed forces (ARVN) to undertake operations against enemy main force units, as well as cross-border operations.

The United States and South Vietnamese cross-border operations against enemy base areas inside Cambodia during the second quarter of 1970 and again during the present dry season have not only caused severe disruption of the communists' supply system, but have also given the South Vietnamese armed forces an opportunity to demonstrate that they can carry out large-scale operations without having to rely on American ground combat support.

As was stated in the House on 30 March, it is still too early to make any final assessment of what the recent South Vietnamese cross-border operation in southern Laos has achieved. President Thieu announced on 8 February that it was limited in time and space and was directed not at seizing and holding territory; but against North Vietnamese supply lines and base areas which have hitherto been immune from ground attack, in a part of Laos not under the control of the Laotian Government. The full effects of temporarily disrupting vital North Vietnamese supply movements to their forces in the south and of destroying large stocks of communist equipment—the operation's main objectives—as well as the effects of communist manpower losses, which were far greater than those of South Vietnam, are not expected to become apparent for some time. At the least these setbacks will further inhibit the communists' offensive capacity in South Vietnam and Cambodia, and allow these countries more valuable breathing-space in which to develop their own ability to defend themselves.

During the past year there has also been continuing improvement in the local security situation in South Vietnam. The Government's pacification programme continues to win support from the people, and more than ninety per cent of the population now lives



in hamlets and villages which are regarded as under secure or relatively secure government control. During the present year the Government is placing increased emphasis on local economic and social development and self-help. Improved security has allowed increased planting of rice and better transportation, with the result that South Vietnam's self-sufficiency in this basic commodity has been virtually restored.

Progress has been made in other aspects of the economy also, notably in controlling the rate of inflation in recent months. However, the task of restoring a war-ravaged economy is a particularly difficult one while the conflict still continues.

During 1970, elections were held for half the Senate, for Provincial and Municipal councils and for village and hamlet representatives. Political interest is now centred on the presidential elections which are due to be held in early October 1971. Elections will also be held at the same time for the Lower House of the National Assembly. The Australian Government is particularly encouraged by this continuing successful association of the people of the Republic of Vietnam, under their constitution, in the running of the country at all levels.

These achievements, in the military, security, economic and political fields, have in their totality contributed to the growing capacity of the South Vietnamese to assume an increasing responsibility for the conduct of their own affairs, including their own defence. This, in turn, has made possible the progressive reduction of Allied forces in South Vietnam, details of which are discussed further below.

**The Situation in Cambodia :** The primary aim of the Vietnamese communists continues to appear to be the subjugation of South Vietnam, and their immediate objective in Cambodia has thus been to re-establish or secure base areas and supply routes of which they were deprived by United States and South Vietnamese cross-border operation in May 1970. They have also continued military and subversive activity against the Government of the Khmer Republic, in an attempt to re-establish eventually Cambodia's subservience to communist interests.

In recent months, during the dry season, the enemy has concentrated on efforts to sever Phnom Penh's major lines of communication. Although their blockade of route 4 linking Phnom Penh to the port and oil refinery at Kompong Som was broken in January by Cambodian forces, with South Vietnamese support and American

air interdiction, the road remains subject to attack and occasional interdiction. Combined Cambodian-South Vietnamese operations have, however, succeeded in keeping open the Mekong River supply route to Phnom Penh. In addition to attacking communications routes and harassing population centres, the communists have also mounted two spectacular hit and run raids, on Phnom Penh airport, which almost completely destroyed the small Cambodian Air Force as a fighting force, and on the oil refinery at Kompong Som, which put the refinery out of operation and destroyed significant quantities of fuel stocks. Apart from large joint Cambodian/South Vietnamese operations against major North Vietnamese/Viet Cong base areas in Kompong Cham and Kratie provinces, military activity has otherwise been light in the last few weeks. It has been mainly in the vicinity of Phnom Penh, with a number of clashes occurring as a result of increased Government patrolling. Contrary to general expectations there was no increase in communist military or terrorist activity in the Phnom Penh area around 18 March, the first anniversary of Sihanouk's deposition.

Throughout the Vietnamese communist attacks, the national Armed Forces and the people of the Khmer Republic, despite their unpreparedness for war, have shown remarkable courage and cohesion in resisting aggression. The Government has successfully maintained control over the main urban centres and the bulk of the population, which lives in the south and west of the country. All the many recruits to the armed forces during 1970 were volunteers, a clear indication of the massive support the Government of the Khmer Republic enjoys from the population.

The political situation in Phnom Penh remains calm, and the Government in general continues to enjoy the support it has consistently had over the past year from important groups, such as the National Assembly, the armed forces, the Buddhist clergy, and students. The orderly conduct of the government, and the prosecution of the resistance against the Vietnamese communist aggressors, have not been disrupted by the regrettable illness and enforced absence from duty since mid-February of the Prime Minister, General Lon Nol.

**The Situation in Laos :** The South Vietnamese cross-border operation against the Ho Chi Minh trails in southern Laos, in response to the massive North Vietnamese logistics build up in that area earlier in the present dry seasons, has already been commented on,

The effects of North Vietnam's blatant violation of Laotian territory have also been apparent elsewhere in Laos. Government positions south-west of the Plain of Jars in northern Laos have been under constant pressure and harassment by North Vietnamese forces throughout the dry season. More recently, North Vietnamese troops suddenly overran Government positions defending the royal capital of Luang Prabang, and launched rocket attacks on its airfield. In addition, in the far south of Laos the communists have overrun the only remaining Government positions on the eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau, presumably in order to improve the security of their supply routes along the Se Kong river and route 16 into northern Cambodia and, ultimately, South Vietnam.

The Royal Laotian Government under its neutralist Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, has repeatedly protested to the Co-Chairman of the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, against these communist moves and against the continued and long standing violation of Laotian territory by North Vietnamese forces. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has declined to participate in any steps that would help to restore observance of the 1962 Geneva Agreements and ensure respect for the neutrality of Laos provided in them.

During 1970 and the early part of 1971 messages have been exchanged between Prince Souvanna Phouma and the Leader of the Laotian communist movement, the Neo Lao Hak Xat, Prince Souphanouvong, on the possibility of entering into talks on a peaceful settlement of the situation in Laos. Unfortunately, despite the Prime Minister's reiterated offers to enter into a negotiations without preconditions, the Communists have continued to demand the prior cessation of bombing throughout Laos while at the same time they have not only refused to discuss the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos, but have denied the incontrovertible fact of their presence there in massive numbers.

The Australian Government has consistently supported the independence and neutrality of Laos, which were guaranteed by the 1962 Geneva Agreements. It welcomes the moves that have been made towards the opening of discussions between the Laotian parties, and regrets that the communist side has so far shown an unwillingness to enter into realistic discussions with the Royal Laotian Government. The Australian Government nevertheless hopes that the contacts, which it is following with close interest, will eventually produce a framework in which the Laotian people

can develop their own way of life in peace and freedom, independent of the external interference and aggression to which they have been subjected in violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1962.

**Australian Policy towards Indo-China :** From even as brief a conspectus as has just been outlined, it is clear that the problem in all three countries in Indo-China derives from the same fundamental cause : North Vietnamese aggression.

Australia's response to the consequent situations has been regulated by the particular circumstances in each of the countries, and the timing of developments there; for although North Vietnam's aggression has created common problems, there are nevertheless significant differences between the three countries. Australian policies have had full regard to Australia's own interests and capabilities, recognising that there are practical limits to Australian political and military influence, and that Australia also has wide responsibilities and interests in the Asian region as a whole.

There is nevertheless a consistency in the Government's policies towards the three countries, which may be summarised along the following lines.

**General Aims :** The primary objective of Australian policy towards Vietnam, Laos and the Khmer Republic has been and is to help those countries and their people to maintain their right to determine their own future free of external aggression or interference.

Australia has sought, and will continue to seek, to promote this goal through peaceful means wherever possible. Where appropriate military assistance in various forms has been provided to help these states to defend themselves against aggression. Throughout, Australia has provided all three with economic assistance to help in their reconstruction and development efforts. Such aid is important both to reduce conditions under which discontent and subversion flourish, and as an end itself, to help the countries concerned to improve the living standards of their people.

**Negotiations :** The Government has maintained a consistent policy in favour of a peaceful settlement in all three countries whenever there has been a possibility of engaging the Vietnamese communists in a genuine negotiation process.

(a) It has supported Allied efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Vietnam in whatever ways have been open to Australia and appropriate. It is the communists who initially refused to enter into discussions, and who continue to refuse

to participate in genuine negotiations. The Government still hopes that Hanoi will reconsider its rejection of the imaginative proposals made last October by both President Thieu and President Nixon looking to a settlement in the whole of Indo-China.

It is particularly regrettable that the communists have resisted all approaches, including the most simple humanitarian pleas, on behalf of the prisoners of war they are holding. They have also rejected the South Vietnamese Government's humane proposal for the release of all sick and wounded prisoners.

- (b) As far as Laos is concerned, Australia actively worked for the 1962 Geneva Agreements and has consistently supported them since. The Government has sought by whatever means have been open and appropriate to persuade North Vietnam to cease its violations of Laotian neutrality, which it began not long after the Geneva Agreements were signed.
- (c) Australia participated actively and from its inception in the Djakarta Conference of Foreign Ministers relating to Cambodia, which was designed to help secure by peaceful means that country's continued independence and neutrality. It is a matter of regret that the initiative met only the flat refusal of the communist nations to consider the Conference's reasonable proposals. Australia has continued by whatever means have been open to explore with other nation, particularly in the Asian region, ways and means whereby the Khmer Republic can maintain its independence and neutrality.

**Military Assistance :** In the absence of a serious response by the communists to efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement, it has been necessary, for the countries of Indo-China to defend themselves. It has also been necessary, and their legitimate right under international law, including the United Nations Charter, to seek assistance for this purpose. It is similarly a legitimate right of other countries to respond to the requests for assistance that may be made to them.

- (a) In 1962, the Australian Government responded to South Vietnam's request for Advisory assistance. In 1965, and again subsequently, it responded to further requests for military assistance, to help meet the growing threat posed by the aggression of North Vietnamese regular forces.

During the past year, as a result of South Vietnam's increasing self-reliance in the political, economic and social as well as military fields, Allied forces have been able to be progressively withdrawn from South Vietnam. Continuing United States troop withdrawals, at the average rate of approximately 12,500 per month, are in accordance with President Nixon's intention, announced in April 1970, to reduce the total of American forces in Vietnam to 284,000 by 1 May next. President Nixon will announce future plans in April but he has already indicated that withdrawals will continue at the present rate at least. One Australian infantry battalion was withdrawn last November, and a further one thousand men from all the Australian services will be withdrawn during the next few months.

The fact that such withdrawals have been possible is a tribute in itself to the assistance that Australian forces and those of the Allies have been able to render. Australia has now embarked on an intensified programme of training assistance to help the South Vietnamese to develop further their own ability to defend their country. As conditions change for the better the presence of the remaining Australian forces in Vietnam will be kept under continuous review.

- (b) Although the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos permits it to receive assistance for self-defence, it has never sought military aid from Australia and indeed has never sought troops from any country. Australia, which has consistently sought to uphold Laotian neutrality, has therefore never had occasion to consider offering military aid of any kind to Laos.
- (c) The Khmer Republic is also seeking to maintain a policy of neutrality. It is faced however with large-scale overt aggression by the Vietnamese communists. It has therefore sought, as it is entitled to do under the provisions for self-defence in the Geneva Agreements and the United Nations Charter, assistance in resisting this aggression. This assistance is precisely for the purpose of helping the Khmers to maintain their independence and neutrality.

The Government of the Khmer Republic has repeatedly stated that it wants outside assistance only so long as it is faced with invasion. It does not want any more military assistance than is absolutely necessary or to join any military pacts or alliances. The Khmer Republic has not asked

Australia for combat troops, and the Government has no intention of sending any there. In response to its requests, however, the Government has made two special aid grants to the Khmer Republic, bringing total aid this financial year to \$2 million. This aid has been used to provide dual purpose items, such as vehicles and communications equipment, as well as a small quantity of arms and ammunition to assist self-defence. Six DC3 aircraft have also been given to the Khmer Republic to help replace some of the losses its Air Force has suffered.

**Economic Assistance:** For twenty years, Australia has been actively assisting all three Indo-Chinese states to improve the living standards of their people.

It has been possible, thanks to the improvement in the security situation in South Vietnam, to proceed with important new infrastructure and development projects there which will assist reconstruction and economic progress.

Efforts by the international community to assist development in the Khmer Republic, such as the Prek Tlnot Dam project, continue to be hampered by communist military operations. There is unfortunately no reason to believe that the North Vietnamese will cease their hostilities against such purely civilian projects. Nor is there any reason to believe that the North Vietnamese will cease their operations against similar aid projects in Laos, to which Australia has also contributed. The Government will continue, however, to make contributions to other projects and to provide technical assistance and training to both the Khmer Republic and Laos.

The Government hopes that it will be possible, as security improves and the level of fighting declines, to consider a wider and longer term international reconstruction effort in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

**Summary:** The Australian Government's policies towards the three countries of Indo-China have thus been marked by consistent support for a peaceful settlement whenever the communists are willing to enter into genuine negotiations, a willingness to provide whatever military assistance is within Australia's means and which has been requested for the purpose of equipping people of these countries to defend themselves, and through the provision of substantial economic aid, a constant concern to help the people in the area to better their living conditions and their security.

These complementary policies have one single overriding aim and one aim only, to help the people of Vietnam, Laos and the Khmer Republic to maintain their fundamental right to determine their own future.

## INDIA

The achievements which the Government of Mr Nehru, Mr Shastri and Mrs Gandhi have recorded since Independence in 1947, must attract considerable respect. Their task of governing a population of 555 millions has been complicated by formidable economic and social problems. Yet the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy, which has played such an important part in shaping Australia's own traditions, has been successfully transplanted and adapted to Indian conditions. The fifth general election in India since Independence was held from 1 to 10 March. An electorate of 275 million voted for 2,570 candidates standing for 520 seats in the Lower House. Mrs Gandhi's Ruling Congress Party was returned with an absolute majority.

When Parliament resumed in New Delhi on 23 March, President Giri foreshadowed a further determined attack on India's great economic and social problems. With her newly won Parliamentary majority, Mrs Gandhi will be in a position to provide strong and positive leadership in tackling these problems.

Australia, through the Colombo Plan has over the years made a modest contribution to economic development. Excluding Papua/New Guinea, India has been the largest single recipient of Australian aid. This is a measure of our interest in and willingness to assist Asia's largest democracy.

## THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND ASIA

In President Nixon's Report to Congress of 25 February the aims of American policy and its fundamental objectives were most clearly restated. The main elements of the Doctrine are :

- (a) The U.S. will keep all its treaty commitments.
- (b) The U.S. will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with the U.S., or of a nation whose survival it considers vital to its security.
- (c) In cases involving other types of aggression, the U.S. will furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with its treaty commitments. The U.S. will, however, look to the nation directly threatened to assume



the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.

The President's emphasis is being placed on the evolution of a partnership designed to contribute to the building and strengthening of a durable structure of international relationships. He has renewed his conviction that the United States, as a Pacific Power, recognises a deep permanent interest in the future of Asia which takes into account the new strength and confidence of many Asian nations. The United States means to continue to support the efforts of the nations of South-East Asia to maintain their freedom and security.

The Australian Government shares United States objectives as the President has defined them, and will continue to contribute the best of our ability to fulfil our own obligation to act as a responsible partner and ally and to contribute to the economic progress and stability of South-East Asia.

### REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN ASIA AND THE FAR EAST

The Australian Government has sought for many years to establish and develop effective security arrangements to secure our country against military threats and together with aid, trade and the many other standards of our total foreign policy—to provide a stable but peacefully changing environment in which our national purposes can be realised.

Our Treaty alliances are, of course, an important part of our security arrangements. But they are not the whole or even the major part of those arrangements.

In the first place, we have our own defence forces, which provide a deterrent; a capability for the defence of Australia and its Territories if that deterrence fails, and the ability to act effectively beyond our shores.

Our defence forces are small but they are well-equipped, well-trained and combat-experienced. Above all, they provide Australia with its own national instrument, under sole Australian control and responsive to Australia's own assessed needs. They are thus the cornerstone of our security arrangements, and the prime expression of that "continuous and effective self-help" which, under both the Manila and ANZUS treaties, we have undertaken to maintain and develop.

A second element in our security arrangements is provided by our

Treaty alliances—ANZUS and Manila Treaty.

ANZUS is critically important to us because it contains a formal recognition by the United States that an armed attack upon Australia or its territories or its defence forces would be dangerous to the United States' own peace and safety.

It is also important to us because it contains a formal declaration by the United States that, in the event of an armed attack upon us, it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

If the President decides an armed attack has occurred, it is then his constitutional responsibility to determine what measures are required to meet the situation which, by definition in the Treaty, is dangerous to the United States' own peace and safety.

The United States commitment, because it is embodied in a Treaty, is by operation of the U.S. Constitution part of "the supreme law of the land". It is thus a commitment upon which we are entitled to rely. It is one of those treaty commitments which have been reaffirmed under the Nixon Doctrine.

Nevertheless, we recognise that the primary responsibility for our own defence rests with Australia. We cannot, and do not, expect the United States to do all our fighting for us. And we have an obligation to consult with our allies and to co-operate with them in building our individual and collective capacity for self-defence. We value the periodical meetings of the ANZUS partners at the ministerial and also the official level.

The Manila Treaty, too, is of value to us because of the United States commitment it contains not only to Australia and New Zealand but also to Thailand and South Vietnam, and the Philippines. These countries are part of our strategic environment, and their security and stability is accordingly a matter of concern to us.

We also believe that the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, established under the Treaty with its headquarters in Bangkok, has value for us. Participation in the Organisation has increased our knowledge of the problems of the region, developed our contacts, and provided a recognised forum for expressing our views and hearing those of others.

The Organisation has continued basic contingency planning and the arrangement of joint exercises, and has been developing its work on counter Communist subversion.

We recognise that the Manila Treaty, and the Organisation, have

their shortcomings and imperfections, and we do not regard them as the total or the final answer to the security problems of the area.

Nevertheless, both are clearly useful and worth maintaining in present circumstances.

Another element has been added to our security system by the Australian military presence in Malaysia/Singapore and the Five Power arrangements to which that presence is a contribution.

The purpose of the Australian presence, and its importance in contributing to the security and stability of our immediate neighbourhood, have been the subject of a number of statements by the Prime Minister and by successive Ministers for External and Foreign Affairs and Defence; I have no need to repeat what has been so frequently said before.

As the result of much detailed work and close discussions among the Five Powers, we are very near finality on the Five Power arrangements.

These will be the subject of a Ministerial meeting in London later this month. Naturally I cannot anticipate the outcome of that meeting. The outlines are however already reasonably clear following the talks the then Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had in Singapore subsequent to a most successful meeting of Five Power officials in Singapore.

A fourth valuable, though not well published element in our security arrangements, is the defence aid we give to our SEATO partners in Asia; to Malaysia and Singapore; and to other countries—including Cambodia and South Vietnam.

The aid takes many forms, from the gift of sophisticated military equipment such as aircraft to the provision of training in the maintenance of vehicles and weapons and many kinds of activity in between.

The common purpose is to help those countries develop their own indigenous defence capabilities, to help make them more able to stand on their own feet and look after themselves at least in circumstances short of massive aggression.

### INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY

The introduction in 1958 and maintenance since then of a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has introduced a new element into an area of great strategic and commercial concern to Australia. No country in the Indian Ocean area can afford to be complacent about it.

We do not regard the Soviet naval presence—which so far has been a relatively modest one—as an immediate threat to Australia's security. Nevertheless it introduces a new element into an area which hitherto has been free of Great Power rivalry. Its primary purpose appears to be political, namely to influence the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, and to further Soviet political and commercial objectives in the area. It may also be designed to serve strategic objectives.

In the situation thus created by the Soviet naval presence, the Government welcomes the decision of the United States and British Governments to develop a joint communications facility on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean midway between Asia and Africa.

It is a situation which prompts us to pay close attention to the security of our Western approaches. For our part, we are taking measures to improve our naval and air infrastructure in Western Australia as Australia's contribution to the security of the area. We believe that it will be necessary to keep a close watch on Soviet actions and to make a continuing assessment of Soviet motives.

### THE SOUTH PACIFIC

In addition to our formal relationships in ANZUS, SEATO, and the Five-Power arrangements and as troop contributors in Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand have developed over the years a network of official and personal relationships which pervade every aspect of policy. These relationships were given expression in February by the visit of His Excellency, the Governor General to New Zealand.

Australia and New Zealand have a natural common interest in the South Pacific where there has been a quickening in political and constitutional development. During 1970 the Government welcomed the independence of Fiji and Tonga and was represented at their celebrations. There are now four independent Pacific States : Western Samoa, Nauru, Tonga and Fiji.

We are seeking to establish closer and more fruitful mutual relations with these States. The keynote of our approach will be readiness to share in a partnership for the benefit of the peoples of the region.

We have already taken some steps in this matter. Our Commission in Fiji has been elevated to a High Commission and our High Commissioner is now accredited also to Western Samoa and Tonga.

We have had a diplomatic representative in Nauru since it became independent in 1968. We look forward to receiving a visit from the Prime Minister of Fiji at the end of this month.

Over the last three years we have substantially increased the level of our economic aid to the region. We intend maintaining that aid.

Twenty-four years ago Australia and New Zealand took the initiative in establishing the South Pacific Commission. This body has promoted co-operative measures for the economic and social advancement of the countries and territories of the region. It has performed a very useful function within this limited mandate.

It has also evolved to the point where the South Pacific Conference has become the annual forum in which Island leaders discuss their common problems and aspirations. It was in recognition of this new importance of the Conference that, for the first time, Australia was represented at the last Conference in Suva last September, by the Minister of Shipping and Transport, Mr Ian Sinclair.

However, we recognise the growing interest of the Islanders in having discussions with their neighbours on a wider range of subjects than is at present possible in the South Pacific Conference. We also understand their desire for the development of a more adequate forum for mutual consultation and co-operation.

## CANADA

The visit by the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr Trudeau, last year to Australia, New Zealand and several Asian countries was evidence of an increased Canadian interest in the Pacific and Asian regions. Mr Gorton discussed with Mr Trudeau means of fostering periodic consultations between the two Governments and between Canadian and Australian Ministers on matters of common interest affecting the two countries. The Canadian Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development is at present in Australia. The Minister of Justice, Mr John Turner, was here last September. Three Australian Ministers accompanied by their officials have visited Canada in recent months.

We welcome this closer contact with Canada, a longstanding friend of Australia in the Commonwealth.

## THE COMMONWEALTH

Outside Asia and the Pacific particularly in Africa, Australian

diplomatic representation reflects Australia's continuing close ties with the countries of the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth now consists of thirty-one countries, all formerly British possessions, plus Nauru, which has special membership. Its continued existence is based upon a combination of interest, sentiment and practical convenience. This persists in spite of many and serious differences of opinion between individual members and upon particular issues. An essential feature of the association is that it is a voluntary organisation based on persuasion, on mutual respect for each other and each other's rights. Successive Australian governments have opposed the alternative concept that the Commonwealth is a mini-United Nations, passing resolutions and seeking to impose a majority vote or a consensus on its members. They have welcomed full and frank discussion but have opposed interference in what are essentially matters for individual member governments to decide.

At the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Governments in Singapore last January at which three newly independent Pacific States were attending for the first time, this Australian point of view was reaffirmed.

The problem was exemplified by the draft Declaration of Commonwealth principles. The Sections dealing with human equality and self-determination in their original form could have been interpreted to justify interference with, for example, immigration policies and to justify the use of violence. So the Australian delegation successfully sought to have a more appropriate wording. It was also concerned that so much time was taken up by discussing the South African Arms issue, limiting the time available for a worthwhile discussion of the affairs of Asia and the Pacific and of economic matters.

At the Singapore meeting it was also decided to establish a group of eight nations, of which Australia agreed to be one, to study the security of maritime trade routes in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. This group has not in practice been convened because of the subsequent decisions of several of its original members to withdraw. The question of its future is now under consideration by Commonwealth Governments.

Our Commonwealth relationship remains one of the many ways in which we can play a part in the world community. If the world is not to be divided on racial lines, which we would wholly deplore, it is essential that we try to build on what we have in common. The Commonwealth goes beyond a shared tradition of parliamentary

institutions to a common fund and experience (which is almost as important) of professional, academic and technical knowledge, maintained and refreshed by mutual exchange and cooperation. Australian institutions and professional associations acknowledge its importance to themselves. This has most immediate value of course to the less developed and smaller members in providing ready machinery for the adaption, to their own environment, of skills, standards of teaching and training methods.

The Commonwealth provides material benefits to many of its members and less tangible ones to all. Common language, common values, the range of mutual interests, facilitate the establishment of a network of contacts at various levels. The Australian Government has reservations about such multilateral aid schemes as the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation and prefers to contribute under its own bilateral programmes. But it recognises the value of the Commonwealth in the interchange of experience. An Educational Conference was held recently in Canberra, and a Commonwealth Medical Conference is to take place in Mauritius later this year.

## AFRICA

Tensions in various parts of Africa continue to cause concern.

In Southern Africa the political and social problem is basically one of reconciling the domestic policies of the minority Governments of the area with the aspirations of the large black population under their jurisdiction.

These policies are resented by the newly independent countries of Black Africa. They are also affronted by the theory and practice of apartheid wherever it occurs. The Australian Government's sympathy with this point of view has been expressed several times. A recent practical demonstration of that sympathy was the contribution of \$ 12,000 by the Government, announced by the Prime Minister on 22 March, to a programme to observe the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. But the Australian Government deplores the use of violence as a means of effecting change in the regimes in Southern Africa, and has noted with interest that some African Governments have taken the initiative in publicly proposing that African countries explore the prospects for a dialogue with South Africa as an alternative to confrontation.

Peaceful progress towards majority rule in Southern Africa would

allow more attention to be paid to the pressing economic problems facing the leaders of the newly independent African countries. These countries are trying to build viable and stable political structures in the face of pressures of both the modern world and of their traditional past. In this tribal differences have been a divisive force and one which is still present in African affairs. Examples of the political tensions which exist in some of these countries have been seen in the recent events in Uganda and Sierra Leone. Africa is a continent of contrasts and it would be unrealistic to expect that political progress there should conform to any pre-determined pattern. Australia's aim should be rather to try to understand the particular problems of African countries and to assist them, to the best of our ability, wherever such assistance would be timely and welcome.

Australia's diplomatic representation in Africa is necessarily limited by available resources and the other demands of the Government's foreign policy. But the Government will continue to take a sympathetic interest in developments there; and through its aid and trade policies, to make a modest contribution to Africa's economic development.

The British Government is again exploring the possibilities of reaching a peaceful settlement of the constitutional issue in Rhodesia on the basis of the five principles, central to which is that there should be unimpeded progress towards majority rule. Meanwhile the Australian Government continues to recognise Britain's primary responsibility for the people of Rhodesia. Pending a settlement of the constitutional problem the Australian Government will continue to discharge its international obligations by observing and applying United Nations sanctions against the illegal Rhodesian regime.

### THE GLOBAL POSITION : THE SEARCH FOR DETENTE

In the past 25 years of its existence, the United Nations has not been able to prevent a number of wars of the conventional type. But the U.N. has played an important role in Korea, the Middle East, Kashmir, Congo and Cyprus.

We cannot depend on the U.N. to prevent all conflicts but it can and does make a significant contribution to world peace and security. Ultimate success in the U.N. peace-keeping role will always depend on the attitudes of the great Powers, on their willingness to work together for peace and on the individual nations involved in particular disputes.



In the area of arms control and disarmament, there have been recent signs of improvement in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

But arms control and disarmament negotiations are inevitably complex and need to be approached with some caution. Those responsible for this work must see clearly the close relationship that exists between their endeavours and the security of all nations. Measures of arms control, if they are to be successful, must make a genuine contribution to the security of nations, and conversely must not have the effect of placing individual states at a disadvantage.

We believe that disarmament measures to be fully effective must attract widespread support. Australia is a party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963; we have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But two nuclear weapons States, France and China, have not signed either and both continue testing in the atmosphere.

However, we have no choice but to continue our efforts for disarmament. The U. S. and U.S.S.R. have been discussing the question of strategic arms limitations. We have welcomed SALT and have stated in the United Nations our view that a balanced and verifiable limitation of such armaments would make an important contribution to the security of the world as a whole.

The Australian Government looks at the question of chemical and biological warfare as a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which it has supported and will continue to support. Australia is following with considerable interest efforts in the United Nations and in Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva to solve the problem of chemical and biological weapons.

The 25th Session of the General Assembly commended to Governments the text of a Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof which had been submitted earlier to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva by its two co-sponsors of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Australia voted in favour of this resolution.

The principal obligation of the Treaty prohibits parties from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond a twelve-mile coastal "seabed zone". The Treaty would in effect place nearly 70 per cent of the earth's surface off-limits to the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We believe the Treaty will

be an important addition to the growing structure of multilateral arms control agreements contributing to international security.

Australia participated in the official ceremonies when the Treaty was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on 11 February 1971.

## EUROPE

Two European developments of particular interests to outside countries have been the improvement in relations between Western and Eastern Europe, and the negotiations for the entry of Britain, the Irish Republic and Denmark into the European Communities.

**Germany and Eastern Europe** : Chancellor Brandt's efforts to improve relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Eastern Europe, and the Eastern Europeans' response, resulted in the conclusion in 1970 of treaties with the USSR and Poland.

In these treaties, both sides have undertaken to respect, and to regard as inviolable, the present boundaries in Europe. This is a major step towards the regularisation of East/West relations, especially in view of the declared willingness of both sides to develop their relations on a broad basis.

Chancellor Brandt's courage and imagination in seeking to put an end to years of tension in Europe was also shown in his efforts to reach a modus vivendi with East Germany. His meetings with East German leaders at Erfurt and Kassel last year, and the continuing conversations at official level, may mark the beginning of a less difficult relationship with East Germany.

Berlin still remains the principal obstacle to European detente. There have been talks between the three Western Allies and the USSR about Berlin for the past year. These are continuing and the Western nations have made it clear that progress in East/West relations, including the possible holding of a European security conference and ratification of the treaties with the USSR and Poland, is conditional upon a satisfactory settlement on Berlin.

The Australian Government welcomes Chancellor Brandt's moves towards detente in Europe, and the possibilities they should afford for further progress in the search for European security.

It is clear, however, that further progress will depend upon the attitude of the USSR and its Eastern European allies, and we hope that their stated desire to see better relations between East and West Europe will result in a more flexible and co-operative attitude on their part.

**Britain and the EEC :** Britain is now in the midst of negotiations for entry into the European Communities. The outcome of these negotiations will be of great significance for Europe and the rest of the world.

Australia supports, in principle, the integration of Western Europe. We recognise that enlargement of the Communities would have important political consequences.

But we are also very conscious that such enlargement has serious economic consequences. If Britain, and the other applicants—Denmark, Norway and Ireland—are admitted, the ten nations comprising the enlarged Community will account for some 40% of world trade. The outlook of such a group is of immense importance to major trading countries such as Australia: If it is inward-looking it could lead to a reduction in world trade. If it is outward-looking there will be benefits for all.

Although the outcome cannot yet be seen with any clarity, the Ministers of the Six are now in process of taking dramatic steps which could ultimately result in economic and monetary union of the Community countries. There is some prospect, therefore, that, over a period of years, one of the most momentous economic developments of the postwar period could bring about a single, rich and powerful economic unit in Western Europe. We must not be blind to the great and far-reaching significance of such a prospect.

Australia has not opposed Britain's application to join the EEC. This is a matter for the British Government and the Governments of the Six to decide. But the terms and conditions upon which Britain enters are naturally a matter of considerable concern to us. We feel that Britain and the Community have responsibilities towards third countries whose trade is likely to be adversely affected. The Western Europeans often argue that the delay of ten years in British entry has given Australia the opportunity of finding alternative markets and adjusting its economy to the new situation. We have emphasised to Britain and the Six that many of Australia's industries were developed to supply, and are still heavily dependent on, the British market.

Our Embassies are also continuing to remind the Governments of the Six that the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, where Australia has the responsibility of developing a viable economy, will be placed at a disadvantage if its position in the British market is weakened.

At the recent Commonwealth Prime Minister's Meeting in

Singapore the present Prime Minister stated that, in order to minimise the harmful effects of an enlarged Community there must be adherence to the principle of GATT of no increase in barriers to the trade of third countries. He urged that a Ministerial level meeting should be held in GATT before negotiations are finalised.

Australia is not a party to the negotiations taking place in Brussels. But we will continue to insist that European leaders have regard to their responsibility to other countries. We have a right to expect that the Community's policies are so based, that the problems of the rest of the world are not gravely accentuated or new problems created.

### INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Australia is an active member of those international organisations most concerned with international trade. We are a foundation member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which is dedicated to expanding world trade in a context of rising world living standards, full employment, full development of resources and expansion of world production. In GATT Australian representatives have striven for freer and more orderly international trade. The GATT has not given all members equal benefits. As a producer and exporter of bulk primary commodities, Australia has much in common with the developing countries who are seeking a better balance of opportunity between the industrialised members and those who depend on primary production.

It is in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that most consideration is given to problems of the developing nations in relation to their development needs. We are active in UNCTAD which, through the Trade and Development Board and a number of subordinate committees, makes recommendations on various aspects of trade such as commodities, manufactures, finance, shipping and invisible payments in relation to trade. From the outset, Australia has been a member of the Trade and Development Board and all the main committees except that on manufactures. UNCTAD consideration has led to the development of a generalised scheme of tariff preference for developing countries a field in which Australia took its own initiative some years ago.

### AUSTRALIA : OECD

The Government has authorised exploratory discussions to determine what would be the terms and conditions if Australia decided

to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). These discussions are well advanced and a full report on the terms and conditions is expected to be available for Ministers within the next few months.

Australian association with OECD is not a new thing. Australia has been a member since 1966 of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee and we have participated in a number of specific activities including discussions among Western countries about UNCTAD issues and about the Second United Nation Development Decade.

### INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMMES : AID FOR DEVELOPMENT

Australia's international aid programme is a well-established, important and integral part of our foreign relations.

As we have developed in our relations with other countries an independent and distinctively Australian policy, we have also taken on responsibilities towards the economic development of other countries in particular those which are our neighbour in Asia and the Pacific.

These responsibilities have been undertaken because we have recognised our humanitarian obligations to the people of those countries, though the countries themselves understand and acknowledge that they have to bear the main responsibilities for their own development. Australians have come to feel over the past two decades that the community in which they live no longer ends at Australia's own national boundaries. Just as we assist those who are economically worse off than others within our own country, so we also help the peoples of developing countries towards economic development and a better way of life. An increase in living standards if not a reduction in the economic disparities in our region can be a positive contribution to the removal of tensions which is in the general interest.

Australia has resisted suggestions that it should set artificial targets for the rate of increase of our aid. We have concentrated on performance rather than on promises—and our aid has risen for the past ten years at an average annual rate of approximately 12%. Today Australia ranks third among Western donors in the Percentage of the Gross National Product being provided as official aid. Moreover our aid, unlike that of most donors is in the form of grants rather than loans which often carry burdensome repayment obligations.

Australia's official aid this financial year even after the recent red-

actions in government expenditure are taken into account, is likely to total around \$ 187 million or an increase of some 13% over 1969/70.

Our bilateral aid goes almost entirely to the Asian region and to the Pacific. In addition to our aid to Papua and New Guinea we expect to spend slightly above \$42 million in Asian and Pacific countries in the present financial year. The largest single recipient of our aid is Indonesia where we have undertaken to give \$53.8 million over the three-year period which began on 1 June 1970. In addition to our bilateral aid we expect this year to contribute approximately \$11.5 million to multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations assistance agencies.

Australian bilateral aid to the region takes several different forms such as projects in the recipient countries, training in Australia, the provision of experts in specialised fields, food and other commodity aid and the provision of foreign exchange support. Aid is given in response to specific requests by the recipient countries to fit into the development priorities established by the developing countries themselves.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has proclaimed the 1970's as the Second Development Decade. It has adopted a strategy under which the members have set down ways in which they will endeavour to co-operate and contribute to the improvement of the economic and social conditions in developing countries during the decade. The Government approaches the Second Development Decade in a constructive spirit and intends that Australia should play its full part in this international co-operative effort.

### CULTURAL RELATIONS

Cultural relations with other countries is a more recently established and less well developed element in our foreign policy programme of action.

By facilitating cultural exchanges the Government seeks both to stimulate the interest of Australians in the ways of life and cultures of their neighbours and, through supporting cultural manifestations abroad, to increase awareness of Australia in other countries.

A wide variety of exchanges have been organised in recent years. Art exhibitions are sent abroad and there are tours of ballet, orchestra and puppet companies. Libraries of books have been presented to universities and education institutions in other countries, assistance

has been provided for the teaching of the English language, visits of influential persons (particularly from Asia) have been arranged, and a small programme of cultural awards for distinguished Asian scholars has been instituted.

Groups from Asian countries, primarily dance groups from India Thailand, Indonesia, the Republic of China and the Philippines have visited Australia.

Cultural exchanges have been organised largely on an informal basis. The only cultural agreement which has been negotiated has been with Indonesia.

UNESCO, and many other international organisations of which Australia is a member, are constitutionally charged with fostering international cultural co-operation. UNESCO has inaugurated a 10-year programme for the development of cultural policies of Member States, in which Australia is co-operating. We are active participants in the work of the ASPAC Cultural and Social Centre.

## ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment to be held in Stockholm in June 1972 will have the support and participation of Australia. Although not a member of the Preparatory Committee, Australia has been represented by observers at the two sessions the Committee has so far held.

There is a need for international action in this field which provides a means for greater co-operation among States and people at the scientific and technical level. Best known are the problems of air and water pollution, but there are others of special interest to Australia also, in the area, for example, of conservation and contamination. International action will bring to mankind a greater awareness of what is at stake, it will stimulate research and assistance and make its results known in the places where they can be most useful.

SWITZERLAND\*  
IN ITS CULTURAL. SOCIAL  
AND  
POLITICAL ASPECTS

\*Probel Verlag Information and Press Lenice, Zurich (as presented by Carl  
Dokk, Dr. of Law)



According to temperament foreign observers have held up Switzerland as an example to others or, even, have spoken of the Swiss miracle. We do not intend to pronounce upon the justice of these opinions. It would be unbecoming for anyone wishing to introduce his country to a foreigner to do so in the form of a panegyric. For one thing, the foreigner will know that the man he is talking to will usually love his country and naturally wish to speak of it as the best and fairest in the world. The self-evident needs no repetition. For another, the foreigner will expect a plain answer to his question on what Switzerland really is. A small continental country, poor in natural resources, rich in contrasts and differences, Switzerland seems to be a "special case" among the nations of this world. With a population of nearly 6 million, she is a living contradiction of the law of power and sheer size which would appear to govern the modern world, aspiring as in the past to maintain her independence by her own efforts and without external aid. Switzerland is the only member of the OECD never to have accepted or even asked for financial aid. Even though the present trend of affairs makes closer links with other countries seem expedient, Switzerland is not yet ready to join the United Nations. But enough of such generalities. Let the facts and figures speak for themselves.

### The Federal State

As most people know, Switzerland is a federal state, i. e. a federation comprising 22 member states called "cantons". This federal state covers an area of 15,941 sq. miles with a population of some 6,184,000 inhabitants, giving a density of 250 per sq. mile. The density of the population is not only sparse but also very irregularly distributed. More than a fifth of the total population is concentrated in the 5 cities of Zurich, Basel, Berne, Geneva and Lausanne. There has been a considerable increase in the population since 1950, particularly in the big urban centres and medium-sized conurbations, this is due not only to a rising birth-rate and a declining death-rate but also to a drift to the towns from the agricultural areas and particularly from the alpine regions. The

peasants, especially in the mountain areas, have a harder struggle to make a living than do the inhabitants of an industrial region or the townsmen who benefit from the annually increasing volume of trade. This is why the population of an alpine canton such as the Grisons has increased from 90,000 to 146,000 over the last hundred years whereas that of the canton of Zurich, which possesses highly developed industries and commerce as well as the largest city in Switzerland, has increased from 250,000 to 1,099,000. Although differences are less marked in the figures for other cantons, it is clear that the ratio between agricultural and industrial regions is changing inexorably in favour of the latter. In other words, Switzerland is in the midst of a rapid process of industrialization. Nor is this merely implicit in the general trend of our times; Switzerland is becoming industrialized because her inhabitants must live. To live they must export; to export they must rely primarily on industrial production. The result is that out of every 1000 persons gainfully employed, 165 are engaged in agriculture, 118 in commerce, banks and insurance and 466 in industry and crafts. It must also be remembered that Switzerland has no raw materials and must import them.

### Foreign Competition

Switzerland lives by exporting. To compete successfully on world markets, she must manufacture each high-grade goods as those produced by the watch-making, engineering and textile industries. Through the systematic promotion of scientific research, either by the state in its universities or by industry within its own organizations, Switzerland has so far succeeded in holding her own against other nations. An excellent example of this is provided by the chemical industry.

### Four Principal Languages

The peculiar position of Switzerland, however, will not permit of her population problem being discussed purely in social and economic terms. Switzerland is a polyglot country whose four principal languages are divided among the population as follows:—

German 69.3 per cent, French 18.9 per cent.

Italian 9.5 per cent and Romanche 0.9 per cent.

Apart from these figures, official statistics (1960) also record 74,300 persons as having another (foreign) language as their mother tongue. Most of the cantons form a linguistic unit, one language

only being officially recognized there. The Grisons is the only canton to have three official languages : German, Romanche and Italian. The cantons of Geneva, Vaud and Neuchatel are exclusively French-speaking. French is predominant in the cantons of Fribourg and Valais, whereas in the canton of Berne it is spoken only by a minority, the majority of the inhabitants speaking German. There is only one Italian-speaking canton, the Ticino. In all the others the official language is German.

### Ethnical Groups

Are there any minorities in Switzerland? If so, do these minorities stand in need of protection? This is a very natural question to ask; the reply is simple : the term "minority" is unknown to both Swiss legislation and Swiss jurisdiction. Only the title of *citizen* matters to the Confederation, irrespective of social class, religious creed or language. Clearly, numerical minorities claim the attention of the state when certain structures within societies deriving their character from, say, language or religion, give rise to conflicts between numerical majorities and minorities. These difficulties are overcome by means of statutes enforceable in all parts of the country, i.e. in all cantons, there being more especially a declaration in the constitution that the liberty of conscience and creed is inviolable and that nobody may be forced to join a religious association or to follow religious instruction. Nor is anyone liable to penalties of any kind whatsoever for holding a religious opinion. For this reason free religious establishment is assured in Switzerland, although the majority of the cantons belong either to the Catholic or the Protestant tradition, or to both, and grant some churches the right to form associations constituted according the rules of public law, thereby gaining an advantage, primarily financial, over the other religious communities. The confederation does not know any special legislation referring to questions of language, a fruitful source of controversy in other countries. Such legislation would be entirely superfluous, since the linguistic peace has never been seriously endangered. If, in the constitution, the Confederation has raised German, French, Italian and Romanche to the rank of national languages, this has been done to show that there are no problems of linguistic minorities in Switzerland. It may be said in all humility that the four languages of Switzerland, i.e. its four ethnical groups, are not only her strength but also the basis of her existence. Remove but one of these groups, and Switzerland as such would

cease to exist.

### Unity in Diversity

It would be equally wrong to suppose that there is a *culture common to the whole of Switzerland*. It is true, of course, that the German language in Switzerland is identical with that in Germany, the French with that in France, the Italian with that in Italy. The literature of German Switzerland is part of German literature; the books, magazines and newspapers published in Germany are read in German-speaking Switzerland. The same may be said of French-speaking Switzerland and Italian-speaking Switzerland with regard to France and Italy. Even so, it must be realized that Swiss literature written in German, French, Italian and, a fortiori, in *Romanche* has a character of its own rooted in the Swiss attitude and spirit. Though the landscape, architecture and customs may differ greatly from one region to another, and even from one valley to another, there is, all the same, a spirit, an outlook peculiar to Switzerland, which is best summed up as 'unity in diversity'.

### Contribution to Culture

World literature is the richer for such contributions from Switzerland as the writings of J.-J. Rousseau, C.-F. Ramuz, Gottfried Keller, C. F. Meyer, Jacob Burckhardt and others. There have also been notable contributions to the fine arts from men like Hodler and Bocklin. In our own day music has likewise been enriched by the work of such composers as Arthur Honegger, Frank Martin, and Willy Burkhard, to mention only three. The same holds good in the educational field (Heinrich Pestalozzi, Father Girard), and in the various departments of science, where no fewer than 14 Nobel Prizes bear eloquent testimony of Swiss ability. This is why it is no exaggeration to say that the Swiss recognizes honours won in the fields of science and the arts by members of another linguistic community as Swiss achievements redounding to the credit of the Swiss people as a whole.

### Primary and Secondary Schools

It will therefore come as no surprise to be told that there is a Swiss school, although the cantons, which are autonomous in educational matters, have their own school legislation, their own curricula and their own training colleges. For it is at this school that the adolescent imbibes the spirit of Switzerland despite the bewil-

dering diversity and number of these schools.

The seven universities, which are all supported by their respective cantons (Zurich, Basel, Berne, Geneva, Vaud, Fribourg and Neuchâtel), provide instruction in all faculties, with the exception of Fribourg and Neuchâtel, which have no faculty of medicine.

St. Gall is the home of the School of Economic and Social Sciences. The Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology, the only graduate schools supported by the Confederation, are at Zurich and Lausanne.

During the winter semester, 1969/70, 24,165 students were enrolled at the 7 universities; 1,114 at the School of Economic and Social Sciences, 4,883 at the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, and 744 at the Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne. These institutions were also attended by a total of 9089 foreign students.

### Civic Spirit

The foreign observer is often strongly tempted to see an unhealthy hypertrophy in this multiplicity of universities. In Switzerland, however it is rather evidence of the interest shown in spiritual values. We may even go further and say that, in so far as state intervention is necessary, it is, in principle, the cantons that will concern themselves with cultural matters, the Confederation restricting itself to certain special spheres such as the Federal Institutes of Technology. The canton is real state with all the attributes of a state: a people, power, public property. But the 22 cantons are firmly welded into a Confederation to which they have delegated certain powers, more especially those pertaining to foreign relations. It would be impossible to deny that during the last few decades as a consequence of economic and technical developments the Confederation has grown in importance. This does not mean, however, that the Swiss is any less conscious of belonging to his own canton. This is particularly true in the cantons which still apply direct democracy in the "Landsgemeinde". In these cantons the people meet in the open air once a year to discuss cantonal affairs and to elect judges and government leaders. On these occasions the word "democracy" assumes its full value and faithfully reflects its meaning as the highest form of government and the safeguard of individual liberty.

### Neutrality

Switzerland is not a special case and has no desire to be one. The Swiss want to preserve their country for their descendants, and

it is for this reason that they hold aloof from the affairs of other nations. "Do not interfere in foreign quarrels?" was the advice their compatriot Nicolas de Flue gave them as long ago as the 15th century. It is precisely this policy of non-interference and non-participation in the conflicts of others which is known to the world as Swiss neutrality. What is often ignored, even by Switzerland's friends, is that Swiss neutrality is not a bed of sloth and that it does not permit the country to sit idly by and watch the destiny of the world with passive interest. This neutrality would be worth little if it were not armed and secured by an alert and modern military defence system. This is why neutrality imposes a grievous burden on the Swiss military budget. Nor should it be forgotten that, as a result of Swiss neutrality, a heavy onus lies on those responsible for Swiss foreign policy, especially in the present state of strained political and economic relations in world affairs. Swiss neutrality is not synonymous with isolation : this would be an impossible attitude for a country so heavily dependent upon world trade. For this reason Switzerland follows a policy of *solidarity*, everywhere and always, provided its neutrality is not endangered. It is in this spirit that it cooperates with the technical bodies of the United Nations, International Labour Office (I. L. O.) world Health Organisation, International Children's Aid, FAO etc.-Moreover Switzerland naturally takes part in the international congresses where cultural, scientific economic and social problems are discussed. Finally, we may add, in all modesty, that Switzerland is the home of the International Red Cross, and that the Swiss, as a people, make it their duty to help any other nation stricken by disaster. In other words, it is Switzerland's wish to share in the spirit of solidarity without which the future of humanity would, indeed, look bleak.

FOREIGN POLICY  
OF  
BELGIUM\*

\*As expressed in Memo from Belgium, 1971.

## BELGIUM'S FOREIGN POLICY

At the time of the international conferences leading up to the recognition of Belgian independence in 1830-1831, the powers imposed upon Belgium the state of guaranteed neutrality for the sake of the stability of Europe and the safety of the Continent.

By this position of international obligation, Belgium was in fact prevented from forming any political alliance, but she did enjoy the advantage of relative security afforded her by an international guarantee of her independence and territorial integrity. This enforced neutrality, however, did not free Belgium from military responsibilities: on the contrary, it made it compulsory for her to maintain a national army in order to ensure that her soil would be respected. The whole of Belgian policy in the 19th and the early 20th centuries was conditioned by this state of things: she had constantly to be on watch lest any of her actions in international affairs could be construed as an infringement of her neutrality, while there was also the unrelenting military effort required to maintain her defences in such a state of preparedness that her neutrality could be regarded as "active".

This policy was to a great extent successful. Not only was Belgium able, for this reason, to stay out of the war of 1870, but in 1914 the Belgian fortifications held back a substantial part of the invading forces (from August to October) and in so doing, contributed greatly to the final victory of the Allies.

The war of 1914-1918 led to the abrogation of the state of neutrality. Belgium consequently decided on other ways of safeguarding her security. In the first place, she resorted to a policy of military agreements with the Great Powers of the Great Powers. While she was able to come to an arrangement with France, England declined to embark on this course of action. It was a question simply of what military precautions to take in the event of a further German aggression in the demilitarised Rhineland. However, the main efforts of Belgian policy were concentrated on the system of collective security advocated by the League of Nations which had been created by the Treaty of Versailles (1919). The Treaty of Locarno was drawn up as a result of these efforts, a regional pact



by which the signatories all bound themselves to keep the peace (1925).

The failure of the Great Powers to intervene when the Rhineland was reoccupied rendered this treaty valueless. Now released from her obligations, Belgium began to look for a new foreign policy line. The one she decided to follow is known as the *policy of independence*, and differed essentially from her former state of imposed neutrality as it meant a voluntary neutrality which Belgium herself could decide to relinquish in case of aggression.

This independence was guaranteed first by France and Great Britain, and subsequently also by Germany.

By this new national policy, Belgium rallied the entire nation for intensive rearmament. Germany, France and Great Britain having reaffirmed on August 26, 27 and 28, 1939 the declarations they had made in 1937, on September 3 Belgium proclaimed her neutrality in the conflict that had just broken out. She hoped in this way to avoid for as long as possible the opening of hostilities on the western front. If, as in 1914, she was to be dragged into the war through the violation of her frontiers, once again both she and her allies would at least benefit morally from the fact she was once more the victim of unprovoked aggression.

After a few months of respite gained by this policy, the German invasion of May 10, 1940, forced Belgium into the second world war. For eighteen days her forces resisted the enemy, but the south flank was turned and the country could not be saved from total occupation, which was to last for four years.

At the end of the war, Belgium took part at San Francisco (April-June 1945) in the drafting of the United Nations Charter, to which she has given her full support ever since. The hope of seeing a lasting peace established with the co-operation of all nations soon faded under the effect of the misuse of the veto, which rendered the United Nations Organisation impotent.

Belgium then began to enter into regional defensive alliances, as provided for under the Charter. Thus, on March 17, 1948 she signed the Treaty of Brussels linking Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries which extended her co-operation to the economic, social and cultural spheres. This alliance was further extended by the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949.

The Treaty of London, signed on May 5 of the same year, created the Council of Europe in which Belgium decided to take part. Finally, on October 23, 1954, Belgium signed the Paris agreements which

extended the Treaty of Brussels to Germany and Italy, allowing Germany to become a member of N. A. T. O., and instituting the Western European Union (W. E. U.).

Since 1921, she has been linked with the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in an *Economic Union* (B.L.E.U.=Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union); and has concluded a *Customs Union* with the Netherlands, which was gradually to become an economic union of the *three Benelux countries* (Convention signed in London on September 5, 1944 followed by a pre-union agreement signed in The Hague on October 15, 1949). The Benelux Economic Union came into effect on November 1, 1960.

On April 16, 1948 in Paris, Belgium signed the Convention for Economic Co-operation establishing the Organisations for European Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) which has since become the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (O.E.C.D.), and on April 18, 1951, the treaty setting up the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.).

The European Economic Community (E.E.C.) set up by the Treaty of Rome signed on March 25, 1957, represents a further stage in European economic integration. This agreement between Germany, Belgium, France, Italy the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and the Netherlands was matched by the treaty setting up the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) for the creation of a common market in the nuclear industry.

Belgian policy is aimed at speeding up the process of economic integration.

On June 30, 1960 Belgium granted independence to the Congo, the colony which she had governed since 1908. On July 1, 1962, Rwanda and Burundi, the trust territories administered by Belgium, acceded to full independence in their turn.

## VIEWS OF Mr M. PIERRE HARMEL MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS\*

We are convinced that we are living through a rare moment of European history, in which convergent political forces are being called upon to help build up the communities to a level of strength and to a scale which will lead to a United Europe within the foreseeable future.

The months preceding the summit meeting at the Hague in 1969 and the months following the meeting in 1970 have seen the birth of a movement whose rate of growth should now be controlled and whose objectives should now be defined. We may justifiably believe and hope that, by 1980, the "Europe of the Communities", which is already a major economic and commercial power in many ways, will also be one of the four or five great 'political' forces in the world. Although we can view the present situation with optimism, we cannot but feel some anxiety when we see that every subject—by its nature technical—implying the construction of Europe is treated by our governments and by European bodies solely on its own merits without sufficient allowance for the opportunities we are letting slip.

We for our part are absolutely convinced that 1971, and doubtless 1972 as well, will be the year in which we can take the decisive path within a space of a few months: shall we enlarge the European Community within this time? Will the first few actions of the Economic and Monetary Union be sufficiently forceful to render the movement irreversible? Can Europe's relations with North America be adapted to the new conditions of living in the world? Will we have come to an agreement with the East on the launching of a multilateral process, even if limited, of regional disarmament? All this work lies before us, and no problem can be viewed in isolation from the rest.

Shall we be able to gather sufficient political momentum not only to take the immediate decisions but also to transmit sufficient force to our successors who will be responsible for implementing these

Speech delivered by M. Pierre Harmel to the Senate House during the discussion on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget, 1971. The speech presents an authentic account of the basic features of Belgium's Foreign Policy.

decisions by 1990 while not necessarily being in such a favourable situation as today ?

The governments which have already come together under the Treaty and those which are now negotiating an enlargement of the Community are all facing these questions. We all have major choices to make : in Belgium's case, the choices are at least as important as our recent internal decisions on adaptation of our constitution to the Community. A United Europe: this is our third dimension, doubtless the most decisive factor in the future. This is why I should like to-day to discuss only one aspect of foreign policy, which I shall break down into three sections :

1. What is the Belgian position with regard to the four foundations of a United Europe ?

2. What is the purpose of Europe ?

3. What will be the relations of a United Europe with the rest of the world ?

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## I. A. THE FOUR FOUNDATIONS OF A UNITED EUROPE

The first part of my report may be the shortest, for it is the part with which we are most familiar.

The four foundation stones which we are preparing to lay are :

- transfer to the definitive period from the transition period;
- new internal developments;
- enlargement of the Community;
- political unification.

In addition to the above, we may just mention *en passant* the new developments occurring recently in areas peripheral to the traditional activities of the European Community, such as the ministerial meetings of the Six between the Ministers of Education, Justice and Tourism.

Apart from these new areas of discussion, the Community has undertaken to put out feelers with regard to an E.E.C. regional policy and an industrial policy.

As part of the decisions taken with regard to the transfer to the definitive period, the Senate has already made its views known by approving, on 22 December 1970, the decision taken by the Council of Ministers on 21 April 1970 to the effect that the Communities would receive their own resources by 1975 separate from those of the

member states and closely supervised by the European Assembly.

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**A. Transfer to the definitive period :** The Communities have, therefore, God willing, become perpetual as of the first of January 1970. They have assembled the basic requirements as laid down by the Treaty of Rome and are able to cross the threshold to enter the definitive period. We should, however, not be revealing the whole truth if we did not point out that many questions should have been settled by this date, but are still outstanding.

This applies in particular to the subjects of competitive terms obtaining in public calls for tenders, the free establishment of banks and to a certain extent to the common trade policy, an area in which great effort is needed if we are to complete the work prescribed by the Treaties.

Moreover, in other sectors the Community is now faced with new facts obliging it to rethink certain aspects of problems or to integrate policies that have already been laid down, especially in the field of Euratom and of a common agricultural policy.

**B. Development of the common market :** The second factor, that of internal development, in pursuance of the Hague decisions, can be broken down into at least three parts :

- social progress;
- technology;
- economic and monetary union.

Obviously the decisions dated 8 and 9 February 1971 on the subject of economic and monetary union are those which will commit us most in the future. The political decision that there will be parallel progress, by stages, towards economic and monetary unification by 1980 is without doubt the most momentous European event since the signature of the Treaty of Rome. If we have the wisdom to set up a solid, wellbalanced basis for this union during the first stage and to take all due care with this trial, by 1 January 1974 we shall be in a position of strength, all the more vital, as by that time new member states will also be involved.

**C. Enlargement :** The first steps towards the third factor, enlargement, have already been taken: negotiations have been taking place on the membership of Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway. The central problems have been stated and the method of negotiation is reasonably satisfactory. By the end of this six month period we should know whether an overall solution can be

reached to the more difficult questions. This term is essential in that unless general negotiations are concluded by mid-year and detailed negotiations by the early autumn, the hostile elements, which always have their importance in politics, would perhaps gain the upper hand.

**D. Political unification :** Lastly, for the first time in the history of United Europe, negotiations on political unity have gone past the stage of aborted projects. In July 1970 in Brussels, with the report of the Directors of Policy of the six member states, a provisional and cautious beginning has been made to concrete discussions between the six Foreign Ministers. An attempt is being made to reach joint positions on concrete aspects of European foreign policy, not without success. The first ministerial meeting of the Six at Munich and later the meeting of the Ten at Brussels was encouraging. The second meeting will be held in Paris in May next.

Of course there is another political and institutional problem of capital importance, and we shall be discussing this later: the organisation of the power of a United Europe. We must pay credit to the French head of state, President Pompidou, for having reopened this matter during his press conference on 21 January 1971. The matter thus launched will not be without its effects.

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However, the peoples of Europe will be able to deal with this major question only if they can all reply to another more fundamental and more important question: our six governments have repeated their intention in the Hague of forming a community of European States, but what do we want to be and what do we want to do?

## II. EUROPE : WHY ?

**A. An economic and commercial power :** We need wonder no longer whether the European Community wishes to be or will be a great economic and commercial power. All the signs are that it is already such a power !

This is the result achieved by the very existence of an agricultural and industrial market united within the limits of a single territory, acting as a single body in major trade negotiations such as the Kennedy Round and the GATT discussions, linked to more than half the nations of the world by specific agreements.

The Europe of the Communities is already a great economic and

commercial power. In whole sectors of scientific research, for example, it holds the leading position in the world, while it has caught up the United States in other sectors.

In industry, Europe-wide agreements are becoming increasingly numerous, thus creating new and decisive tools for the creation of European cooperation.

Compared with the United States, the European chemical industry has a higher production capacity, steel production is level, and energy production will be equal in ten years' time due to the nuclear power stations; gold and convertible currency reserves are one and a half times higher; the growth rate of the gross national product is also higher; total exports of finished products from the leading Western European countries are three times those of the United States.

In making these comparisons we are not, as we shall see later on, issuing a challenge but merely stating a few stimulating truths and counting the "European aces" in our hand. These aces merit our attention, and they have been far better described by one of our compatriots, Joseph Basile, in a concise work whose value I should like to emphasise.

However, as George Ball wrote, to be a great power it is not enough to have the territory and population of a continent, to draw on enormous physical resources, to have a population of well-trained workers. If we are to play the role made possible by these advantages, both in our own eyes and in those of the world, we need a political horizon, internal cohesion, overall power and the will to use that power.

**B. Europe : the basic truths :** We must, then, face the more far-reaching and more fundamental questions to which the European Community should be able to reply with a single voice: what are the basic truths, the truths recognised by all, what is the kind of European awareness that provide the underlying reasons for the unification of our states? We think there at least four such truths.

1. The very first truth is that of caution: we want to *protect ourselves against ourselves*!

Our peoples cannot forget that four times over the past 150 years our fragment of Europe has been at war with itself, and that on three of these occasions it has become the field of a single tenant sown with hate and misery.

Today our younger generation sometimes feels that twenty-five years without civil strife in Europe and the interlinking of our

interests have finally routed our nationalist demons. Let us not be so hasty in drawing such a conclusion! Today we are no longer bloodless ex-combattants who must be reconciled to give us time to bind up our wounds! The nations of Europe are prosperous once again; to a greater or lesser extent they may be tempted by this very renewal of strength. Each nation, then, especially the leading nations, must recognise that the advantages of a United Europe are at least equal to those that they would sacrifice by renouncing an exclusively national destiny.

It is through caution, therefore, through the instinct of self-preservation that Europe will achieve a dimension which will never allow it to appear too small to any one of its peoples, a structure so carefully balanced that none of the component states will be tempted to try to win supremacy, a degree of integration sufficient to counteract any idea of detachment.

2. The second conscious truth contributing towards the formation of a United Europe is the need to ensure the *permanent survival of parliamentary democracy*.

The choice of the democratic system for the government of Europe was at the same time a way of strengthening the principle in each of the member states.

Industrial undertakings are not the only organisations that have to be big enough to survive! The same rules apply to the party system, the basis of parliamentary government.

A European democracy that is divided into tiny fragments by the over-multiplication of political formations would continue to be weak, volatile, eternally subject to the random combinations of too many political alliances.

On the other hand, if a United Europe is guided by a small number of basic ideological schools of thought deep-rooted in each of these countries, the cohesion of parliamentary democracy—still fragile in so many places—would be considerably strengthened.

In addition, European integration enables our nations to rejuvenate and adapt the existing structures, thus providing solutions to problems that no single nation can arrive at alone. The process of integration must give this part of the world the force to face the challenge of the future, both internally and in its international relations.

3. A third truth a *coetly* truth, underlies the concept of Europe: *Europe is the society devoting the largest portion of its resources to the personal happiness of its citizens.* In a very recent work, Professor Albert



Coppe, a fellow Belgian, ably demonstrated this by comparison with other leading collective groupings. By highly developed social democracy, Europe is attempting to foster the use of liberty.

When, early this year, King Baudouin, speaking to those in authority, underlined the importance of collective investment, he was expressing the European spirit which tends gradually to convert the economy of things into an economy of men.

In the final analysis, this is the basic and original preoccupation of European society : since every citizen is acquiring more and more choice, and therefore more and more power, how should we help him to use so much liberty properly ? This is why Europe in general is doing its utmost—although the means to achieve the end are not always easy—to ensure that human society is a society of dialogue, participation and mutual assistance.

4. The fourth important truth in Europe is that, for all the above reasons, it is different from the other leading world groupings and it could not exercise the same type of authority as in the United States or the U.S.S.R. Its balance between technique, the art of living and the higher aspirations of the individual confers upon Europe another sort of influence.

Europe has no ambition to acquire military power on an inter-continental scale; it has no intention of winning its place in the world by its ambitions of supremacy.

Europe is prepared to shoulder its share of the responsibility for defending its own area. But its ambition is to be a moderating influence, conciliator, even an arbitrator, provided that its social generosity is not limited by its borders but can be spread wide to less fortunate and more distant peoples. To do this, it must identify itself with a contemporary truth : peace is no longer represented by a military super-power, but by cooperation and a sharing in prosperity !

These four considerations are fundamental to Europe and are wider than its economic objectives. Altogether, they supply the answer to the question : "Why Europe ?"

**C. Three major questions :** If Europe is to be true to its own nature, European unification will be a peaceful revolution, less exciting than adventure perhaps, but requiring political decisions of greatest importance in three fields:

- the size of Europe;
- effect on opinion;
- the institutional structure.

1. **The scale of a United Europe.** It is not enough to criticise the division of the world into two super-powers. Only if Europe faces up to its own responsibilities, both internal and external, will we help others to limit their own responsibilities. The best service that Western Europe could render the two super-powers would be to create a politically homogeneous body, a well balanced society pursuing its own objectives and capable of achieving them by reason of its size and its solidly-based institutional system.

The necessary size will be reached by the enlarged community, grouping the ten nations which were originally the inspirers.

a. We have already told the representatives of European countries which have lost or which have not yet achieved a democratic organisation that no United Europe based on the parliamentary system could exist unless the same type of power obtained within each member state.

b. We also consider that if other European nations boasting an equally democratic system of government desire to remain neutral or non-committed for reasons of history, geography or political concept, they are right not to ask for membership but rather for a form of cooperation. To set up a United Europe, a Europe that is needed by the world, each of its members must be ready to pool its instruments of power so that in the final analysis a single foreign policy can be forged. We also believe it to be a good thing that about a third of the countries in Europe are non-committed or neutral. Wherever they are—in the Great North or in the Mediterranean—even though their situation may be difficult, they can form bridges, the ground for experiments, the links between the contradictory systems separating the East from the West.

It is in the interests of both the East and the West to respect the political originality of states remaining outside the movement of integration.

c. Having stated the above, the ten nations now negotiating an enlargement of the Common Market will form the basic essential Europe: not too small, as the Community of the Six is in danger of becoming; not too heterogeneous, as they are united by geography and by a single philosophy; not too unbalanced, as the enlarged community will include four large nations and six medium-sized or small nations.

It can never be emphasised sufficiently that the reasons for enlargement—and especially for the membership of Great Britain—are not solely or even principally economic. The advantages would of

course be reciprocal. We are well aware of the scientific and technological contribution that Great Britain could make to the Community, and of its unique efforts in the leading fields of radiotelescopy, controlled thermonuclear reaction, oceanographic research, aircraft construction, automation. We also know that the very fact of enlarging a single market to a population of 250 million inhabitants provides the certainty of increased prosperity for each individual, the guarantee of regular growth of family income and an unsurpassed opportunity for social development. But the political reasons for enlargement—the reasons that we have called the “European truths”—are just as decisive.

Neither Great Britain nor the Scandinavian countries nor Ireland nor ourselves will ever reach a successful solution to the obstacles hampering negotiations if we are to base our negotiations on legitimate, but short or very medium term, material interests. If we are to succeed, we must clearly realise that Great Britain without the Six and the Six without Great Britain will never constitute the single leading power who, together with the United States, the U.S.S.R., Communist China and perhaps Japan, can play the role of moderator, the original and incomparable role of intermediary, in the world. It must be a Europe of peace, taking no pride in having too often lit the match which set off world wars; an integrated not obsessed with ideas of supremacy, having Europe resolutely turned over the page from the days of colonialism and responding to the aspirations to growth and prosperity in the whole of the Southern hemisphere to which it is joined by so many links.

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It is understandable that those having only a dim concept of the essential and promising nature of this change should hesitate; it is equally understandable that those who have understood all too well the position that would be won by such a Europe should have attempted to prevent its creation. In 1967, at the Karlovy-Vary Congress, the principal aim of the Communist parties in Europe was to attempt to arouse the Community countries against the German Federal Republic and to prevent Great Britain's entry in the Common Market! In other words, they wanted to dismantle democratic Europe. Events have fortunately gone quite the other way, and perhaps the opinions of these people have progressed a little since then.

2. **Arousal of European awareness :** The risk that the venture will not succeed is an internal risk. This is why its success depends mainly on the awareness of what is at stake by general opinion in all ten countries, in every class of society and in every generation.

I do not believe that we are doing enough to arouse awareness. If the people belonging to Europe of the Ten are to be instilled with enthusiasm and to spur us on, a dialogue must be started up, particularly with the representatives of each nation through parliamentary with the representatives of each nation through parliamentary debate. But even this is not enough.

International labour and management organisations, the major international political movements, the centres of European political thought and, within each of the ten countries, a multiple branch movement have all worked hard for the past twenty years to implement their convictions. Europe owes them a great deal, but we must call upon them, as well as the parties and parliaments, to intensify their efforts for, as we have said, 1971 will be our decisive year.

3. **The final institutions :** Europe will not be true to itself unless it is given all the power it needs to set up a European government.

Belgium has never taken part in the abstract disputes as to whether there should be a Europe of Nations or a Europe of States. But now that Europe is beginning to take shape, each act accomplished raises institutional questions to which our full attention is being paid. The problem on each occasion is a three-fold one :

1. What powers should be transferred by the governments to the Community institutions ?

2. Will the national governments take part in administering the powers transferred ? In what way ?

3. How will authority be shared between Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission ?

There is no one simple outline solution : the solution will be complex and will evolve. It will be complex, because each transfer of power raises simultaneously the three questions above. It will evolve, as the EEC has acquired the habit of moving forward by stages.

However, in the light of experience a few concrete rules can be established :

(a) It is absolutely certain that at the end of the process of unification, each state will continue to handle whatever can best be

handled at its own level : everything concerned with language, culture, local and regional authorities and many other powers will continue to be the responsibility of the national governments. These will have more and more weight, and regional interests will be accentuated as divergences will not be smothered by a United Europe.

(b) National governments will be all the more ready to limit their sovereignty as two precautions will have been taken. Firstly, power will not be transferred to Community level *en bloc*, but rather a little at a time, area by area, in accordance with concrete objectives that have been determined in advance. One example is the method that has just been agreed upon regarding the Community's own resources and regarding economic and monetary union. Secondly, in the preliminary stage, these powers will usually be delegated before they actually transferred. This perspective appears to open up a wide field of action for the Commission. This has already been the case with agricultural policy which is administered by the Commission except in the case of major options or if the Commission decisions are reversed by unanimous vote of the Council. Finally, the Assembly and the Council of Ministers will have wider powers if the national delegates take part in decisions. For example, members will be more prepared to give authority to the Council of Ministers if, as recommended by the French head of state, this continues to be composed of ministers who still belong to their own national governments.

In the same way, we are perhaps justified in our belief that the Assembly will be granted wider powers if it consists partly of representatives elected by a direct vote and partly by representatives of the member governments.

In expressing these thoughts, we are merely interpreting the current trends and guiding thought in Belgium. The Belgian government upholds no abstract theory on the political structures of Europe, but it considers that any new mission entrusted to the Community must be offset by a fresh injection of power, carefully distributed between existing European institutions which will make it possible to reach rapid decisions—and this is not yet the case!

### III. Beyond the Frontiers of Europe

Thirty one years ago, at a tragic moment, Winston Churchill

suggested to Paul Reynaud that the two empires, British and French, be combined under a single government. Each citizen would have dual nationality French and British. All their resources would be pooled... Now the day has almost dawned when, at a less emotional time, the citizens of the ten countries of Europe are to have dual nationality, their own and European nationality. As for the date on which part of the member nations' resources are to be pooled, this has already been fixed!

The aims of the Europe of the Communities therefore, are already far-reaching: it has made a joint effort to achieve economic and social growth, it has achieved internal peace in the West!

However, our young Europeans who have never known war in the West and who find our prosperity "only natural" will not be content with tranquillity and relative security alone. They will refuse to accept the over-simplification of a world divided into two camps, each with their fortress and their walls around them. They will refuse to accept the division of peoples into the rich and the poor: to them it will be irrelevant and unrealistic. They will want to throw a new card on to the card table of the world.

If they are to give of themselves to Europe, they will need to see that there is hope and promise for many other humans. United Europe must be fully aware of its place in the world by its foreign policy towards the Mediterranean, North America, the Communist Eastern states and the Far East, and finally the Southern hemisphere.

Recently there have begun to be prospects for discussions and, in due course, cooperation with the Latin American countries, with the adoption of the Buenos Aires declarations whose importance cannot be over-emphasised.

Belgium will do all it can to develop such a policy during meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the Six, then of the Ten, and through the wider multilateral institutions on which the EEC member countries are represented.

1. **The Mediterranean.** To explain why the Mediterranean is of prime importance to us, the French poet Paul Valéry wrote "Wherever the names of Plato, Teigan and Saint Paul have a simultaneous meaning and authority, there lies Europe."

And there lies the Mediterranean, with which we are inextricably linked as already two member countries of the Community have shores that are washed by its waters and as we have drawn from the Mediterranean the three pillars of our civilisation.

In the words of President Nixon, speaking of the United States and the U.S.S.R., Europe too has "vital interests" in this sea and on its shores.

It was not mere chance that has led the Communities to enter into agreements with each of the countries bordering the sea beneficial to the prosperity of the Mediterranean, from overall association to traditional or preferential trade agreements. One of the reasons has been that our countries are anxious to see the restoration of peace in the Near East. Belgium has always—but particularly since the fresh crisis in 1967—wished to retain equal relationships with the parties to this conflict, believing that this is in the interest of peace. Belgium is delighted that the six EEC nations have all more or less adopted this attitude and that they are thinking along the same lines on this subject. Our country welcomes the initiative taken by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers which has set this region of the world on the path to appeasement.

Belgium also welcomes the work of the four great powers and the leading role played by the mediator, Gunnar Jarring. More recently we have seen with satisfaction the changes which, in Egypt, give more hope for the future.

Belgium would also be happy to see Israel, for its part, making the gesture awaited by the world which will clear the horizon in this part of the world.

**2. North America :** Different kinds of links unite us to the United States and Canada.

Originally we owe all to the Mediterranean. In North America, our peoples originally gave all.

My generation will not forget the history of half a century, two liberations and then the prosperity of Europe restored from 1948 on by the 18 thousand million dollars poured into Europe over five years under the Marshall Plan.

We are also bound to each other by what is happening today: the identity of our political systems, economic and commercial currents, the interdependence of many industrial ventures, and even more the intercontinental nuclear defence system which safeguards Europe and which makes our part Eurasia the front line and essential line of defence and the outpost for remote detection in protection of North America.

For twenty five years Europe has built up its strength once again, sheltered by the United States. Now the situation is different. Canada and the United States are facing problems of defence, not

only on the Atlantic side but also in the Pacific and the Great North and these major nations have acquired a more comprehensive overall vision of the world than in the 1950's.

Although we complement each other, we are nonetheless different from each other, if only in our view of our mission in the world.

This is the reason why, in 1962 and 1963, the Belgians were among those who took to heart President Kennedy's speeches at Frankfurt and Philadelphia on partnership.

At Frankfurt, John Kennedy said: "We are now looking towards a strong and unified Europe, speaking with a single voice, acting with a common will, acting as a world power capable of dealing with world problems as a partner on an equal footing".

"The present great task of construction is here, on this continent, where the effort to unite a free Europe has already been started. It is not for the Americans to dictate to the Europeans how they should progressively tackle such efforts. The construction of Europe as conceived by the Europeans—banishing for ever the civil wars which have repeatedly shaken the world—will have the heartfelt support of the United States. Such construction is a necessary phase in the strengthening of the community of peace."

When, five years later, we tried to introduce this idea into the Atlantic Alliance, it was defeated and it was a pity!

We would have preferred that in 1968, on the twentieth anniversary of N.A.T.O., it should have become not only what it is today, an alliance whose aim is defence and an easing of the situation, but that, it should have been built up on two equal foundations: North America and Europe.

This project should now take shape over the next two years. As soon as the Community is enlarged, we shall have to take the view that the unification of Europe's foreign policies does not only involve diplomacy, foreign trade and cooperation in development, but also defence.

We do not believe that this would lead to Europe attempting to outdo the United States in mastery of intercontinental weapons, but it would mean that United Europe would take a reasonable share in regional defence within the Alliance.

In the field of trade, in the meanwhile, it is very evident that systematic contact between the Community and the United States and Canada is essential; such contact need not be institutional, but—as we have already told the Community—we hope that a regular exchange of information and views should be set up so that



we can investigate in depth those divergences in trade policy risking harm to both continents.

**3. Policy towards the East :** A third and very apparent direction of Belgium's foreign policy and that of other Community nations is the opening of the door to the East

In a recent work by an American diplomat who has lived among us for many years, it was asserted that in about 1967 Belgium adopted this policy as a sort of psychological counterweight to our loyalty to the Alliance when N.A.T.O. was forced to set up its Secretariat General and S.H.A.P.E. in Belgium. The evaluation is, I believe, slightly mischievous ! We thought that we should take as many diplomatic risks for peace as military risks ! Nor have we changed our minds. When we survey the progress we have made, particularly in 1970, despite the crises through which we have passed, we cannot but admit that relations between the East and West have made strides since March 1967 when, to the scandal of many, the German Federal Republic renewed diplomatic relations with Rumania.

Since that time we have negotiated a considerable numbers of bilateral agreements with Communist regime countries in Europe. The problem facing us now is whether multilateral agreements on collective security can be negotiated between all European countries committed or non-committed. In principle our reply is that the will to reach such agreement must exist. For the past four years we have been repeating that there is one clear test of such political will: are we prepared to make a single concrete gesture in the freezing of armaments ?

It is obvious that neither the countries of United Europe nor the North American nations wish to maintain forces on a war footing whose immense destructive capacity is constantly reinforced by "progress" in armament. However these countries cannot agree to unilateral disarmament when they know that far greater force is available to the Warsaw Pact countries.

The Warsaw Pact countries do not refuse to discuss the problem of reducing regional armaments—and this progress too dates from recent times—but they state that such negotiations cannot be initiated except as part of or following a conference on European security. We for our part do not understand why they could not begin ? However, that may be, the problem is urgent. In December, the United States, in the person of President Nixon, declared that they would not withdraw troops from Europe unless equivalent

reductions were made in both camps.

It must be possible to prepare for multilateral negotiations without delay if we are not to be faced with the ecclesiastical provocations connected with West Berlin. The Federal Republic has done its utmost, at least in the view of German public opinion, to seek better relations with the East. The agreements signed in Moscow last summer have removed all doubt as to the frontiers of the Democratic Republic and the role of East Berlin as the capital of this state. However, we believe that no real international agreement can exist without reciprocity.

This is why, in turn, the *de facto* situation of West Berlin must be an honourable one: contacts between families in the Berlins must be made more easy; access to West Berlin from the Federal Republic must be guaranteed; and finally, the right of the Federal Republic to represent the Germans of West Berlin must no longer be contested.

We are often asked whether Berlin is a preliminary to discussions paving the way to a conference on European security. No, but it is a proof of credibility! We are anxiously awaiting this proof so that the first concrete multilateral agreements can be negotiated and concluded. We have a long way to go before regimes that are as contradictory as those co-habiting Europe manage to agree to regional pacts of the type envisaged in the San Francisco Charter. However, the first milestones can be passed on the road to peace, and real, tangible measures must be taken rather than wasting our time with high flown, empty words.

To declare that one wishes for peace while at the same time continuing to accumulate more forces of destruction will convince nobody of the sincerity of our actual intention. Belgium, as we know, is always willing and ready to devote new effort to a true detente.

Another effort is called for farther to the East, in relations with the Far East. How can Communist China be persuaded to take its share of responsibility for world equilibrium? Our problem is to ensure that the desired entrance of Peking China into the United Nations and the Security Council does not bring about the expulsion of Formosa and its disappearance from the list of states protected by the Charter, and to avoid the easily imaginable situation that would arise if the Formosa government were menaced by Peking military undertakings and asked other states for their help!

4. **Europe and the Southern Hemisphere:** The new face of Europe will best be defined by its attitude to the different regions.

of the world and by comparison with them. However, the true test of the foreign policy of the United Europe will be in the Southern Hemisphere. What kind of dialogue will we start up with the developing countries to ensure a new and improved world balance?

This is the theme that my colleague, Minister R. Scheyven, will no doubt expand here.

In concluding my speech, I wish only to state a firm conviction of mine. If United Europe becomes one of the four or five leading world powers, I believe that it will be able to draw sufficiently upon its resources to defend itself in a worthy manner; however, it will not agree to the exercise of authority from afar based on fear. Let us take care, though, not to arouse a different kind of anguish, more subtle, more basic, more sad even than war: the despair that would be caused by economic egoism in Europe. The only way of living with other peoples in friendship is to share with them their aspirations to a better economic, social and human future whenever they call upon us. If we are to respond to their appeals, we must of course gradually but systematically and fundamentally amend the rules of European trade and industry. But nothing is impossible to those who have time and enjoy continuous growth. It is only a question of introducing new elements guaranteeing the profitability of these countries' labour into our own European medium and long term commercial and industrial plans, which are already so complex.

Only then will Europe truly have acquired its proper status.

# FOREIGN POLICY OF DENMARK\*

\*As presented by Paul Hartling, Foreign Minister, M. P. Denmark. (Official Handbook of Denmark)

## INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION\*

Denmark has a vital interest in development in Europe and related North America. She wants close cooperation with other democratic countries, in the first place the Nordic countries. Her situation at the approaches to the Baltic implies a special interest in European security policies. Lacking raw materials and natural sources of energy, she has developed a large volume of foreign trade, her exports and imports being, in proportion to population, among the largest in the world. These extensive economic connections mean that she is permanently influenced by world economic developments. Danish foreign policy recognizes, however, that not only the geographically closest countries closest but all countries have become Denmark's neighbours, and consequently that her interests in Europe must not impair the feeling of interdependence with the peoples of other continents.

Denmark's foreign policy and participation in international cooperation must be seen in the light of these fundamental factors.

### Security Policy and European Perspectives

Since the Second World War, major divisions have arisen in Europe, some the result of political problems in the classical sense others due to problems of trade policy. While political disagreements have split Europe and Germany—into East and West, trade policies have led to a division of Western Europe into two major economic groupings, the European Economic Community, or Common Market (EEC), and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). These two main divisions differ in character and in importance, but both are a challenge to countries which, like Denmark, wish to reduce the barriers between nations.

### Nato

Denmark's adhesion to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 sprang from the desire to create, with like-minded

\*Toft-Harung, Foreign Minister, M. F. Denmark (Official Handbook of Denmark).

nations, a defence against the threat to her security, out-look, and way of life that was evident in the radically changed ideological, political, and military conditions in Eastern Europe after the war in the Danish view, NATO has largely achieved one of its major aims, that of restoring and maintaining a reasonable political and military balance in Europe.

Despite the uncertain prospects of progress towards a solution of the European questions, Denmark will therefore continue to support any realistic move towards cooperation between East and West.

### **Council of Europe**

Through membership of the Council of Europe, Denmark also promotes efforts to create cooperation among European countries on a democratic basis.

Through the Council of Europe a basis has also been provided for the promotion of cultural cooperation in Western Europe. Denmark attaches great importance to this because of the growing social significance ascribed to cultural activity in the widest sense. Moreover, cultural exchange between Western and Eastern European countries can contribute to restoring and consolidating the cultural unity of East and West, and in this way some of the requirements of international understanding and tolerance.

### **Market and Trade Policies**

Since the fifties the fundamental aim of Denmark's market and foreign trade policy has been the creation of an enlarged European market. This objective should be seen in connection with Denmark's very considerable volume of foreign trade, of which three-fourths is with the two European market groupings. Her foreign trade thus gives Denmark a vital interest in the economic and political development of Europe, and in European economic unity.

### **Un and the Global Outlook**

While pursuing vital international political, security, and economic interests in regional organizations, Denmark attaches the utmost importance to participation in the work of the United Nations, and membership of the organization is an integral and extremely important part of Danish foreign policy.

Denmark has always to the best of her ability worked to have the United Nations function as was intended: to secure world peace and establish effective forms of international cooperation. Imperfect

though United Nations activities may have been in the political sphere, Denmark attaches great importance to the organization's potentialities, and it was for this reason that, through membership of the Security Council in 1967-68, she recently, for the second time, assumed an increased sphere of responsibility for maintaining peace and strengthening the UN as peace-keeping factor.

Denmark has always attached great significance to the United Nations' work for disarmament. Danish disarmament policy can be briefly characterized as the desire to support any realistic attempt to achieve general and complete disarmament under adequate control; to cooperate with the United Nations in its endeavours to promote disarmament; to cooperate with NATO's other member countries and other Scandinavian countries, and by means of bilateral contacts in general to elucidate the possibilities of practical steps towards disarmament.

Among the many other areas in which Denmark takes an active part in the UN's work there is reason to mention her many years of participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations. Danish UN observers are stationed in Asia and Middle East; Danish troops served for over ten years under the UN flag in Gaza; and Denmark still participates in the UN force in Cyprus. Like the other Scandinavian countries, she has established a permanent emergency force which, after due consideration in each case, can be made available to the organization collectively or separately at short notice.

### **Activity and Definite Approach**

There is in Denmark far-reaching agreement on the general lines which Danish participation in international cooperation should follow, which is quite natural in a country where opposing group interests are relatively slight and where there are no racial, religious, or linguistic conflicts. It is also understood that by her membership in international organizations Denmark is assuming obligations which, though they may perhaps be said formally to restrict her freedom of action, at the same time provide an opportunity for wielding influence where she would not otherwise do so. This is presumably one of the factors that, to a far greater extent than before the war, have prompted Denmark to display international political activity and a definite approach to world problems.

### **Inter-Scandinavian Cooperation**

Geographical situation, a common cultural and historical heri-

tage, homogeneous social patterns, and to some extent community of language bind the Scandinavian countries together and provide a sound basis for cooperation. Their democratic and humanitarian traditions indicate an identical approach to most international problems and conflicts. For these reasons, there has naturally developed a rich and many-sided association. Scandinavian cooperation has not meant isolation from the rest of Europe and the world, but on the contrary has been to a great extent realized and strengthened through associations with Europe. Cooperation with the rest of Europe has also assisted the Scandinavian countries to overcome setbacks to their association on two occasions since the war: the break-down of endeavours to establish a Scandinavian defence union at the beginning of 1949, and the shelving of a planned Scandinavian market and customs union in 1958-59 after many years of discussion.



# FOREIGN POLICY OF NORWAY\*

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## NORWAY'S INDEPENDENT SINCE 1905

In her thousand years old history Norway has played a varied role in world affairs, but her traditions in foreign policy, which were developed in this century, are of recent origin measured by a European yardstick.

Norway regained its full independence when the union with Sweden was dissolved in 1905. The union was formed in 1814 with one king reigning over both countries, and a joint foreign service under Swedish administration. Prior to 1814 Norway had been united with Denmark for more than 400 years. In 1905 the Norwegian Government assumed complete and sole responsibility for Norway's foreign policy. One of the factors contributing to the dissolution of the union was Norwegian demands for a separate consular representation abroad to back the growing interests in international trade and economy.

There were strong neutralist currents in political circles and public opinion at the time of the dissolution of the union with Sweden. In line with these views Norway tried to secure, in treaty form, an international guarantee from the major European powers for the neutrality and territorial integrity of the country. This was one of the first Norwegian major actions in foreign policy. The goal was not fully achieved. The united Kingdom, France, Russia, and Germany undertook by the so-called "integrity treaty" of November 1907 to guarantee jointly the integrity of Norway, but did not accept any obligations with regard to Norway's neutrality. However, for Norway, this represented nevertheless an endorsement of Norway's neutrality in relation to the power alignment of Europe at the time. The "integrity treaty" remained in force until 1923, when it was abrogated on Norwegian initiative.

Norway's neutrality was subject to great pressures during the First World War, but the country managed to stay out of the conflict. It was therefore logical to continue the policy of neutrality after the war as well. This remained a basic principle of Norwegian foreign policy until it was swept aside by the German invasion of Norway on the 9th of April 1941.

## IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Norway became a member of the League of Nations at its inception in 1920, and remained in the organisation until it was dissolved after the Second World War and was replaced by the United Nations.

As a member of the League, Norway actively supported the collective security system which the League tried—without success—to organise. This did not bring about any lasting or substantial change in the policy of neutrality. Norway participated in the sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian war in 1935-36. When this action failed, Norway, together with other states, explicitly reserved its position concerning future application of the sanctions article of the League of Nations Covenant. This was made in a joint declaration of July 1936.

It is worth nothing, as an example of Norway's attitude towards international economic problems, that in 1930 Norway was a founding member of the so-called "Oslo States". This group also included Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg with Finland joining at a later date. The purpose was to improve conditions for freer trade on a regional basis. Achievements were modest, but this basic belief in freer international trade has later become a central factor in Norwegian policies towards international economic cooperation.

## ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC INTERESTS

The signing of the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) treaty was an important event in Norwegian foreign policy in the interwar period. The treaty, which entered into force in 1925, confirmed international recognition of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard, but also provided the other signatory powers with special rights on a par with Norway. The basic principle is "national equality" concerning exploitation of economic resources on this archipelago. According to the treaty Svalbard is a demilitarised area.

Another major issue of foreign policy during this period concerned the safeguarding of Norwegian interests in Greenland. Denmark not only claimed sovereignty over all of Greenland, but also tried to prevent Norway from engaging in economic activity there. This limited political-economical dispute was resolved by the conclusion of the East Greenland treaty of 1924. According to this treaty, Denmark and Norway enjoyed equal rights to economic activity and maintainance of scientific stations in East Greenland. This

treaty, concluded for a period of 20 years, was unaffected by the subsequent dispute concerning the sovereignty over East Greenland in the 1930's. In 1947 the treaty was renewed for another 20 years, and in 1967 was superseded by a treaty of shorter duration.

As a consequence both of Norwegian discoveries in the Antarctic and the economic interest which Norway developed in this region, Bouvet Island was annexed in 1928. In 1931 this was followed by placing under Norwegian sovereignty the Antarctic continental coast and the land inside between the Australian sector, i.e. 45 degrees East and the Falkland Islands Dependencies, or British Antarctic Territory, i.e. 20 degrees West. This claim is not universally recognised. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has recognised this nor any other territorial claim in Antarctica. The issue was provisionally resolved by the international Antarctic treaty of 1959. This treaty in reality makes all of the Antarctic continent an international territory for the duration of the treaty, i.e. for 30 years, but without prejudicing any territorial claims or objections to such claims.

### REAPPRAISAL

The German invasion of Norway and the active participation on the Allied side during the war forced a thorough reassessment of Norway's defence, security and foreign policy. The war-years themselves and the immediate postwar period, until Norway joined NATO in 1949, could to some extent be considered an interlude during which time the country searched for a safer basis for its national security.

During the war Norway was allied with both the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Cooperation with the Allied powers was good. Problems arising from the liberation in 1945, and in the case of Northeastern Norway during the winter 1944-45, were solved quickly. This was in part due to the treaties, which had been concluded with the Allied powers in advance, dealing with this transitional period. The arrangements were respected by all parties.

The years 1945-48 were a maturing period for Norway's foreign policy thinking. The diminishing belief in the United Nations' abilities contributed to this process. During the first few postwar years Norway was among the countries which hoped to base its security on membership in the United Nations. The role and the success of the UN as an instrument for international peace and

powers, and a foremost task of Norwegian foreign policy was to act as bridge-builder between the Great powers, primarily the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Experience proved that this policy was illusory.

The underlying principles which were formulated during this period are still the main basis for Norway's security policy of today and thereby also an important and integral part of Norway's foreign policy in a wider sense. New aspects have emerged with the gradual change in the international climate, but the underlying principles remain the same.

The conclusion that Norway's security could be safeguarded only in cooperation with the countries which have similar political traditions and with which Norway has close relations, brought about the decisive reorientation away from neutralism.

There were three, or strictly speaking only two, alternatives after the war. One was a return to neutrality. The invasion in 1940, however had proved that Norway alone did not command the resources to uphold this policy if it was challenged by a major power. Therefore, this alternative was eliminated more or less automatically.

The alternative of a Nordic Defence Union was examined carefully by Sweden, Denmark and Norway. This in reality entailed a return to neutrality to be based on the combined military power of the three countries. The alternative was rejected because it did not provide the degree of security desired by Norway. The negotiations for a Nordic Defence Union were conducted prior to and partly concurrently, with the negotiations for the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

### IN NATO

Norway decided to seek security in cooperation with the large Western powers and with Western Europe. But this was more than the final result of a military, political and economic analysis. It must also be judged against the background of the situation in Europe at the time and the deep sense of insecurity this created in Norwegian public opinion. The Soviet expansion in continental Europe, with the inclusion of the East European states in the orbit of Soviet power, was regarded with deep anxiety. The impression was reinforced by the Berlin blockade in 1948-49; the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia also influenced the assessment of Norway's position.

The political support for the decision to join NATO was clearly expressed by the division in the Storting (Parliament) with only 13 representatives voting against out of a total of 150; 7 representatives abstained. This was by far the most important decision in foreign policy since the policy of neutrality was adopted in 1905. It marked the completion of a reassessment and reorientation in foreign affairs with much wider perspectives than participation in NATO alone.

No new decisive factors which could indicate a change in this policy have emerged since the basic decision was taken in 1949. But the situation will be carefully analysed and assessed in connection with the completion of the first 20 years of NATO in 1969, at which time it becomes possible to withdraw from the alliance at one year's notice. Two white papers, one dealing with the question of Norway's continued membership in NATO and another presenting a five year defence plan based on continued participation in NATO, were submitted to the Storting in March 1968. In the subsequent debate in June the opposition against membership had dwindled to only 6 representatives who voted for withdrawal. There were no abstentions.

Norway attaches great importance to the opportunities for reducing tension in Europe and to the role which NATO can play in this context. It is seen as an important factor that NATO is now committed to such a policy.

### UNILATERAL RESTRICTIONS

The Soviet Union reacted with protests and pressure when Norway joined NATO. Norway and the Soviet Union have a common border of about 200 kms. in the North. Mindful of this fact and with the Nordic balance in mind, Norway has imposed upon herself certain unilateral restrictions for cooperation in NATO. This, however, is a voluntary move, subject only to Norway's own judgment and does not in any way represent any international obligation. These restrictive principles relate to policies concerning foreign bases and nuclear arms.

The Soviet Union feared that Norway's membership in NATO would lead to the stationing of Allied forces and the establishment of Allied bases in Norway. The issue was raised even before Norway became a member of NATO. In its reply to the Soviet Union in a note of 1st of February 1949, the Norwegian government stated:

The Norwegian government will not *"enter into any agreement with other states creating obligations for Norway to open bases for the fighting forces of foreign powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not attacked or under threat of attack"*.

This is the so-called "base-doctrine". It has not been altered since the assurance was given to the Soviet Union in 1949. The Soviet views have been kept in mind, and to the extent Allied forces have taken part in maneuvers in Norway or in Norwegian waters, these exercises have always taken place at a distance of at least 300—400 kms. from the nearest Soviet territory. Such maneuvers are always of limited duration.

### NON-NUCLEAR

Development of national nuclear weapons has never been considered by Norway. On the contrary, it has for many years been a consistent Norwegian policy to try to prevent proliferation of such weapons to additional states and to strive for a total test-ban and a reduction of the nuclear capability of the nuclear powers.

Norway stated at the NATO ministerial meeting in Paris in December 1957, when the political development and development in arms technology brought forward the idea of European nuclear defence, that *"Norway does not intend to allow storage of nuclear weapons or the installation of firing bases for medium-range rockets on Norwegian territory"*.

This is the so-called nuclear doctrine of Norwegian foreign policy which still stands firm. It has, if anything, become more comprehensive, inasmuch as it has become common to define Norway's policy regarding nuclear weapons by saying that one *"does not intend to allow the storage of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory or to adapt the Norwegian defence for such weapons."*

In line with this restrictive attitude Norway abstained from participating in the negotiations for a "multilateral nuclear force"—MLF or for an "Atlantic nuclear force"—ANF. Initially, Norway took a wait-and-see attitude towards the American proposal of May/June 1965 to organize a "selected group" to discuss nuclear problems in the alliance. This initiative led to the establishment of the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee which Norway joined in December 1966.

Apart from these limitations, Norway has participated in the cooperation within NATO like the other partners. Norway has contributed to the infrastructure programme with her stipulated

share based on the economic capacity of each member. Under a bilateral agreement with the United States Norway has received substantial military aid in the form of weapons, equipment and in other ways. The assistance has for a number of years totalled approximately 500 million Norwegian kroner annually but is now in the process of being discontinued.

The NATO headquarters for the Northern Europe Command are located at Kolsås outside Oslo, and Norway is included in the integrated command structure. In peacetime, however the Norwegian forces are not under NATO command, except for a part of the air force, which has been integrated in the NATO defence since 1961. This is based on operative considerations regarding the time factors in our age of radar and supersonic aircraft. The common NATO warning system includes Norwegian territory. Svalbard is completely excluded from all Norwegian engagements in NATO.

Norway has attached increasing importance to NATO's political rôle and to the political cooperation among the Allies since the gradual lessening of tension began in Europe and in certain other areas of the world, in the mid 1950's. In recent times NATO's potential as an instrument for as detente between East and West in Europe has also been strongly emphasized. Norway pursued such a policy even before it was formalised as a political guideline for the alliance.

### THE NORDIC BALANCE

The voluntary restrictions which Norway imposed on its own defence policy were also maintained uninterrupted during the period when tension in Europe was at its peak. This policy also takes into consideration *inter alia* the Nordic balance. The Nordic area i. e. Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland, is strategically regarded as a unit in Northern Europe. The two restrictive doctrines take this into account.

Finland has a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union with which it maintains close contacts. Sweden is neutral and nonaligned. To the West are the NATO countries Norway, Denmark and Iceland. In other words, there is a gradual transition between the two alliance systems, with the exception of the Norwegian—Soviet border in the North. This gradual transition is an expression of the recalled "Nordic Balance". It has never been formalised, nor has Norway during any tense political situation resorted to it. But nevertheless, it is there. Shielded by this balance,



and on the basis of the close relationship between the Nordic countries, a Nordic cooperation has developed which is unique in Europe today. Any action, which may destroy the informal balance, can result in additional consequences and thereby affect the basis of Nordic cooperation in matters far removed from the field of tension in big politics.

Norway's rejection of proposals concerning non-nuclear zones must be seen against this background. Such proposals have been made by Poland, and suggestions to the same effect have come from Finland. There is no objection in principle against non-nuclear zones, but such proposals must, in Norway's opinion, be judged in the context of a wider process of reducing tension in Europe, and cannot be seen in isolation.

### RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE

Norway has maintained regular contacts with the Eastern European countries since the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations after the war. These were partly also a continuation of diplomatic relations between the governments in exile during the war. The general European postwar development, especially the dark period of the 1940's and the first half of the 1950's, made it difficult to exploit these contacts for fruitful political cooperation. But the contacts were never severed as a result of political differences.

The political thaw which followed in the path of destalinisation opened opportunities for utilizing the contacts with the Eastern European countries in a more positive way. The initial step was taken in 1958 with personal contact between the Norwegian Foreign Minister Mr. Halvard Lange and his Polish colleague Mr. Adam Rapacki. This bilateral contact at ministerial level has later continued and has developed into a practise with regular meetings between ministers. Relations with other Eastern European countries have also been strengthened, but not always to the same degree as in the case of Poland.

Norway has not been directly breaking new ground in the general process of lessening of tension in Europe—apart from the early Norwegian—Polish contact—but she has systematically followed-up these trends. When NATO in December 1966 advised the member states to develop such bilateral relations, Norway was already well under way doing precisely this. In addition to normal diplomatic relations there are also contacts at ministerial level with the Eastern

European states. The exchange has been most intensive with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia belongs in the same category although this country generally falls outside the political concept of "Eastern Europe" as such.

### THE GERMAN PROBLEM

The German problem is being studied in close connection with the NATO policy and with the efforts for reducing tension in Europe. Diplomatic contacts were established with the German Federal Republic at an early stage, and the cooperation with Germany in NATO has been carried out without friction. The Federal Republic is also one of Norway's main trading partners. The Eastern zone in Germany is not recognized as a state by Norway, and no contact exists on an official level. "Kammer für Außenhandel der DDR" has an office in Oslo, and the private Norwegian trading company "Norsk Kompensasjonsselskap A/S" has an office in East Berlin. These offices are not official trade missions, and they have no official status.

It is Norway's opinion that the German question can be solved only within the framework of a German peace treaty. At that juncture a solution must be found to the problem of the two parts of Germany and formalisation of the German postwar borders. For this reason no direct position has been taken on the Oder-Neisse issue. On the basis of the Paris protocols of 1954 Norway stands for reunification of the two parts of Germany and the non-recognition of East Germany. Furthermore, Norway is of the opinion that the German problem should be solved on the basis of the principle of self-determination, but it is recognized that the question of reunification must be settled with due regard to European security. The former Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Halvard Lange, formulated the Norwegian position in the following statement given to the Storting on 4th of June 1964:

*"In international law the situation is formally and legally that the problem of Germany's borders shall be settled through peace negotiations. This is a four-power issue about which there now has been any disagreement. Realistically, there are hardly anyone can imagine any change in the de facto situation concerning Germany's external borders which were the result of the Second World War."*

This position was reaffirmed by the Foreign Minister, Mr. John Lyng, in a statement to the Storting in October 1966.

## FOUNDING MEMEER OF THE UN

Norway is one of the founders of the United Nations and participation in the UN is a cornerstone of Norwegian foreign policy. To join a new world organization which had an object to secure peace and to act as a forum for international political cooperation was an obvious sequence to the membership in the League of Nations. But in certain fields there was a new assessment of the structure and role of the new world organization as compared with the League. This appeared clearly with regard to the evaluation of the peace-keeping tasks of the UN and the sovereign authority of the Security Council in this Context. During the preparatory drafting of the charter of the UN, Norway supported the idea that the major powers should have a special responsibility and also a special authority, and opposed the tendency represented by some medium-sized states to restrict the special position of the Permanent Members in the Security Council. The fiasco of the League as an instrument for collective security was well remembered and the belief was also strong that it would be possible to maintain the wartime cooperation between the major powers in the new world organization. Therefore the UN was initially regarded as the cornerstone for the security, but this, as already mentioned, was quickly altered by events. Norway has nevertheless consistently regarded the world organization as the supreme international forum. Loyalty to the UN and fulfilment of obligations flowing from the UN charter have been given priority in the appraisal of foreign policy. Norway has practiced this policy consistently and without interruption from 1945 to the present time.

## UNIVERSALITY

Norway adheres to the principle of universality for admission of new members to the UN. This entails that all internationally recognized independent states ought to be members of the world organization, and that no such state should be excluded through political manipulations. After its recognition of the Peking Government as the government of China in 1950, Norway has consistently supported proposals in the UN to transfer to the Peking Government the representation for China in the UN. Loyalty towards the principle of universality also explains why Norway has opposed proposals to exclude the Republic of South Africa from the UN.

In weighing the responsibilities and authority of the Security Council and the General Assembly Norway has never tried to reduce the competence of the Council in order to overcome the difficulties

arising from the right of veto for the Great Powers. On the other hand, Norway has sought and supported practical steps aimed at enabling the UN to act when the Security Council is paralysed by a veto. The American "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 1950, according to which the General Assembly recommended actions to secure peace, was supported. This resolution was again supported when it was resorted to in 1956 in connection with the Suez crisis. At that time a considerable structural change had already taken place in the UN as a result of admittance of new member states. The structural change is much more evident today, and this development may have a bearing on this very problem.

### PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Norway has systematically tried to improve, by way of practical measures, the peace-keeping ability of the UN. A recommendation was presented in 1952 proposing that the smaller member states should organize a force which the UN could employ in case of need. Norwegian personnel have participated in UN forces and have served under the UN flag on many occasions. In Korea, the Norwegian contribution was provided in the form of humanitarian and medical assistance. Norwegians have served in UN forces in India, Pakistan, Cyprus, the Congo and the Middle East. In 1964 Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland decided to organize a special force earmarked for such tasks. The Norwegian contingent, mainly an infantry unit but also incorporating detachments from the air force and the navy as well as a surgical unit, is ready at all time. It is understood, however, that the force will only be dispatched when there is complete agreement with the UN, the host country and possibly the other Nordic countries as well. It has, however, been pointed out that such actions in the future should have a more satisfactory basis.

Supporting the special organizations of the UN financially and in other ways is an integral part of the Norwegian UN policy and great emphasis is placed on playing an active role in the special organizations. Contributions have been granted to technical assistance, aid to refugees and not least for solving the financial crisis of the UN, substantially beyond the formal commitments. Thus Norway is channelling a greater part of its development assistance through the UN than any other country.

Norway has also actively supported collective measures to strengthen the peace-keeping capacity of the UN such as sanctions

imposed by the world organization.

In the General Assembly and the special organizations the views and the policies of the Nordic countries are coordinated to large extent and there is daily cooperation between the permanent Nordic UN delegations. The impression might therefore be left that the Nordic countries represent a solid block in the world organization, but this is true only to a limited extent. The Nordic countries have pursued different policies on many occasions, even on important international issues, but this does not affect the cooperation as such.

## DECOLONIZATION

The policy that colonies have a right to become independent states has been the guideline in the decolonization issue and this development has been encouraged by Norway. These problems have, however now receded to the background and are being replaced by the problems of the developing countries, by issues as the apartheid-question or by political crises in or surrounding the new states, such as the Congo crises. Norway takes a strong stand against the apartheid policy of South Africa, and supports the right of the Portuguese colonies to political freedom. The official UN policy towards Rhodesia has been supported. These attitudes follow the same pattern adopted by Norway at an early stage.

During the period of bloc policy and as long as the cold war dominated international politics, Norway had a natural place in the Western camp. But cooperation with the West in defence and security matters did not carry with it an automatic cooperation in other fields. The attitude towards Chinese representation in the UN is one example, and the open disassociation from the French British intervention in the Suez Canal Zone in 1956 is another.

## ECONOMIC POLICY

Norway joined from their inception the economic organization of the "UN family", such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The UN alone did not, however, provide a universal framework for economic cooperation, and the pattern of foreign economic policy which has been adopted by Norway is partly dictated by the structure of the external economy and partly by political developments in Western Europe and the world. Norway joined GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) when it was founded in 1947. The opportunities of the Marshall Plan for post-war reconstruction were accepted with open arms. But equally great

importance was attached to the incentives of the Marshall Plan for a free economic cooperation in Western Europe, and between Western Europe and North America. The OEEC and later the OECD have been important instruments in providing a more favourable climate for Norway's external economy.

These organizations were not sufficient to solve Norwegian international economic problems. Norway's concept for the future was and had to be a wider and binding liberalization on a broader basis. The ideal arrangements are in this respect dictated by the export structure and shipping interests. The importance of these factors are evident from the following figures.

### SHIPPING

As per 1st of April 1968 the Norwegian merchant fleet totalled 19.6 million gross tons making it the third largest active merchant fleet in the world. The shipping industry's net foreign currency contribution to the balance of payments, after payments for ships and operating costs had been deducted, was in 1967 about 2 949 million Norwegian kroner. Foreign currency earnings by the shipping industry cover about 70 per cent of the deficit in the balance of trade, and its part of the net national product equals that of agriculture, forestry and the fishing industry combined. Thus the operating freedom and earning opportunities for the merchant fleet are of vital importance to Norway's economy. The term "net foreign currency earnings" must not, however, be mistaken for net profit. The net profit margin is narrow because of intense international competition, and shipping is highly sensitive to economic and political crises and changes.

### FOREIGN TRADE

The structure of foreign trade is shown by the following figures:

In 1967 total commodity exports amounted to 12.411 million Norwegian kroner. Of this, exports to EFTA countries accounted for 5.834 million Norwegian kroner or 47 per cent of the total. The EEC countries' share of Norway's exports was during the same year 2.292 million Norwegian kroner or 2.33 per cent. Over a number of years the importance of the EFTA market has increased relatively while the EEC has, in relative terms, declined slightly in significance. But together these two market groupings buy more than 70 per cent of Norway's total commodity exports.

East European countries buy about 3½—4 per cent of the total

commodity exports. Since 1966 there has been a declining trend in exports to these countries in relative terms. The remaining exports went to the rest of the world, including North America and the Far East.

### TRADE LIBERALIZATION

During the 1950's Norway took part in the efforts to create free trade in Europe. Negotiations during the first years of this decade for the establishment of a Nordic Customs Union did not lead to any positive results. The basis was too narrow to satisfy Norway's needs. This is also evident from the figures above. One had to aim at more ambitious goals, but the realization of those goals depended on the policy of the major industrial countries. The establishment of the European Common Market in 1958 created problems for Norway to which there initially were no solutions. Negotiations for a wider European Free Trade Area, the so-called Maudling Plan, to which Norway attached some hopes, failed. Following this, an initiative was taken for the establishment of a European Free Trade Association in 1959. EFTA is now an important factor in Norwegian trade and market policy. EFTA, however, is not seen as an end in itself, but rather as a transitional arrangement for a wider European solution.

For Norway EFTA has been a success and Norway seems to be one of the member states which has reaped the greatest benefits from the cooperation. As a by-product came the Nordic industrial common market which it had been impossible to establish some years earlier. Furthermore, Norway has obtained access to the British market as well as to the markets of the continental European members. This has been a strong incentive for Norway's economy as well as a useful educational operation for trade and industry in adapting themselves to greater market units. Following the total removal of tariffs on manufactured goods in EFTA at the beginning of 1967 the main momentum of this organization has been exhausted, unless the members are prepared to resort to other instruments. An elimination of non-tariff barriers is now being sought.

### THE EEC

But free trade within EFTA was only one of the aims. Britain's initiative in 1961, applying for membership in the Common Market, was welcomed by Norway. The export structure shows that the market divisions in Europe are a serious handicap, and it remains a main

task for Norwegian foreign policy to overcome this division. In 1962 Norway followed Britain's example and applied for membership in the EEC. This application was inactivated when Britain's negotiations broke down, but was revived again when Britain applied anew in Brussels in 1967. A renewed Norwegian application was submitted in Brussels in the summer of 1967, and the application still stands.

Norway's dependency on both the EFTA and the EEC markets explains the economic interest in finding a solution to the division in Europe. But economic considerations apart, the economic integration is an important peace-strengthening factor in its own right in Western Europe. It is seen as a guarantee against a revival of national rivalries in European politics.

Norway's European political orientation has also found its expression in the membership of the Council of Europe, the signing of the European Convention of Human Rights and the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court of Human Rights under this convention.

This orientation towards Europe and an intimate European co-operation has occurred very quickly in Norway. A geographical position on the fringe of Europe together with centuries of weak communications with the Continent created a semi-insular mentality. This is now rapidly being eliminated by the pressure of political reorientation as well as technical developments.

The arguments in the debate in Norway against possible Norwegian membership in the Common Market are partly based on economic and partly on political considerations. Politically, the left-wing radical minority group is the main centre of opposition. In addition, some quarters, mainly connected with the farming community, are fearful for economic and political reasons of being absorbed in an integrated Europe.

The economic arguments do carry a certain weight within their context. Norwegian agriculture, for reasons of climate, poor soil, short summer etc., sees itself in a lasting handicapped position in relation to the Continent. In addition there is the demand and the desirability that the population structure of the Northern provinces, or in the mountainous and outlying areas elsewhere, should be preserved in case of membership.

The relative importance of agriculture in the national economy is however steadily diminishing, and it would not be acceptable to disregard the interests of all in favour of any individual group.



## DEVELOPMENT AID

The very concept of developing countries is new to Norway with its non-colonial past. Norway faced this issue initially in the UN. The first Norwegian grants for development aid were given to the UN expanded programme for technical assistance. The growing role of development problems in international politics has brought with it a gradual expansion in government activity in this field in addition to aid provided by private organizations. The latter include first and foremost missionary societies and humanitarian organizations but different forms of assistance is also provided by industry. At an early stage it was realised that it was an important task for the industrial countries to assist the new independent states towards an accelerated and self-generating economic growth.

Norway's capacity to contribute to the solution of the problems of developing countries is modest in international terms. Norway herself is small and a capital-importing country. Thus the Norwegian contribution can best be provided in terms of know-how and experts.

The first bilateral project was started in 1952 with an advisory programme in the health sector and for the fishing industry in Kerala, India. The project is still in operation and has, after initial setbacks, produced good results. The cooperation is based on a tripartite agreement with India and Norway as the active partners, and with the UN as the third party to the agreement. The principle to bring bilateral agreements under the umbrella of the UN has been maintained, and experience shows that the receiving countries favour this type of arrangement.

The importance of the problems of the developing countries has increased rapidly during the 1960's. This factor and Norway's activity in development aid led to the establishment in 1962 of a special government agency to administer Norway's aid to developing countries, Norsk Utviklingshjelp (Norwegian Agency for Development Aid). Norsk Utviklingshjelp has been the main instrument for bilateral Norwegian aid projects and for the participation in joint Nordic projects. The budget of Norsk Utviklingshjelp for 1968 was approximately 37 million Norwegian kroner which is appropriated through the national budget. Additional funds were provided for the UN aid activities. The total grant for 1968 was 154 million Norwegian kroner.

Norsk Utviklingshjelp will in the near future be reorganized into a Directorate under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The

Directorate will be responsible for all government aid both bilateral and multilateral.

Nordt Utviklingshjelp has allocated a part of its funds to finance development assistance organized by private institutions. In some cases joint projects are carried out in cooperation with other Nordic countries. The first of this kind was a college hospital in Korea which opened in 1958.

A special tax is levied in addition to the ordinary income tax to cover the costs of Norwegian aid to developing countries.

Norway took part in the preparatory work for the establishment of the UN Organization for Trade and Development—UNCTAD. The general aims of UNCTAD are welcomed by Norway. But some of the proposals to solve the problems of developing countries are followed with a certain anxiety. This refers especially to protectionist tendencies in the field of international shipping, where moves for controlling freight rates and establishing national merchant fleets in developing countries based on non-economic shipping considerations have been suggested.

Norwegian trade policy with regard to products of major interest to developing countries is liberal, not least concerning tropical primary products. Moreover, it is Norway's policy to attempt to contribute to price stabilization schemes for raw materials and primary commodities.

### NORDIC CO-OPERATION

The present pattern of five independent Nordic states is a product of this century. Norway's union with Sweden was dissolved in 1905. Finland won its independence in 1917, and Iceland became independent in the form of a personal (monarchical) union with Denmark in 1918 and a republic since 1944.

The Nordic countries are so closely related that an exceptional degree of solidarity and interdependence exists across the borders. This, combined with common international interests and common views on important international problems, forms the basis of the intimate Nordic co-operation, despite the division into five different states.

It is hard to pinpoint exactly where the political co-operation begins, because there are so many ties and connections; the political co-operation never ends after all, only a part of the total. The Nordic Council, established in 1919, is a joint forum for parliamentarians and non-royal. The council has only an advisory capacity but its

role is above all to act as a catalyst for common ideas and to be an initiator to ensure that the national authorities act on the recommendations.

The Nordic foreign ministers meet regularly twice a year for formal consultations, and more informally on a number of other occasions. The biannual meetings are used for exchanging information and views and coordinating policy, especially concerning the UN. Other ministers also meet frequently. The Prime ministers maintain a close contact, but without the regular pattern of the foreign ministers' conferences.

Beneath this, topstructure there is a tight web of agreements creating internordic rights and obligations. Social benefits are enjoyed on a mutual basis, there is a free labour market, mutual recognition of a number of university degrees etc. Combined with the industrial free trade area in EFTA this today makes the Nordic countries highly integrated. In some fields even more extensively than is the case in the EEC. Iceland is not taking part in the purely economic integration, but is considering becoming a member of EFTA, a step which would draw the country much closer into the Nordic economic cooperation. The three Scandinavian countries (i.e. Denmark, Sweden and Norway) have a passport union which entails that visitors from other countries are checked in only when entering Scandinavia. Citizens of Nordic countries need no passport for travel between these countries.

This free form of cooperation and the advantages that flow from this integration are benefits which the Nordic countries all want to maintain, also within the framework of a wider European integration.

A treaty of Nordic cooperation formalising obligations as well as limitations may have a bearing on any possible expansion of the Common Market. Denmark and Norway have applied for full membership, while Sweden's approach to the EEC is limited by its neutrality. These applications are still pending, even though the momentum in European market politics, which followed the new applications in 1967, is lost for the time being.

The day-to-day work on the inter-Nordic scene is rather informal, a quality which often makes it difficult for foreigners to grasp the substance of Nordic cohesion.

It can be summed up by saying that each of the Nordic countries strives to avoid any action which may be detrimental to a Nordic partner. An intimate contact concerning common problems is main-

trained, and the attitude to third parties is coordinated when possible.

But these guidelines also hides limitations, particularly in the field of defence and security. Security of the region is kept in mind, but is held outside the field of cooperation and consultations. When on occasion this rule is disregarded, complications, usually of a negative character, are always the result.

The main fields of integration across the borders are on the economic and on the individual side. Between Sweden and Norway a high level of economic integration exists which has been facilitated and accelerated by EFTA. Trade between the two countries nearly trebled during the seven year transitional period in EFTA from 1959 to the end of 1966. This is by far the highest rate of increase in trade between any of two EFTA partners.

The Nordic countries are now one of Norway's most important markets, a situation which is now for the 1960's. This economic interdependence, much stronger than before, makes close consultation among the Nordic countries concerning European market problems a natural phenomenon.

### POOLING POSITIONS

A method which is rare in international economic politics was applied when Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland pooled their positions and negotiated as one party during the final phase of the Kennedy Round. It was not the first time the Nordic countries acted in this way, but it had never happened before on such a scale in modern times. Through this procedure the four countries acted as one group much in the same way as the EEC delegation represented the six member countries in these negotiations. This was done because the offers presented by the other main parties, not least the EEC, were regarded as unsatisfactory by all the Nordic countries. In 1965 the Nordic countries had an import surplus of nearly 1,200 million dollars in their trade with the EEC and an import surplus of about 700 million dollars with the USA. The cooperation in the Kennedy Round produced such good results that the procedure invites repetition on other occasions when conditions are suitable. The essence of the cooperation was not a common political front, but a pooling of the respective national negotiating positions.

### BROAD PARLIAMENTARY BASIS

A prominent feature of Norway's foreign policy is the broad national support for the main principles, a fact which to a large extent

in turn leaves foreign policy unaffected by changing governments. This was the case when neutrality was a main principle, and it is also the case today when Norway is a member of NATO. The final transition to a policy of alliance after the Second World War was endorsed by an overwhelming majority in the Storting. This cross party basis for major foreign policy decisions also applies to other issues. There was a unanimous support for joining the UN. Participation in the OEEC, membership in EFTA, the application for membership in the EEC in 1962 and again in 1967 followed the same pattern with large majorities in the Storting. To the extent that there are different opinions, the controversies relate more to methods than to the goals themselves.

This stability is closely connected with the decision-making procedure. Foreign policy is the responsibility of the foreign minister and the Government. However, a foreign policy contrary to the majority rule in the Storting is impossible in a parliamentary democracy. There is an intimate and close cooperation between the Government and the national assembly in foreign affairs. The Storting has a standing committee for foreign affairs. This committee, like the other committees is recruited from all parties according to their strength in the assembly. Furthermore, there is a so-called extended committee for foreign affairs, which among other functions also acts as a sounding board. The committee is recruited on the same principle as mentioned above. Disagreement on any major international issue would be uncovered in these two committees. On the other hand, one can count on a broad support in the Storting for decisions and guidelines agreed upon in these committees, since the members work in close cooperation with their parliamentary parties. The parliamentary party leader will always be a member of the extended committee for foreign affairs if his party's representation in the Storting is sizable enough to qualify for membership.

This arrangement in no way reduces or shifts the parliamentary responsibility, but it is a useful machinery of cooperation for taking foreign policy out of and above party politics. This should be kept in mind when judging the strength behind Norwegian foreign policy and its basis in national policy.

# FOREIGN POLICY OF SPAIN\*

\*As expressed by Dr. Gregorio Lopez Bravo, minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, in his speech delivered at the C.I.E. S.E. D.E.N. (High Centre and National Defense Studies), of Madrid in February 1971. It reflects an authentic account of the nature and objectives of Spanish Foreign Policy.

## DEFENCE POLICY AND EXTERNAL POLICY

If Politics is the exercise of the power possessed by a national collectivity to organize, secure and perfect its existence, the intimate relationship between defence policy and foreign policy is evident. The two ideas are only aspects of the same reality, namely National Policy, defined and applied by the supreme organs of the State. Similarly, there cannot be a substantial difference between internal and external policy, and in many respects the external political activity is the projection, on international relations, of the permanent constitutional assumptions and the conjunctural political life of the country.

It is said that defence policy determines the *national objectives* and foreign policy the *permanent interests* of the country. Allow me to see a great resemblance, or at least a wide coincidence, between the two expressions, and therefore to propose today, with your benevolence, to concentrate upon those *permanent interests* of Spain which increasingly tend to become identified with the *objectives* of national defence.

Diplomacy conducts external policy as strategy and tactics conduct war, and it is clearly true that there is an intimate relationship between the military and the diplomatic spheres, and between the two of them and the political sphere, to such a degree that it is difficult to distinguish them at the higher levels of the State.

For a long time, even long after technological development and the appearance of new weapons made it impossible, a forced opposition existed between the activities of war and of peace, fostering the illusion that it is possible to attend to the conservation and development of the national community without devoting the necessary resources to its indispensable military strength, and the parallel and no less deceptive illusion that there are objectives which can be attained solely by force, thus neglecting diplomatic action for attaining them.

Henry Kissinger, Adviser to the President of the United States for Affairs of National Security, and a former professor of Harvard, has written as follows: "It is an illusion of posterity to think that the international understandings of the past were solely the out-

come of logic and of skill in negotiation. In a society of sovereign States, a Power can only vindicate its interpretation of justice, or defend its vital interests in the last resort, if it is prepared to use force. Even during the periods of greatest apparent harmony, it was understood that an unsuccessful negotiation did not go back to the starting-point, but could cause pressures of a different kind. The determining impulse of international agreements has always been faith in the advantages of harmony with fear of the results of obstinacy. A total renunciation of force, by abolishing the sanction on intransigence, would put the international order at the mercy of the most pitiless or most irresponsible of its members."

The fact is that peace is not merely the absence of violence, but, as a classic adage has it, "the result of justice", in other words a positive, dynamic conception. Peace is both a total state of mind and the expression of certain relationships of power. A nation lives in peace only if it is prepared to accept the other nations and to adapt itself to them, and at the same time is ready to fight for certain values and interests which it considers fundamental. Hence peace is, conjointly and coordinatedly, the final objective of all strategy and all diplomacy.

The defence policy must cover the nation against all contingencies, and external policy must cover all the aspects of the country's security and its development in its international relations. Yet the compulsory limitation of means, which is inherent in every human undertaking, makes it necessary to select the objectives, giving them an order of priority, and even more necessary to proportion and combine resources, thus bringing greater political and diplomatic effort to bear on the points at which material strength might perhaps be weakest.

This task of concretion is especially difficult in the case of Spain, a country conditioned by geography and the course of history to an opening towards many civilization and several continents. Convinced of this reality, I have tried since my arrival at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to project our external policy towards all possible perspectives for Spain, and to impel the country, in step with its internal socio-economic development, towards a greater degree of participation in international life. A wide aim, which is broken down into a multitude of specific problems and subjects. I have assembled the main ones, in order to share my reflections with you, around a number of themes of outstanding international attraction for Spain: on one hand, the Mediterranean, Gibraltar and the Strait; our relation-



ship with the United States and the Near-Eastern conflict; on the other, Central Europe in its aspects of security and economics, adding, to conclude, some remarks on the United Nations as a field of action for our diplomacy.

### THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Mediterranean, from the Spanish viewpoint, signifies first the Strait of Gibraltar and its region; next, a matchless way of communication; then, the sea and land area—the ancestral home of our Latin mother-civilization and of the familiar Arab culture—which extends as far as the Near East, itself the gateway to other and more remote eastwards lands.

The Strait of Gibraltar zone is one of the densest of the world in complexity of geopolitical interests. It is an area at once inter-continental and inter-oceanic; its commercial and strategic importance requires no stressing to an audience of specialists, but it would indeed be in order to refer to some of the lines of political interest that intersect there.

Passing from the universal to the particular, we will say that the Western Mediterranean has recently become one of the critical points in the military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, of parallel significance in the general political confrontation between the two super-powers. Spain must be clearly aware of this fact, which faces us with risks but also with opportunities, in a dynamic vision of our defence.

Beneath the excessive shadow of the super-powers, the interest of the coastal countries is out lined. above all those of Spain and morocco, without forgetting those of Algeria, Tunisia, France and Italy, to mention only the countries neighbouring on the zones contiguous to the Strait. Our interests largely coincide, at any rate as regards the need for peace, free communication and stability in the area, and respect for national independence. Hence, without prejudice to the freedom of each of them to decide and develop its own policy, a greater interpenetration and understanding would be most desirable among us, and even with other Mediterranean-coast States, in order to make our weight felt, through union in the problems relating to our sea.

Historically speaking, there is an interest self-designated as "European", linked since the 18th century to the British military presence at the Rock of Gibraltar. Hitherto Great Britain has tenaciously clung to this territorial presence, attributing to it a vital in-

terest of strategic character; most of the European countries passively accept this situation, which none of them would tolerate at the expense of their own territorial integrity, just as Spain does not tolerate it, though she has renounced the use of force to change it. One or two justify this occupation—also foreign—of a piece of Spanish soil by the argument that it keeps the Strait zone free from perturbations arising out of any instability in the Peninsula, as well as all monopoly or unilateral control of navigation through the Strait.

### THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR

Yet our policy has not been, is not, and cannot be aimed at impeding the legitimate use of the Strait of Gibraltar still less at unilaterally and arbitrarily debarring any country from navigation or other utilization use of the Mediterranean, which is largely high sea and hence the patrimony of all mankind. The only possible policy desired by Spain is peace and security in the Mediterranean, and defence of our inalienable right to national preservation, independence and legitimate use of this international road of communication. Our just interests, accepted by all, are sanctioned by International Law. Through her authentic attachment to this region, a strong and healthy Spain such as that which we are striving to build and have a right to expect, together with our friendly neighbour, Morocco, far from threatening the other States, legitimate rights, can be their most scrupulous guardians.

### GIBRALTAR

Spain's revendication of the British Colony of Gibraltar goes much farther than a legitimate patriotic desire. The fact that a foreign power holds a base of this importance, nailed into our country without our consent, is grave serious in itself; in the game of international politics it is perilous not to have absolute control of one's own cards, and still more so when they are important trumps which have been forcibly seized from us.

This unjust handicap also weight heavy on us by making us unwillingly share a double risk; in the first place, Spanish land is endangered by a foreign military base, which in wartime would undoubtedly be a main objective, but whose existence and functioning, Spain has not consented to and does not control.

Again, I would remind you of the documents published on January 1 last, from the British secret archives, which set forth the plan

prepared in 1940 for blowing up the Spanish ports of Vigo, Cadix and El Ferrol if Spain had joined forces with the Axis Powers. Well, gentlemen, the explosives for perpetrating that aggression were stored, at that date, in Gibraltar. This heavy mortgage on our security, which extends to pretended right of way through our home waters and our air space, strengthens the necessary character of the Spanish revendication over and above a just and honourable desire to see the integrity of our national territory restored.

As you are aware, the policy followed by the Spanish Government in connexion with this subject has consisted in attempting to negotiate the return of the Rock, on the basis of the just Resolutions of the United Nations, which England refuses to obey, taking refuge behind some pretended rights of the Gibraltar population. In face of this posture, which starts from a false basis, since Spain has always shown herself ready for realism and generosity towards the inhabitants of Gibraltar, there is nothing for it but to reply with what forms the basic argument of the current situation: there has been a return—only partially, it should be emphasized to the situation prescribed by Article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht. At the same time, an active policy is being followed in defence of our rights in the waters and airspace adjacent to the Rock, and the economic and social development of the Campo de Gibraltar is being spreaded up.

This does not mean that we adopt a hostile or negative attitude to that great European nation which is Great Britain. Further still, I am convinced that in our times a historical cycle has closed,—later for Britain than for Spain—namely that of our two countries' colonial and overseas expansion, in which our interests and policies were often opposed. Today, facing Europe, it seems to me possible and desirable for the British and Spaniards to meet again in the common task of achieving the unity of our Continent. As well, to find at the negotiation table, in calm conversation with patience and good faith, a final solution for the old dispute about Gibraltar may be agreed upon.

### REVISION OF REGIME OF MARINE SPACES

As you are aware, we are approaching a moment of great historical importance in regard to the rules governing marine space. On 16 December last, the United Nations General Assembly passed a Resolution, number 2750 C, convoking a Conference on Marine Law for 1973. This Conference will adopt Treaties on various points

of Marine Law which today are either unregulated or are governed by rules (especially the 1958 Geneva Conventions) which are deemed revisable in view of the fresh data arising out of scientific and technical advances. In the mandate which the aforesaid Resolution established for the Conference, together with the establishment of an international regime for the sea and ocean bottoms of the subsoil outside the limits of national jurisdiction, and of their precise definition, there is included, as a question connected with the foregoing subjects, the territorial sea, adding in parenthesis "including its width and the question of the international straits." However, this inclusion, though in a minor tone and almost accessory, of the straits, is the result of a strong, I would even say a tremendous pressure from the super-powers.

One of the international straits that do not enjoy a special regime, and the most important in tonnage of traffic which passes through it, and for its strategic value, is the Strait of Gibraltar. To obtain the maximum freedom of passage through the Strait of Gibraltar is an essential priority objective of both the United States and the U. S. S. R. To get an idea of how and to what extent a modification of the international legal regime of the Straits can affect our interests, I must very briefly refer to the present legal situation and try to assess its scope and efficacy realistically.

The 1958 Geneva Convention on the territorial sea includes a rule of general International Law when regulating, in its 14th article, innocent passage through territorial waters. This is a universally accepted rule, so that it can be invoked by any State, whether it has adhered to the Convention or not.

This rule applies to the straits that are covered by the territorial waters of one or more States, when used for international sailing from or into the high sea, as in the case of Gibraltar, and it establishes freedom of passage when this is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. To this it is added that submarines must in all cases sail on the surface. Again, the coastal State may forbid flights over its jurisdictional waters, and take any necessary steps to prevent any passages other than innocent ones;

In accordance with the six mile rule, which Spain maintains to the present day, or that of twelve miles which is followed by the Arab countries and the U. S. S. R., the Strait of Gibraltar is included in the territorial waters of one or the other coastal State for a distance of ten miles in the East-West direction, which would be extended to thirty-three if Spain extended her territorial waters

to twelve miles. The United States, as you are aware, have hitherto followed the three mile rule, among other reasons, precisely in order to increase the area of free sea without limitations, and in accordance with that rule, it would be possible to maintain that a canal of free sea exists in the middle of the Strait of Gibraltar. However, the 12 mile rule is today followed by over thirty States, whereas only twenty six followed the three mile rule until 1969.

The qualification of the passage as innocent or not, and the ban on overflight of jurisdictional waters, form a guarantee which has the value and scope that legal rules possess in this agitated period that we live in. But at any rate it is a minimal and unrenounceable safeguard. It is the international-law basis of our defence at what is perhaps the point of greatest strategic importance to Spain, and of the protection of our territory in a zone of such intense offshore traffic.

I took special care to point this out at the world forum of the United Nations General Assembly in my address of October 13th last. On that occasion I said that Spain feels vitally interested in all that may occur in the Strait, through it, or above it. On that account, I emphasized, "passage through the Strait of Gibraltar is bound to respect, as a minimum at all times and on all occasions, the peace, good order and security of Spain"; and when referring to the conditions with which a passage through the Strait must comply in order to be admissible, I deliberately chose the actual formula with which Article 14 of the Geneva Convention qualifies it as innocent.

However, since roughly two years ago, and in an intense and reiterated manner since last spring, a veritable diplomatic action has been set afoot, intended to replace the current international code in force for passages through international straits by another code designed to grant greater freedom to navigation and overflight, and hence to restrict the rights of the coastal States.

For example, the United States sounded various countries, including Spain, about their attitude towards the convoking of an international Conference (in the first American idea, not necessarily in the framework of the United Nations) on three points of Marine Law which in their view needed reforming. The first was the adoption of a twelve-mile limit with universal application; the second—the need for which they coupled with the foregoing one—was a fresh regulation of passage through the Straits; and the last was the granting of certain fishing rights to coastal States outside their own jurisdictional waters.

Significantly, the American proposal was followed by a Soviet one drafted in almost identical terms, which was then transmitted to us by our Delegation in the United Nations; and lastly by a British proposal, also in the same terms.

The diplomatic attitude of the super-powers seems clear and answers to interests to which they give priority in their external action. Again, the granting of special fishing rights to coastal States is intended to satisfy interests of the developing countries, whose maximal attitudes, expressed at the Montevideo and Lima Conferences, regarding the width of territorial waters, are known to you. The United States are prepared to line up with the Soviet Union and the majority of other States on the 12-mile rule, but the compensation is support for their thesis of freedom of passage through straits, which in the first American draft was concentrated upon the creation of a number of "channels of free sea in straits", and in the second draft proceeds by assimilating international straits to the high sea, as regards navigation and overflight.

During the last United Nations Assembly the debates on marine subjects were the most long-drawn-out and deepest, for they displayed the exceedingly complex interweaving of the interests of all the groups and of each country. It has repeatedly been said in New York that we are facing a real dividing up of waters, a "scramble for the sea" equivalent to the one that occurred in the 19th century for the overseas territories, especially those in Africa. My view is that unlike what occurred in the past, there should be no dividing-up, but a just harmonizing of the interests of all peoples.

As from now, the Spanish Government, and not merely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should examine all the hypotheses, prepare all such positions as may allow of the best defence of our legitimate interests in the Strait. In this task, an exceptional part is to be played by the Armed Forces, through their appropriate organs and services.

## RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Perhaps this may be the moment, now that I have expressed my ideas on the question of Gibraltar and the Strait, to make some observations on the nature and scope of the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation with the United States in the matter of defence.

The years that have elapsed since the first enunciation of a defence relationship with the powerful American nation, and the

change in circumstances both internal and external, have altered the premisses on which that relationship was based. In 1953 there was added to the purely military factors the need to possess a political support for a partly isolated Spain; in addition, the cold war had a pressing character which has subsequently been fading out.

Today the situation is different, and the strengthening of our national entity has been accompanied by an intensification of our ties with other countries, proportionately greater with those that coincide with our appreciation of the same basic values. During the days that I have just spent in Washington, accompanying T. R. H. the Prince and Princess of Spain, I have been able to observe, and I think the whole Spanish nation will also have observed, through the press and television, the warmth of friendship and the sincerity and good wishes with which the Spain of today and the future is regarded in the United States.

In this line, it seems to me that in the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, it will be necessary to emphasize the two following as the chief characteristics which distinguish it from the Agreements of 1953.

1.— Its content is much ampler, and is not confined to the need to face immediate circumstances, but consecrates a relation of friendship, which is reflected in a wide range of possibilities for cooperation in the technical, cultural and economic fields.

2.— Strictly in the defence aspect, the collaboration between the two countries is established under the sign of equality, not, of course, in the contributions, which are materially different, but in the legal commitments and the political spirit which inspires us.

Not long ago I had occasion to explain to our Cortes, in reply to a member's question, something that it might perhaps be appropriate to insist upon from this most authoritative platform. The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation with the United States not only represents the title whereby the United States are empowered to use a number of defence facilities in Spain, but also, starting from the principle that the security and integrity of each country affects the other, it establishes a system of institutions, rules and obligations for harmonizing the respective defence policies in areas of mutual interest and for providing mutual defensive support.

It is true that the 1970 Agreement does not contain any irrevocable commitment of a political nature, and that both Spain and the United States are left free to take any decisions that they

may deem appropriate in their foreign policy. In the event of a threat or external attack against the security of the West, the United States need our Government's consent regarding the moment and the mode of using the facilities which are granted to them at certain military installations.

Again, the presence of their forces on our soil, and their connexion with the Spanish defence mechanism, create a *de facto* solidarity which has enormous value at the moment of the actual decisions. All this seems to me correct, and a useful achievement of our foreign policy. A merely legal guarantee would serve no purpose without coincidence of interests and without mutual convenience, which are the sole realities that ensure effectual support. This mutual convenience exists, and the effectiveness of the United States defence policy in Europe, and our own cooperation for defence, constitute a very strong guarantee for Spain.

Recognizing this fact, the Agreement itself envisages our defence collaboration with the security arrangements in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, the task which at present faces us.

It is now incumbent on us, and very specially on the Armed Forces, to ensure full compliance with what has been agreed on, and to create the doctrine and develop the activity which will give life to this institutional and normative complex, in which we participate voluntarily, since we consider that it serves the national interests, and through our sense of responsibility towards the international community.

### THE NEAR EAST

If for us the Strait of Gibraltar forms the defensive key to security in the western Mediterranean, which is vital to our country, at the other end of the same sea, in the Near East, the long and bitter Arab-Israeli conflict has altered the strategic and political conditions of the preceding historical stage and continues to affect all questions of world peace.

In this area there is at present developing one of the culminating episodes in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, in which a part is played by both the interest of strengthening their respective positions of power and ideology, the region's wealth in petroleum, and its character of being the passage to the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia, without forgetting the perfecting of new weapons.

The present stagnation of the Arab-Israeli struggle, in a situation



close to warfare but to actually reaching it, produces two effects of interest to the Great Powers: for the United States it implies the continued closure of the Suez Canal, thus hampering Soviet expansion; for the U. S. S. R. it assures the exploitation of a situation of discontent among the Arabs thus offering it a very propitious field for ideological penetration.

However, for the European and chiefly the Mediterranean countries, there are causes for concern in view of the menace implied by the danger of a large-scale military confrontation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The member countries of the Common Market are making efforts to collaborate with the two Great Powers in the framework of the United Nations, so as to furnish the bases for a solution of the conflict. In this sense, those countries have recently distributed the study on the various points in Resolution 242 of the Security Council, at a meeting held in Munich. France is going to deal with the study of the demilitarized zones; Italy with the question of Jerusalem; West Germany with the problem of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran; and finally Belgium and Holland with the problem of the Palestinians.

On the whole, the countries of the Third World are not directly involved in the problem; but, actuated sometimes by economic interests and at others by political pressure, they are mostly lining up with the Arab countries. Owing to the numerical value of these countries, Israel is meeting with a more and more hostile atmosphere at the UNO; this explains the interest of Tel Aviv to get the discussion of this subject taken away from that world organization, and in particular from the Security Council.

The attitude of Spain—a linear but flexible attitude, with one starting-point and one direction—is a function of two different orders of realities, namely that of our conditionings and that of our interests.

Our continued policy of friendship with the Arab countries, a fruitful policy and one that has become a constant factor for our diplomacy, should not be understood solely in sentimental, historical or cultural terms. It is a realistic policy, which is consistent with our past and in turn influences the problems derived from our geopolitical position in relation to the North of Africa. It is a policy which covers the whole spectrum of Arab diversity, friendly to both progressives and conservatives, and is characterized by our not taking part in their internal discussions. The Arabs have appreciated our conduct, and their fourteen votes at the United Nations are one of

our firmest supports in any question which does not involve any of themselves.

## ISRAEL

This Arab policy runs parallel to our policy with Israel, our non-recognition of Israel as a State. It is parallel, but nevertheless it is not the same policy. The non-recognition of Israel was originally the responsibility of the Israelis themselves, who refused to inform us of their proclamation as a State in 1948, and one of whose first acts at the U. N. O., on 16 May 1949, was to attack us through the lips of Abba Eban himself. Later, they several times opposed our entry into that international organization.

This attitude has changed, and now it is Israel that would like to have relations with us. It is evident that, without harbouring anti-Jewish feelings, we are paying a high price with our present status, for example in information and financial circles. Nevertheless, the recognition of Israel by Spain at the present time, without the concurrence of other circumstances, would on the whole have a repercussion unfavourable to the cause of peace.

Our support of the Arabs is important—we have had to make great efforts to extract several resolutions in their favour in the Security Council—, and it is an advanced support, in which we sometimes go further than many Arab countries do—the subject of Palestine may be a good example—. Yet that support does not imply any animosity to the Jews or to Israel. The latter I had occasion to say so at a press conference in Cairo itself. One proof of this is the very considerable but discreet work that we are doing on behalf of the Jews held in the Arab countries at war with Israel, a piece of work that is rendered possible by our good relations with the Arabs.

Though the Arabs—and when I say the Arabs I am chiefly referring to the belligerents—seem little desirous of an intervention of ours with Israel, they do on the other hand frequently ask for our approach to the United States and our joint action with France and Italy in a common front.

For some time we have been working for a better understanding between the United States and the Arabs. As you are aware, our Ambassador in Cairo represents American interests there. The Egyptians, by reason of their leadership and greater manoeuvring capacity, are our chief interlocutors in this task of peace.

The visit of Minister Riad to Madrid in September, in connection with President Nixon's impending trip to Spain, falls within this

line. During the Egyptian Minister's stay, we kept in constant touch with Washington, Rogers and Roid exchanged their points of view through us. These were dramatic circumstances, and I believe that if Egyptians did not then break their moorings, but consented to go on trusting the westerners, it was partly due to our efforts.

I should also to remind you that as soon as Minister Riad arrived in New York for the last General Assembly of the United Nations, he had an interview with me in order to ascertain my envisagement of the situation. During my long stay in that city I was able to work thoroughly on this problem, and I think that Spain contributed a good deal towards getting the continuance of the cease-fire accepted.

## EUROPE

Spain is a European power by her situation and history. Allow me here to quote, with respect and emotion, the fine words recently spoken by President Pompidou about our country, "I have been brought up to esteem the Spanish nation, one of the the greatest, most illustrious and noble in Europe."

I wish to assure that great French gentleman and statesman that we Spaniards thank him for this feeling of his at its true worth, and that the Spanish Government, and it has affirmed on repeated occasions, is resolved to promote the increasing integration of our country into our Continent.

## THE GERMAN QUESTION

No all-round consideration of the problems of Europe can evade, as its starting-point, those which arise in its central geographical nucleus, and specifically the division of Germany, the occupation of Berlin, and the relations of the three German territorial elements with the other countries, both the western ones and those of Eastern Europe.

I will not weary you with an account of historical events with which you are perfectly acquainted. Suffice it to say that the preamble to the Fundamental Law of the German Federal Republic, promulgated at Bonn on 8 May 1949, defines what was to be an inflexible attitude of the Federal Republic for many years, as many as there when the Christian-Democratic Union Party was in power, that is, until the end of 1959. In that text, the Germans of Bonn declare that they have also acted on behalf of those Germans who are forbidden to collaborate in the drafting of a Constitution, and urge

the German people as a whole to put into effect, by free self-determination, the unity and freedom of Germany.

An inevitable corollary of this premiss will be the so-called "Hallstein Doctrine", according to which, any country that renewed relations with the German Democratic Republic would inevitably break them with Bonn; Berlin is one more "Land" among the many which compose the Federal Republic, and hence there should exist, between the former capital and Bonn, the same functional and organic bonds as between the rest of the Federated States and the federal capital; the frontier alterations arising out of the Second World War cannot be regarded as final until the signature of a Peace Treaty with the four victorious allied powers which occupy the German nation.

During the years that have passed since then, the Social-Democratic Party has been changing its status of a mere belligerent in the social-economic order, devoted to exclusively internal questions and working-class revendications, to enter fully into the battle of pan-German and external politics.

When the social-democrats eventually came to power in December 1966, in coalition with the Christian-Democrats, and their visible head, Willy Brandt, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, the "Ostpolitik" began, on the basis that it was necessary to accept a series of facts and to find a mode of coexistence with the German Democratic Republic, a formula of settlement with the Soviet Union and a solution, even if only provisional one, of the frontier problems. Though the question of Berlin legally belongs to the Allies, the functional and organic ties that have been growing up between the old capital and Bonn are to be maintained at all costs.

Such ideas have been gaining ground in public opinion, and in the parliamentary elections of 23 September 1969 the Social-Democratic party obtained 42.7 percent of the votes and formed a coalition Government with the Liberal Party. Despite a very small Parliamentary majority, Brandt and Scheel decide to put into practice, in all fulness, their conception of "Ostpolitik" and of the pan-German problems. Mr. Brandt was aware of being the only western interlocutor accepted by the East, among other things because this is expressly stated in the final Communiqué of the Warsaw Pact Meeting of 4 December 1969.

Its action develops in three directions :

1. Relations between the two Germanies.—Germany is divided into "two States", which have to maintain "special relations", but

without the German Federal Republic's recognizing the German Democratic Republic internationally, or renouncing the right of self-determination for all Germans either. The unity of German nation is still one of Bonn's primary objectives, which does not mean that there is no need to get out of the present stagnation. To that end, it offers to negotiate with the communists at ministerial level about all the questions pending.

This new attitude of Bonn implies, first, abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine, and secondly, the opening of a process that might lead to complete recognition of the German Federal Republic by the German Democratic Republic and *vice versa*.

2. Berlin.—The Bonn Government is following with special interest the present initiative of the three western Powers to achieve conversations with the Soviet Union, in order to improve the position of the Berlin population.

3. "Ostpolitik".—Though a rapid advance on the path of European relaxation is not easy, there is a disposition to solve the questions pending with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and to conclude with other communist States a declaration of renunciation of the use of force.

The recognition of "two States within the German Nation" signifies a flat no to the pretensions of a third State, or a free city—Berlin—within the German Nation in accordance with the aspirations of the German Democratic Republic and Moscow; but on the other side there would be possibility of some relations "suigeneris" between the two Germanies and hope of the stabler peace for all, in recognizing that "the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany", or the still more artificial description of "Mitteldeutschland", had disappeared in order to admit a reality which henceforth would be denoted by the initial R. D. A.

Accordingly, this policy of temporary arrangement that would help the cohesion of the German people, implies, despite all reservations, acknowledging the existence of the German Democratic Republic. Yet for Bonn at the present time, the special nature of German internal relations excludes a recognition, in international law, of the German Democratic Republic. Its attitude towards the latter's international relations essentially depends on whether East Berlin will favourably receive its efforts for an ordered modernization. If that were achieved, it would also exert the appropriate effect in the international field.

However—and this I would specially emphasize—Federal Germ-

any has no objection whatever to contacts with the German Democratic Republic in the commercial and cultural spheres, through its awareness that it must not diminish the advantages which they imply for its fellow-countrymen or for third-party countries.

### SPANISH ATTITUDE ON GERMANY

I have dwelt at some length the evolution of the governmental theses of the German Federal Republic because Spain has loyally supported them, as befits the good relations that have always existed between our two Governments. Contacts between Spain and the German Democratic Republic have been hitherto confined to a mere agreement on inter-bank payments, between the I. E. M. E. and the "Deutsche Notenbank" of Berlin, signed on 21 October 1966; and to the obligatory sporting contacts derived from official calendars. Thus, from 1963 to 1965, this Department received three Notes Verbales from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic opposing the creation of the N. A. T. O. multilateral atomic force. None of these was replied to. On the other hand last August we did not receive the petition which the German Democratic Republic addressed to a series of European countries requesting the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Yet even with every precaution that the case demands, a revision of our attitude is necessary. Perhaps not yet in the political sphere, but certainly in the economic, and based, like the whole of Spain's so-called opening to the East, on pure realities.

It is advisable not to forget the privileged economic position of East Germany, since inter-German trade, being regarded as inter-zonal, is duty-free. On this account, East Germany has been described with some justice as "the seventh country of the Common Market". Thanks to this, it has attained one of the three first places in Europe as regards degree of industrial development, and offers us, and any other country, a vast commercial attraction. I think we may omit the aid of the statistical data.

The possibility that a "modus vivendi" between the two Germanies may be reached does not seem an unattainable fantasy. Moscow, Prague and even Budapest, greatly impressed by, and interested in the economic power of the German Federal Republic, work to explore all the possibilities of Bonn's new policy. Practical results have already been recorded: the German-Soviet Agreement on renunciation of force, signed on August 12 last, with very specific references to the frontier questions, opens up certain hopes for a

new continental security system, for which it could serve as an interesting precedent; the German - Polish Agreement, elucidating the serious dispute about the Oder-Neisse frontier; and the current negotiations with Prague for the same purpose.

It is true that the direct conversations between the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic do not at first sight seem to be going well, and that the Statute of Berlin is a question which in practice eludes the initiative of Bonn. Here it is necessary to rely, much more than in the previous negotiations, on the physical and legal presence of British, French and Americans, besides the *fait accompli* of a wall which divides the city into two parts.

In principle, Bonn's present "Ostpolitik" and pan-German policy has the assent of the NATO or at least that of the three western occupying Powers, because otherwise it would not have existed nor would it be possible. Nevertheless, at the meeting of spring 1970 in Rome, the NATO considered that not enough progress had been made in the German question to allow of proceeding to a stage of negotiation about the future European order. Later, undeniable substantial advances have been achieved, such as the German-Russian and German-Polish Agreement. Hence the NATO decided at its meeting in Brussels last December, that the question should be made subject to a tangible advance in the present quadripartite conversations about Berlin.

Thus we see that in the former German capital there lies the possibility that the Central-European and even the continental problem may be starting to move towards a solution after a quarter century of immobility, based on the highly perilous and unstable equilibrium of terror. Hence I believe that it is desirable, as hitherto, to give a margin of confidence and support to the present theses of the German Federal Republic in the political order, with the interesting possibilities of modification in the economic order that those theses themselves offer and to which we have already referred.

## EUROPEAN SECURITY

The problem of Berlin, that of the German frontiers, in a word, the question of Central Europe and its solutions, together with the reduction of forces, conditions the possibility of achieving a fresh European order, a fresh system of continental security.

Even recognizing that this is so, out of elementary realism we have always maintained a positive attitude towards the convocation

of a European Security Conference. It is clear that the subjects to be discussed are numerous and broad, and that accordingly no partial aspect of them must be made a condition "sine quanon" for such a Conference. The conference must be eminently political and held at the highest level, and may well be envisaged as the origin of a series of Conferences, and even as the germ of a more permanent organ. Its aspiration should be to give the principles that are to govern European life an identical interpretation of all, and one to which all consent. It is an error to suppose that disarmament, even if only partial, can be effective without having previously established a balanced and just continental political order to provide it with its vital reasons.

On the other hand, Spain records the fact that plans for reduction of forces and for disarmament have been hitherto confined to the geographical zone of central Europe, with total oblivion of the perilous superabundance of armaments in the Mediterranean. She rightly thinks that if a reduction of forces in Central Europe were attained, this might result in an increase of military pressure in the periphery of the Continent and more especially in the Mediterranean area. She observes with anxiety that the NATO communiques pay very little attention to the growing tension in our ancient sea, and this would be one more among the many motives which from the outset have inclined our country to declare itself ready and willing to take part in the projected European Security Conference which, in our view, ought to be held as soon as possible. We have spared no effort to point out to all the countries of the Continent, both eastern and western which are uncommitted, that we desire to be present in the future pan-European order, and to contribute our best efforts.

The Conference should be genuinely multilateral and should not turn into a dialogue between one bloc and the other. I think the ghost of bipolarity has too long been projected upon international relations, and with paralysing effects; and I also believe that the present leaders of the Great Powers, and especially of the United States, have become aware of this defect and are trying to correct it. Each country should contribute to such a Conference, as it does to other institutions of international life, its own viewpoint, a definition of its interests, the inimitable contribution of its own personality. This does not mean, in our case, that Spain should not go to the European Security Conference with her ideas and opinions previously contrasted with those of other countries of the western



world, to which she belongs for reasons of every kind.

In any case, in this aspect of reduction of forces in Central Europe, it seems too much to hope for speedy any final solution from a European Security Conference. To begin with, quite likely it will only be possible to arrive to an agreement in the fundamental question of whether the actual principle of reduction of forces is to be admitted, while leaving to a later series of Conferences, or to an organ created *ad hoc* the development and putting into practice of the principle approved.

On this subject as in many others, and with a unitary view of the high responsibilities that we share, my Department offers itself unconditionally to the Armed Forces and the General Staff, from whom, at the same time, it hopes to go on receiving the inestimable aid which has always been given to it, and for which I take this opportunity of publicly returning thanks.

### ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

If security is one pillar of the construction of Europe, the other is economic and social development, whose apex is the political. The chief reality of Europe today is the Common Market, or European Economic Community, and to this I will devote a few minutes.

As you are aware, on June 29 last I signed on behalf of the Spanish Government a commercial agreement with the E. E. C., which places Spain in a preferential situation in regard to that organization and the countries composing it, and which I have on previous occasions described as the first, irreversible step in Spain's progressive integration into the European Continent.

The basic object of our Agreement with the E. E. C.—progressive elimination of the obstacles to trade—will be attained, as is specified in article I, in two stages, the first of which will last six years. This six-year period, let it be carefully noted, applies to the first stage only, and not—as at times has been mistakenly thought—to the Agreement *in bloc*; the latter, is of unlimited duration.

At the end of the first period a large number of obstacles to trade will be abolished, especially in respect of the E. E. C. This, however, does not exclude of possibility and desirability that even in the course of it there may be enrichments of the dispositions and of the mutually agreed advantages, which would be, in short, tantamount to speeding up the achievement of the content scheduled for the said period.

In this respect, it is desirable to stress the idea that the Agreement

as a whole, and its first stage in particular, are something dynamic and capable of improvement both internally and externally. Good evidence of this is the extension of the already important concessions made by the Community regarding imports of Spanish wines contemplated in the Agreement, an extension which is now well on the way to achievement. The same can be said of the foreseeable broadening, previously negotiated, of the concessions offered by the Community in fishing, motivated by the appearance of the new community regulations.

Again, it should not be forgotten that the broadening of the Common Market, with the admission of Great Britain and other candidate countries, will imply the need to proceed to partial renegotiation of the Agreement, to suit the fresh situation that has arisen.

At the end of the second stage the basic objective of the Agreement will have been attained, namely the abolition of obstacles to trade, an objective which will have to be devised in the form of a free-trade area or a customs union, as the stage previous to full incorporation in the Community.

It is clear that even at this first pre-integrative moment a solidarity of interests is being created between the Parties, and one in which the E. E. C.—desirous of possessing a market of large importing capacity and a solvent member—such as Spain—embarked on a growing process of development, which she seeks to canalize within an extensive scale economy—find themselves obliged to improve mutually. To tread this road side by side is tantamount to entering fully into a number of community mechanisms which are operating, to accepting number of regulations already adopted by the Six in their market relations. It is logical, that this in itself implies a certain harmonization of the respective economic policies.

But the fact is also, as I have already said, that integration is a dynamic, progressive process: the first of its objective having been attained—namely elimination of obstacles to trade—, there will necessarily ensue a second moment, namely that of free circulation of the productive factors and the harmonization of the policies connected with this free circulation. This second moment, in turn, will be its own dynamism give rise to that of full economic integration. Thus the existing Agreement is the first of these moments, the one that starts up the integration process, the starting-point of Spain's accession to the status of full member, a path which lies open to her by the general principle of article 237 of the Treaty of Rome

and by virtue of her European vocation, as has been reiterated in the act of signing the agreement.

However, for the process described to develop fully and efficiently, its actual dynamics demands awareness of the fact that Spain's economic policy in the next few years must bear in mind the objective of integration, through her convergence towards the community's policy, with all the renovation and modernization of her structures that this involves.

The Spanish business man, for his part, must not forget that the present limited and uneven mutual concessions—a lack of balance caused by the differences in the respective levels of development—are measures of economic policy, which are destined, through a careful progressive increase of foreign competition, to reinforce a substantial improvement of our competitive positions, failing which we could not efficiently exploit the opportunities offered to us by the great market of the new Europe.

Lastly, it is necessary for this new mentality regarding the purely economic postulates of European integration to extend equally to the actual fact of its existence as a sociological and political phenomenon of our time and to achieve its specific character as a long-range dynamic process.

### THE UNITED NATIONS

As the final part of these remarks today, I will now lay before you some observations on the United Nations as a field of action for our diplomacy.

The fact that Spain, condemned in 1946, has been the national which presided in 1970, at the first periodic meeting of the Security Council held in twenty-five years, as the culmination of the event commemorating the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the U. N. O., gives an idea of the distance covered and the use made of those initial possibilities.

Why has the context of the United Nations proved favourable to Spain?

On October 15th last year, in the general debate of the Assembly, I affirmed: "Spain, which is and always has been a crossroad of geographical, cultural and historical routes, can serve as common ground on which many viewpoints, many conflicting situations, meet and find their synthesis."

To this geopolitical situation, and to the diplomatic will to exploit it, we owe the fact of having succeeded, starting from an origi-

nal opposition, in occupying a post of solid prestige which has opened up to our country some interesting possibilities of action at the United Nations. This, its just to indicate here, is due to the clear-sightedness and special dedication to foreign policy of H. E. the Head of the State, to the intelligence and tenacity of my predecessors Martin Artajo and Castiella, and to systematic and devoted work of our Ambassadors, all of them exceptional men— Ericc, Lequerica, Aznar, Pinies— at the Organization.

Spain, through her geopolitical situation, her understanding of the new countries which are emerging into international life with recently achieved independence, her good faith in complying with her duties and acceptance of her responsibilities towards the territories that she had or still has under her administration, has gained a prestige and number of friendships in this environment which allow her the broadest collaboration.

It is our intention to support, at the Organization, all initiatives that are aimed at achieving and maintaining peace in the world, and are based on the principle of justice and equality of opportunities for all peoples, while collaborating with all the regional groups, without losing our legitimate freedom of action.

## DEVELOPMENT

In this future prospect, if the decade of the 'sixties was under the sign of decolonization, that of the seventies will undoubtedly be characterized by development, and perhaps to some extent, disarmament.

On completing a quarter-century of existence, the General Assembly of the UNO approved an important document. *The International Strategy of Development*, which will serve as a guide for Development in the Second Decade of the United Nations. From 1971 to 1980, this document will be the code of behaviour inspiring the economic development policy of the 127 member countries, plus two others which are not members of the organization but carry great weight, West Germany and Switzerland and doubtless, of others which may be added. Its principles, moreover, have been endorsed by the spiritual authority of the Vatican.

Here again Spain, through her situation as a developing country and her spiritual proximity to Latin-America and the Arab countries, can be equidistant from both, understand both the longings and demands of the underdeveloped, and the caution and prudence of the highly industrialized. It is needless to describe the most impor-

last part that our country can play in this task of approach and comprehension.

It is also well to note the aid lent by the United Nations to Spanish development, though Spain is obviously not a country of the Third World, but a country in full "take-off", which has attained the highest economic growth rate, after Japan, among the Member States of the OECD. Everyone is aware of the impulse of our industrialization, the transformation of an almost entirely agrarian economic structure, the stability of the currency and the volume of foreign-exchange reserves, etc. This growth implies fresh international responsibilities; however, aid from the United Nations is very useful in some sectors which have not followed the general rate of expansion, and has a remarkable multiplying effect, since it is channelled into opportunities of obtaining the assessorship of experts of international repute, as well as for sending out specialists to complete their preparation at foreign centres.

### DISARMAMENT

Finally, a few words on disarmament activities in the United Nations. What is disarmament, and how far does it affect us?

Disarmament is an objective, a goal, or in some people's eyes, a utopia. But at the same time it constitutes today an increasing state of awareness which steadily extends and deepens, to the point at which the very countries responsible for the armaments race make real efforts to justify their military expenditure in the eyes of the public.

The vertiginous armaments race of the last twenty-five years occurred as a result of a spiral of distrust. From 1961 to 1969, perhaps the years when the need to allot great resources for solving the problems of large areas of the world became most evident, over 3,000 million dollars were earmarked for warlike purposes, 80 per cent for which was spent by only half a dozen countries; the growth rate of military expenditure down to 1968 was of the order of 20 per cent per year. It is true that the presence of these unusual greater minglings and tensions, but it is equally true that apart from economic reasons perhaps exaggerated in some cases, fear and distrust are the spur which have truly impelled the arms race. Accordingly, in face of this vicious circle, let us trust more in an atmosphere of confidence than in the adoption of partial disarmament measures, even if an attempt should be made to justify their adoption by describing them as "confidence-builders".

In 1969 there suddenly emerged a brand-new statistical item: for the first time, world military expenditure was halted, and the experts have forecast for the year just concluded—I am not yet in possession of the final figures—a drop of 2 per cent. The decade of disarmament, as it has been called, has opened hopefully.

In this context a series of efforts are developing at present. Some are openly aimed at disarmament, such as the debates in the 1st Commission of the General Assembly and the Disarmament Conference of Geneva, and the Russo-U. S. conversations of Helsinki and Vienna for the limitation of strategic weapons. Others, of indirect character but no less important, are the talks about the German problem, the mission of Ambassador Jarring in the Middle East, and the project for a European Security Conference.

Supporting, as we do, the multilateral efforts on this subject, I am bound to refer to the reservations aroused in us by the two texts which have been given most publicity as concrete disarmament measures, namely the Treaty on Non-Proliferation and the Treaty on Denuclearization of the Sea Beds, which have just been approved by the United Nations General Assembly with Spain's vote in favour.

As you are aware, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which came into force on May 5 last when it was ratified by 43 States, is based on the nuclear powers' undertaking not to transfer or grant weapons of this type to third-party countries, with the control and vigilance laid down in the Treaty falling solely upon such third parties.

Is Spain bound to adhere to this Treaty, which, to be sure, has not been signed by two of the five atomic powers? The subject is still being examined at this moment. We have objections based on equity, above all, respect for the powers with medium nuclear technology, as well as on the guarantees needed for our own security, and on the fact that only the non-atomic countries are subjected to vigilance. If there are countries such as France, Israël, India, Brazil and Argentina among others, which have not yet taken a decision, it is not strange that Spain, on whose periphery atomic weapons of other countries can be found at any moment, should take a suitable time to make up her mind.

The Treaty on De-nuclearization of the sea bed presents parallel problems in a certain sense. It will be interesting to observe, in function of the international climate, how much time will elapse before it comes into force after being ratified by the 22 countries required by its text.

In fact, this Treaty plays with two elements: An undertaking not to situate atomic weapons on the sea bottom—which cannot affect us as active subjects in a foreseeable future—and a wide possibility of inspection, a thing only permissible to the powers possessing great technical development. In other words, this Treaty implies, for the countries of medium development, a prohibition against placing on the sea bed weapons that they do not possess, in return for recognizing third-parties' right to inspect the adjacent underwater areas.

Thus its significance seems reduced to symbolic value in the desired advance to disarmament, and in this sense Spain had no hesitation in giving her affirmative vote at the General Assembly together with the great majority of the members of the Organization, before the moment of deciding upon her signature had yet arrived.

The application of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation is entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency with headquarters in Vienna. Though we have not signed this treaty, we take part, as other countries do, in the very intense meetings that are held by the various OIEA bodies to study the modalities of nuclear control. Our position in this respect is very unusual, considering the fact that our country is one of those which present the clearest and most positive balance-sheet in respect of the use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful purposes.

There are two revealing facts which prove our attitude and explain the international respect it arouses. The first is that as we now have a research centre of international status, the Nuclear Energy Board, our scientific efforts have been strictly polarized on peaceful uses, and we admit inspection of our atomic power stations in such a way that both before and after the signature of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation we have been, after Japan, the country which proportionally most respects what is denoted "system of safeguards". Our frontiers are wide open to the teams of inspectors regularly sent by 'IAEA' and not the least infringement is ever found. Secondly, Spain is advancing very rapidly in producing electricity of nuclear origin, and may quite possibly occupy 6th place in the world during the present decade, after the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the German Federal Republic. This gives us increasing international importance which justifies our fruitful decisions to renounce all participation in the atomic armaments race and to concentrate on the authentic key to the future: peaceful progress.

So clear-cut is our attitude that during 1970, a most significant event occurred in the IAEA: though Spain is not a signatory

country of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation, the person actually appointed Director of the Service of Safeguards (which deals with the international inspection for preventing proliferation of atomic weapons) is a Spanish technician; no further words are needed to reveal the credit which our country's constructive pacifism deserves.

You have had the patience to follow me thus far, and I do not wish to strain it further. Quite a number of external problems of our policy, and quite a number of aspects of interest and importance for our international relations have been left undiscussed.

### PORTUGAL

But among them I must at least mention, though I cannot here analyse, our relations with Portugal and Latin-America, which are always an object of preferential attention. Just over a month ago I paid an official visit to Lisbon, where I was received by Admiral Thoamas, the President of the Republic, and Dr. Marcello Caetano, President of the Council of Ministers, and where I held long and intimate conversations with his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Rui Patricio. The atmosphere of this visit, and its results, could not have been more satisfactory. In Portugal it is impossible to feel oneself a foreigner; all the paths of reasons and feeling lead necessarily to an ever closer Hispano-Portuguese collaboration, within the strictest respect for our separate national identities.

Accordingly, besides the exchanges of views which were of high political interest, I regard as most valuable the decision we arrived at, to put into operation immediately the study on the institutional organization of our economic relations, bearing in mind the situation of both countries in respect of the Common Market, in which our own position is already decided and that of Portugal is in course of negotiation. I think that this opens up a line of action which will be of the greatest importance for the future of both peoples.

### HISPANO-AMERICA

As regards Latin-America, it is our desire to devote preferential attention to it in 1971, which is altogether due, owing to the special ties that unite us to those countries, whose importance in the world is increasing day by day. You may be aware that I propose to visit each and all of them in the course of the year; let this announcement suffice for now, and I am prepared, if you desire it, to return to the subject later and to comment with you on the result of those visits.



FOREIGN POLICY  
OF  
SWEDEN\*

\*As declared by the Swedish Institute, Stockholm, Sweden, August, 1971.

## BASIC MOTIVATIONS AND AIMS

Sweden's foreign policy of neutrality does not rest on international treaties and agreements nor is it supported by clauses in her Constitution. This policy is based on the conviction held by an overwhelming majority of Sweden, that it affords the most practical means for safeguarding the nation's vital interests. The tradition of neutrality has also firm roots among the Swedish people.

Swedish foreign policy is usually described as a policy of non-participation in alliances aiming at neutrality in the case of war between the major powers. This is the official formula which has been approved by all parties of the Swedish parliament. It is, however, generally recognized that this formula is by no means an exhaustive description of the aims and means of Swedish foreign policy. Neutrality as a legal concept is applicable only when a state of war is in existence. The danger that the present precarious balance between the major powers will be upset through acute political crises and will lead to armed conflicts is evident. It is therefore a basic aim of Swedish policy to try to contribute to diminishing such tension and to help within its modest means to further the cause of peace by being ready to assume mediation or conciliatory roles in international crises which are handled within or outside of the United Nations.

Sweden is a small country in terms of population, highly dependent on international trade and therefore on international stability and cooperation. It has enjoyed peace for about 150 years, during which time a stable and prosperous society has been created. With these traditions it is natural that a broad public opinion exists in favor of an active diplomacy to further peace and international cooperation.

Sweden's policy is, of course, also in the direct national interest of the country. Political tension in the Nordic area and in Europe as a whole has a direct impact upon Swedish security. Sweden therefore tries to promote understanding between the major powers here involved. The Nordic countries themselves have chosen different ways of assuring their national security. Finland pursues a neutral foreign policy with a special relationship to the Soviet Union. It is clearly in the interest of the Swedish Government that good relations exist between these two countries. Norway and Denmark belong to the Atlantic Pact but limit their participation so as to

exclude from their territory foreign bases and nuclear weapons. This also corresponds to Swedish national interests.

A further basic aim of Swedish foreign policy is the promotion of an expanding world economy and the general liberalization of world trade. A substantial amount of Sweden's national income is derived from exports, and she has built up a highly specialized industrial establishment. Her prosperity depends increasingly on the free flow of goods over national borders. Indirectly this is also bound up with Swedish efforts to diminish world tension, as the liberalization of trade and economic growth are seen as conducive to world peace. The Swedish Government has been anxious to further trade with the developing countries and to prevent all discrimination in trade relations with these parts of the world.

### SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS

While the policy of neutrality and a strong defence are the main instruments by which Sweden hopes to achieve her major foreign policy goals, there are certain other features that should also be mentioned in this connection. In order to safeguard her security and to play a conciliatory role in world affairs, Sweden needs a substantial amount of independence of action. It is thus not enough that she is not formally a member of any power bloc; Sweden must also avoid links and agreements that might make it difficult or impossible for her to uphold a neutral course in the case of war. This, of course, does in no way prevent the Swedish Government from expressing its opinion on important international issues.

Efforts to strengthen and further international cooperation and solidarity, primarily within the framework of the United Nations, have a strong support by the Swedish Government. A multitude of initiatives have been taken in this regard. Swedish military personnel has participated in several UN peace-keeping operations such as the Congo, Cyprus, the Middle East, etc. A voluntary United Nations task force has been set up in cooperation between the Nordic countries. Proposals have been submitted to further agreements on arms regulation and disarmament. Mediatorial roles have been assumed by Swedish diplomats in South East Asia and the Middle East. Efforts have been made to get development assistance channeled through the international organizations. An efficient world organization capable of guaranteeing peace and forestalling international conflicts by promoting equal political rights and equal economic opportunities among all nations and in-

dividuals would, of course, also constitute a powerful safeguard for all small states. Sweden is therefore interested in encouraging all measures aimed Nations.

Three recent trends in international politics have played a significant role in Sweden's foreign policy after the second world war, each of which will be given some consideration. They are, efforts for economic integration in Europe, the rise of new nations in Africa and Asia, and the arms race between the super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

### SWEDEN AND THE EEC

In line with her long tradition of a liberal trade policy, Sweden has taken an active part in the efforts to end the present division of Western Europe into two trade blocks — EEC and EFTA.

Almost three-quarters of Sweden's exports go to the countries of Western Europe. The most important task for Swedish trade policy today is to find such solutions to the country's future relations with the enlarged European Communities which would enable Sweden to take part in the future free exchange of goods and economic cooperation between all countries in Western Europe. It is also essential that the far-reaching cooperation between the Nordic countries can continue and be further developed within the framework of an overall arrangement in Western Europe.

Sweden's present negotiations with the EEC were opened in Brussels on November 10, 1970. On this occasion the Swedish Minister of Trade declared that Sweden wanted to participate in the enlargement of the EEC through comprehensive, close and durable relationships having regard to the policy of neutrality. This policy prevents Sweden from becoming a full member of the EEC but not from participating in economic cooperation in most of the fields covered by the Treaty of Rome.

For a more detailed description of Sweden's attitude to the EEC, see the fact sheet "Sweden and European Economic Integration", published in April 1971.

### SWEDEN AND THE NEW NATIONS

Another recent trend in international politics of great importance for Sweden's foreign policy is the emergence of the new nations in Asia and Africa. The obvious inclination of the African and Asian states to adopt an independent course of non-alignment is one of several factors which have led to a more positive understanding of a neutral position.

The basic aim in the developing parts of the world must be the growth of viable and stable societies. Sweden has therefore taken great interest in furthering the 'United Nations' assistance to these states — technical, economic, financial, and military, if necessary — which generally is preferred by the receiving states having no conditions attached. Furthermore, efforts are being made to expand rapidly the direct co-operation between Sweden and the developing countries to assist in the work for economic and Social growth.

### SWEDEN AND THE ARMS RACE

The arms race between East and West has prompted Sweden to take various diplomatic initiatives in the field of disarmament. In 1961, when the resumption of atmospheric nuclear tests appeared to rule out all progress towards achievement of a test-ban treaty, Sweden proposed that the non-nuclear powers join forces to break the deadlock. The main objective of the Swedish plan was to put pressure on the nuclear powers to check the arms race in this sphere and to prevent the further spread of atomic weapons. It called upon the UN Secretary-General to ask non-nuclear members to state on what conditions they would be prepared to refrain from the procurement and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

The above-mentioned plan dates from a time when the gulf between East and West was particularly wide and an initiative from the non-nuclear powers seemed justified.

During the 1962 negotiations the leading nuclear powers came closer to one another's views on the test-ban issue. One factor which broke the ice was improvement of the technical means for discovering atomic and thermonuclear test explosions. At this stage Sweden and several other non-aligned countries stepped in with compromise proposals designed to bridge over the remaining differences. The partial test-ban treaty agreed upon by the major nuclear powers during the summer of 1963 was made possible by a number of substantive factors of a political nature. There seems to be no doubt, however, that the agreement was facilitated by the patient work of the negotiators at the 18-nations conference in Geneva, where Sweden played an active role.

The disarmament conference has continued its work of arriving at limited agreements, mainly concerning nuclear weapons. Sweden persists in its efforts to step up this process and to make it more effective.